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Articles 1 - 7 of 7
Full-Text Articles in Law
Fishing And Selling, Victor P. Goldberg
Fishing And Selling, Victor P. Goldberg
Faculty Scholarship
Consumers are a lot like fish, out there waiting to be hooked. Like most images, this one is a caricature of reality. The choice and search effort of consumers is suppressed in order to explore the implications of selling activity by manufacturers and retailers. In particular, the fishing analogy suggests that there is a tendency toward excessive selling activity if sellers do not take into account the effects of their activity on the costs of their rivals. However, sellers, like fishermen, have an incentive to arrange their affairs to mitigate the dissipation of rents. This argument is developed in Section …
Understanding The Plaintiff's Attorney: The Implications Of Economic Theory For Private Enforcement Of Law Through Class And Derivative Actions, John C. Coffee Jr.
Understanding The Plaintiff's Attorney: The Implications Of Economic Theory For Private Enforcement Of Law Through Class And Derivative Actions, John C. Coffee Jr.
Faculty Scholarship
Probably to a unique degree, American law relies upon private litigants to enforce substantive provisions of law that in other legal systems are left largely to the discretion of public enforcement agencies. This system of enforcement through "private attorneys general" is most closely associated with the federal antitrust and securities laws and the common law's derivative action, but similar institutional arrangements have developed recently in the environmental, "mass tort," and employment discrimination fields. The key legal rules that make the private attorney general a reality in American law today, however, are not substantive but procedural – namely, those rules that …
Economics Of Public Use, Thomas W. Merrill
Economics Of Public Use, Thomas W. Merrill
Faculty Scholarship
The fifth amendment to the United States Constitution, as well as most state constitutions, provides that private property shall not be taken "for public use" unless just compensation is paid. American courts have long construed this to mean that some showing of "publicness" is a condition precedent to a legitimate exercise of the power of eminent domain. Thus, when a proposed condemnation of property lacks the appropriate public quality, the taking is deemed to be unconstitutional and can be enjoined. In practice, however, most observers today think the public use limitation is a dead letter. Three recent decisions, upholding takings …
Takeover Defense Tactics: A Comment On Two Models, Jeffrey N. Gordon, Lewis A. Kornhauser
Takeover Defense Tactics: A Comment On Two Models, Jeffrey N. Gordon, Lewis A. Kornhauser
Faculty Scholarship
One of the most important debates of current corporate law practice and scholarship is about the appropriate role of target management confronted with a takeover bid. The controversy turns on the identification of a criterion for evaluating takeovers and target management defensive tactics. An influential body of opinion contends that maximization of shareholder wealth is the appropriate criterion because, first, traditional notions of fiduciary duty generally require managers to act in the shareholders' interest, and, second, shareholder wealth maximization is seen as the best available proxy for social wealth maximization. On this view, takeovers are desirable because they can increase …
A Relational Theory Of Secured Financing, Robert E. Scott
A Relational Theory Of Secured Financing, Robert E. Scott
Faculty Scholarship
Despite advances in finance theory, secured debt remains a puzzle. As a consequence, the justification for the current legal regulation of secured financing is similarly unclear. What purposes, whether benign or malignant, does security serve? And what explains the peculiar system of priorities established by Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code? These are particularly urgent questions for students of commercial law because legally created priorities among creditors are an apparent aberration. In most legal regimes, equal treatment of those similarly situated is an important normative goal. Indeed, much of federal bankruptcy law seems to reflect a conception of business …
Rethinking The Theory Of Legal Rights, Jules S. Coleman, Jody S. Kraus
Rethinking The Theory Of Legal Rights, Jules S. Coleman, Jody S. Kraus
Faculty Scholarship
In the economic approach to law, legal rights are designed, in part, to overcome the conditions under which markets fail. In correcting for market failure, economic analysis endorses two rules for assigning legal rights. The first specifies the allocation of rights under conditions of rational cooperation, full information and zero transaction costs. Provided that exchange is available and that obstacles to exercising it are insignificant, rational cooperators will negotiate around inefficiencies. Under these conditions, legal rights are not assigned in order to establish optimal levels of resource deployment directly; rather, they establish well-defined entitlements or negotiation points which create a …
Error And Rationality In Individual Decisionmaking: An Essay On The Relationship Between Cognitive Illusion And The Management Of Choice, Robert E. Scott
Error And Rationality In Individual Decisionmaking: An Essay On The Relationship Between Cognitive Illusion And The Management Of Choice, Robert E. Scott
Faculty Scholarship
How do individuals make choices? In recent years, economists, psychologists and legal academics have searched for answers to various aspects of this question. One topic of recent interest, for example, concerns a lingering problem in information theory: Does consumer inability to process "too much" information cause market failure? The normative implications of this question raise significant policy issues. If consumers' cognitive circuits can become overloaded, then information disclosure is less appealing than direct regulation as a solution to problems of market failure.