Law Commons^™

Cleaning Corporate Governance, Jens Frankenreiter, Cathy Hwang, Yaron Nili, Eric L. Talley

Faculty Scholarship

Although empirical scholarship dominates the field of law and finance, much of it shares a common vulnerability: an abiding faith in the accuracy and integrity of a small, specialized collection of corporate governance data. In this paper, we unveil a novel collection of three decades’ worth of corporate charters for thousands of public companies, which shows that this faith is misplaced.

We make three principal contributions to the literature. First, we label our corpus for a variety of firm- and state-level governance features. Doing so reveals significant infirmities within the most well-known corporate governance datasets, including an error rate exceeding …

Transnational Regulatory Regimes In Finance: A Comparative Analysis Of Their (Dis-)Integrative Effects, Katharina Pistor

Faculty Scholarship

Financial markets have become increasingly interconnected with financial intermediaries and instruments linking local and national markets to form regional or even global ones. The global financial crisis of 2008 demonstrated once more that financial interdependence can be both a blessing and a curse. It facilitates the movement of capital and the expansion of credit, and as such promotes economic development in good times; however, in bad times it transmits liquidity shortages throughout the system triggering financial crises and economic recessions where credit expansion earlier fuelled expansion and growth. A critical question therefore is how to structure the governance of transnational …

Dispersed Ownership: The Theories, The Evidence, And The Enduring Tension Between "Lumpers" And "Splitters", John C. Coffee Jr.

Faculty Scholarship

This article argues that dispersed ownership resulted less from inexorable forces and more from private ordering. Neither legal nor political conditions mandated or prevented the appearance of dispersed ownership. Rather, entrepreneurs, investment bankers, and investors — all seeking to maximize value — sometimes saw reasons why selling control into the public market would maximize value for them. But when and why? That is the article's focus. It argues that law played less of a role than specialized intermediaries — investment banks, securities exchanges, and other agents — who found it to be in their self-interest to foster dispersed ownership and …