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Columbia Law School

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Common Law

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Full-Text Articles in Law

The New Public Nuisance: Illegitimate And Dysfunctional, Thomas W. Merrill Jan 2023

The New Public Nuisance: Illegitimate And Dysfunctional, Thomas W. Merrill

Faculty Scholarship

Leslie Kendrick’s defense of the new public nuisance fails to come to terms with legitimacy objections to such actions based on the rule of law and norms of democratic accountability. Nor is the new public nuisance a “second best” solution to widespread social problems. These actions rest on joint ventures between prosecutors and personal-injury lawyers that are likely to generate over- and under-deterrence and risk runaway liability.


Cardozo And Uncertainty In The Common Law, Shyamkrishna Balganesh Jan 2023

Cardozo And Uncertainty In The Common Law, Shyamkrishna Balganesh

Faculty Scholarship

Benjamin Cardozo’s The Nature of the Judicial Process is best understood as one of the most successful contributions to this category of work defending the common law on the basis of its process. In the book, Cardozo offers a spirited and principled defense of the judicial process, all in an effort to highlight the manner in which judges manage the seemingly pervasive uncertainty of the common law method in the discharge of their duties. All the same, it is obvious that he considered the project to be necessarily incomplete. Just a few years after the publication of the Judicial Process …


Relying On Restatements, Shyamkrishna Balganesh Jan 2022

Relying On Restatements, Shyamkrishna Balganesh

Faculty Scholarship

Restatements of the Law occupy a unique place in the Americanlegal system. For nearly a century, they have played a prominent and influential role as legal texts that courts routinely rely on in a wide variety of fields. Despite their ubiquitous and pervasive use by courts, Restatements are not formal sources of law. While they resemble statutes in their form and structure, Restatements are produced entirely by a private organization of experts set up to clarify and simplify the law and thus lack the force of law on their own. And yet, courts treat them as formal and authoritative sources …


Public Nuisance As Risk Regulation, Thomas W. Merrill Jan 2022

Public Nuisance As Risk Regulation, Thomas W. Merrill

Faculty Scholarship

Public nuisance has always been defined in terms of the object of protection – the community, the public, or perhaps even the state as a whole. Public nuisance in this regard has been juxtaposed to private nuisance, which protects individual persons and their use and enjoyment of land. Commentary on public nuisance has thus long been concerned with defining (without notable success) what it means to advance a public as opposed to a private right.

In this paper, I offer a different take on the function of public nuisance. The common law is designed to provide redress for actual harm, …


Restatements Of Statutory Law: The Curious Case Of The Restatement Of Copyright, Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Peter S. Menell Jan 2021

Restatements Of Statutory Law: The Curious Case Of The Restatement Of Copyright, Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Peter S. Menell

Faculty Scholarship

For nearly a century, the American Law Institute’s (ALI) Restatements of the Law have played an important role in the American legal system. And in all of this time, they refrained from restating areas of law dominated by a uniform statute despite the proliferation and growing importance of such statutes, especially at the federal level. This omission was deliberate and in recognition of the fundamentally different nature of the judicial role and of lawmaking in areas governed by detailed statutes compared to areas governed by the common law. Then in 2015, without much deliberation, the ALI embarked on the task …


The Supreme Court's Regulatory Takings Doctrine And The Perils Of Common Law Constitutionalism, Thomas W. Merrill Jan 2018

The Supreme Court's Regulatory Takings Doctrine And The Perils Of Common Law Constitutionalism, Thomas W. Merrill

Faculty Scholarship

My objective in this lecture is to take seriously the observation that constitutional law in the United States, as expounded by its Supreme Court, bears far more resemblance to common law than to textual interpretation. We live under a written Constitution. But the main body of that Constitution, including the first ten amendments we call the Bill of Rights, is very old, having been adopted nearly 230 years ago. As time marches on, judicial interpretations of this venerable text have piled up. Constitutional disputes today are almost always resolved by the courts applying this growing body of precedent. Constitutional law …


The Common Law Of Contract And The Default Rule Project, Alan Schwartz, Robert E. Scott Jan 2016

The Common Law Of Contract And The Default Rule Project, Alan Schwartz, Robert E. Scott

