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Full-Text Articles in Law
The Shaping Force Of Corporate Law In The New Economic Order, Jeffrey N. Gordon
The Shaping Force Of Corporate Law In The New Economic Order, Jeffrey N. Gordon
Faculty Scholarship
My topic for this Allen Chair lecture is the shaping force of corporate governance in the new economic order. It is easy to think of corporate law as an arcane field with mysterious terms and peculiar rules, ultimately of interest only to those who are prepared to bill at least 2000 hours a year to unravel its complexities. This is the view that there is a pointless mystery about shareholders, directors, common stocks, debentures, and the bizarre creature my class encountered recently, a convertible exchangeable cumulative preferred stock; and that ultimately corporate law and practice consists of the expert manipulation …
The Folklore Of Investor Capitalism, John C. Coffee Jr.
The Folklore Of Investor Capitalism, John C. Coffee Jr.
Faculty Scholarship
Ideally, Thurman Arnold should review this book. In his The Folklore of American Capitalism, Arnold dissected the ideology and rationalizations by which the business community of an earlier day defended its legitimacy and perquisites. Michael Useem, a sociologist at the Wharton School, also has an interest in the ideology of the business community: how corporate managers view the new institutional investors, how they justify resistance, and the tensions and inconsistencies between their critiques of money managers and their own behavior. This is an underutilized perspective (which law and economics inherently tends to overlook), and Useem is at his best …
Controlling Strategic Voting: Property Rule Or Liability Rule, Zohar Goshen
Controlling Strategic Voting: Property Rule Or Liability Rule, Zohar Goshen
Faculty Scholarship
Strategic voting – situations where voters place their votes according to their assessment of how other voters will behave rather than according to their actual preference – results in distorted decisionmaking. Strategic voting can cause the company to lose desired transactions and can also be used to coerce voters into accepting alternatives they would have otherwise rejected. An analysis of the various types of strategic voting situations which arise in corporate law demonstrates the author's argument that strategic voting is inherent in the voting mechanism, regardless of the type of group involved or of the decision being made. Maintaining a …