Law Commons^™

Proving Copying, Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Peter S. Menell

Faculty Scholarship

Proof that a defendant actually copied from a copyrighted work is a critical part of a claim for copyright infringement. Indeed, absent such copying, there is no infringement. The most common method of proving copying involves the use of circumstantial evidence, consisting of proof that a defendant had “access” to the protected work, and a showing of “similarities” between the copy and the protected work. In inferring copying from the combination of such evidence, courts have for many decades developed a framework known as the “inverse ratio rule,” which allows them to modulate the level of proof needed on access …

Who Owns Our Ancestors Voices? Tribal Claims To Pre-72 Sound Recordings, Trevor Reed

Kernochan Center for Law, Media, and the Arts

A familiar story is told in Indian Country: a researcher arrives on a Native American reservation and begins recording ceremonial songs and oral histories; years later tribal members find, often to their horror, that these sensitive materials are available for sale, download, or streaming to the public. This scenario aptly describes the life of numerous sound recordings made on federally recognized Indian reservations prior to 1972, whose ownership status remains uninterrogated due to the complex overlap and ambiguities of copyright and federal Indian law. Yet recently, owing to an increased sense of self-determination and autonomy, Native American tribes have begun …

The Immanent Rationality Of Copyright Law, Shyamkrishna Balganesh

Faculty Scholarship

Why does copyright treat certain kinds of copying as legally actionable? For nearly a century, American copyright thinking has referenced a core consequentialist dogma to answer this question: incentivizing the production of creative expression at minimal social cost in an effort to further social welfare. This rationale, routinely traced back to the Constitution’s seemingly utilitarian mandate that copyright law should “promote the [p]rogress” of the sciences and useful arts, has come to dominate modern copyright jurisprudence and analysis.2 By classifying specific acts of copying as a wrong, and thereby recognizing a “right to the use of one’s expression,” copyright is …

The Folklore And Symbolism Of Authorship In American Copyright Law, Shyamkrishna Balganesh

Faculty Scholarship

Despite its formal commitment to “authorship,” American copyright law pays surprisingly little doctrinal attention to understanding the concept. Originality, taken to be modern copyright law’s proxy for authorship, has come to assume a life of its own, with little regard to the system’s supposed ideals of authorship. What role then does authorship play in modern American copyright law? This Article argues that authorship is best understood as a form of folklore and symbolism in copyright law. Drawing on the anthropological strand of Legal Realism advanced and developed by Thurman Arnold, the Article argues that authorship serves an important symbolic purpose …

"The Exclusive Right To Their Writings": Copyright And Control In The Digital Age, Jane C. Ginsburg

Faculty Scholarship

In this article, I will explore the concept of control and the meaning of exclusive rights in the constitutional text, the pre-1976 Copyright Act regime, and the 1976 Act. I then consider the new technology cases from piano rolls through videotaperecorders, as well as Congress' responses to new technological means of exploitation. I make two submissions. First, I conclude that when copyright owners seek to eliminate a new kind of dissemination, and when courts do not deem that dissemination harmful to copyright owners, courts decline to find infringement, even though the legal and economic analysis that support those determinations often …

Copyright, Common Law, And Sui Generis Protection Of Databases In The United States And Abroad, Jane C. Ginsburg

Faculty Scholarship

What protection remains for compilations of information, particularly digital databases, since the United States Supreme Court swept away "sweat copyright" in its 1991 Feist decision? "Thin" copyright protection is still available, but it covers only the original contributions (if any) that the compiler brings to the public domain information. Moreover, Feist makes clear that padding the compilation with original added value will not flesh out the skeletal figure beneath: the information, stripped of selection, arrangement, or other copyrightable frills, remains free for the taking.

If copyright is unavailing, contract is appearing more promising, as mass-market, "shrinkwrap" and "click-on" licenses gain …