Faculty Scholarship

The common law developed over centuries a small set of default rules that courts have used to fill gaps in otherwise incomplete contracts between commercial parties. These rules can be applied almost independently of context: the market damages rule, for example, requires a court only to know the difference between market and contract prices. When parties in various sectors of the economy write sales contracts but leave terms blank, courts fill in the blanks with their own rules. As a consequence, a judicial rule that many parties accept must be "transcontextual": parties in varied commercial contexts accept the courts' rule …


Law Reform Agenda As Ali Approaches Its Centennial, Lance Liebman Jan 2014

Law Reform Agenda As Ali Approaches Its Centennial, Lance Liebman

Faculty Scholarship

The American Law Institute and I are happy and proud that the Brooklyn Law School and its Law Review chose to hold an important conference about ALI work, to persuade such an outstanding group of scholars to write such varied and interesting papers, and now to publish their work. I am especially happy because, as I near the end of my service as ALI Director, these papers give me an opportunity to reflect on the projects, perfect and imperfect, that the ALI accomplished (or attempted and failed to accomplish) in our effort to improve the American legal system.


The Role Of Unfair Competition In The Common Law, Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Gideon Parchomovsky Jan 2013

The Role Of Unfair Competition In The Common Law, Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Gideon Parchomovsky

Faculty Scholarship

Does the idea of “unfair competition” present the law with a viable alternative to thinking about the regulation of information and informational resources, independent of the traditional categories of the common law (e.g., property/tort) and the assumptions that these categories entail? In this chapter, we argue that, although the answer to that question is no, unfair competition nevertheless plays an important role in complementing the categories of property and torts as they apply to competitive settings. Specifically, unfair competition allows courts to both broaden and narrow the traditional notions of property and torts – especially as they apply to the …


Melms V. Pabst Brewing Co. And The Doctrine Of Waste In American Property Law, Thomas W. Merrill Jan 2011

Melms V. Pabst Brewing Co. And The Doctrine Of Waste In American Property Law, Thomas W. Merrill

Faculty Scholarship

Melms v. Pabst Brewing Co. may be the most important decision ever rendered by an American court concerning the law of waste. Unless your specialty is property law, that might not be enough to stir your interest. The doctrine of waste, after all, does not loom very large in public consciousness these days.

Nevertheless, waste has held a peculiar fascination for property theorists. The reason, I think, is that it touches directly on an important line of division in how we think about property. Does property exist primarily to protect the subjective expectations that particular owners have in particular things? …


Transparency And Determinacy In Common Law Adjudication: A Philosophical Defense Of Explanatory Economic Analysis, Jody S. Kraus Jan 2007

Transparency And Determinacy In Common Law Adjudication: A Philosophical Defense Of Explanatory Economic Analysis, Jody S. Kraus

Faculty Scholarship

Explanatory economic analysis of the common law has long been subject to deep philosophical skepticism for two reasons. First, common law decisions appear to be cast in the language of deontic morality, not the consequentialist language of efficiency. For this reason, philosophers have claimed that explanatory economic analysis cannot satisfy the transparency criterion, which holds that a legal theory's explanation must provide a plausible account of the relationship between the reasoning it claims judges actually use to decide cases and the express reasoning judges provide in their opinions. Philosophers have doubted that the economic analysis has a plausible account of …


Courts Or Tribunals? Federal Courts And The Common Law, Peter L. Strauss Jan 2002

Courts Or Tribunals? Federal Courts And The Common Law, Peter L. Strauss

Faculty Scholarship

Every Justice, save perhaps Justice Breyer, has recently subscribed to an opinion raising questions in one or another context about whether federal courts can appropriately exercise common law law-making functions that had, until these questions began to appear, been characteristic of all American courts. To invoke a special class of "federal tribunal" whose actions are not to be confused with those of common law courts suggests broader implications than the long-familiar debates about Erie RR. Co. v. Tompkins, or more recent contentions over when, if ever, it is appropriate to infer privately enforceable judicial remedies in aid of federal statutes; …


How Law Can Be Determinate, Kent Greenawalt Jan 1990

How Law Can Be Determinate, Kent Greenawalt

Faculty Scholarship

This Article, part of a longer study, considers one problem about the objectivity of law. The problem is whether the law as it exists provides determinate answers to many legal questions for judges, other officials, and citizens. I emphasize the word many. This Article does not focus on "hard cases" and then ask whether single correct answers for them exist. It does not inquire whether in some complicated sense all legal questions have determinate answers. This is a treatment of easy legal questions. To most lawyers, it may seem self-evident that many legal questions do have determinate answers; and that …