Law Commons^™

Religious Toleration And Claims Of Conscience, Kent Greenawalt

Faculty Scholarship

One aspect of the issue of toleration of religion is how far the government and others should recognize religious claims of conscience. Such claims will be present in any liberal democracy. The particular controversies on which attention is mainly focused shift, but certain underlying themes remain.

In this essay, I outline what I take to be the major issues about government recognition of religious claims of conscience. I then address the special problems created when a claim of conscience ends up competing with an opposing claim of conscience or with basic premises about fairness and justice. We can conceive of …

Statutes That Are Not Static – The Case Of The Apa, Peter L. Strauss

Faculty Scholarship

...[T]he lesson of the past two hundred years is that we will do well to be on our guard against all-purpose theoretical solutions to our problems. As lawyers we will do well to be on our guard against any suggestion that, through law, our society can be reformed, purified, or saved. The function of law, in a society like our own, is altogether more modest and less apocalyptic. It is to provide a mechanism for the settlement of disputes in the light of broadly conceived principles on whose soundness, it must be assumed, there is a general consensus among us. …

Illiberal Liberalism: Liberal Theology, Anti-Catholicism, & Church Property, Philip A. Hamburger

Faculty Scholarship

Liberalism has long been depicted as neutral and tolerant. Already in the eighteenth-century, when Englishmen and Americans began to develop modem conceptions of what they called "liberality," they characterized it as elevated above narrow interest and prejudice. Of course, liberality or what now is called "liberalism" can be difficult to define with precision, and there have been divergent, evolving versions of it. Nonetheless, liberalism has consistently been understood to transcend narrow self-interest or bigotry. Accordingly, many Americans have confidently believed in it as a neutral, tolerant, and even universalistic means of claiming freedom from the constraints of traditional and parochial …

What Is Punishment Imposed For?, George P. Fletcher

Faculty Scholarship

The institution of punishment invites a number of philosophical queries. Sometimes the question is: How do we know that inflicting discomfort and disadvantage is indeed punishment? This is a critical question, for example, in cases of deportation or disbarment proceedings. Classifying the sanction as punishment triggers application of the Sixth Amendment and its procedural guarantees. In other situations the question might be: Why do we punish? What is the purpose of making people suffer? In this context, we encounter the familiar debates about the conflicting appeal of retribution, general deterrence, special deterrence, and rehabilitation.

In this article I wish to …