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Public Contracts, Private Contracts, And The Transformation Of The Constitutional Order, Thomas W. Merrill
Public Contracts, Private Contracts, And The Transformation Of The Constitutional Order, Thomas W. Merrill
Faculty Scholarship
Modern interpretation of the Contract Clause of article 1, section 10 has created a dual standard of judicial review that bottoms upon the classification of a particular contract as public or private. However, which particular category has received greater deference has changed depending upon the precedential climate. Within his Article, Professor Merrill outlines three modern justifications for affording greater protection to public obligations “Kantian theory,” “process theory,” and “utilitarian theory.” He argues, however, that none of these theories adequately justify the dual standard of review, and concludes that a unitary analysis of the contract clause that affords no presumptions in …
Quantity And Price Adjustment In Long-Term Contracts: A Case Study Of Petroleum Coke, Victor P. Goldberg, John R. Erickson
Quantity And Price Adjustment In Long-Term Contracts: A Case Study Of Petroleum Coke, Victor P. Goldberg, John R. Erickson
Faculty Scholarship
Much economic activity takes place within a framework of complex, long-term contracts. While economists have shown increased interest in these contracts, surprisingly little is known about them, or, indeed, about how to analyze the contracting activity of private economic actors. A case study of the actual contracts used in one industry could provide sorely needed data about the way in which reasonably clever businessmen and lawyers cope with problems scholars might consider intractable. In this article, we provide such an analysis of contracts concerning a particular product – petroleum coke. We focus on the problems of quantity and price adjustment. …
Conflict And Cooperation In Long-Term Contracts, Robert E. Scott
Conflict And Cooperation In Long-Term Contracts, Robert E. Scott
Faculty Scholarship
This Article uses the techniques of modern decision analysis and game theory to analyze the decisionmaking strategies of parties to long-term commercial contracts. Most parties to long-term contracts initially allocate the risks of future contingencies and agree – either explicitly or implicitly – to adjust this initial risk-allocation scheme if unanticipated events occur. Once contract risks are initially distributed, however, each party's self-interest may compel them to evade their responsibility rather than adjust cooperatively as originally agreed. Visualizing the interactions between contracting parties as an iterated prisoner's dilemma, the Author attempts to clarify the dynamics of this adjustment process. Professor …