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2015

Antitrust

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Full-Text Articles in Law

Recognizing The Limits Of Antitrust: The Roberts Court Versus The Enforcement Agencies, Thom Lambert, Alden F. Abbott Dec 2015

Recognizing The Limits Of Antitrust: The Roberts Court Versus The Enforcement Agencies, Thom Lambert, Alden F. Abbott

Faculty Publications

In his seminal 1984 article, The Limits of Antitrust, Judge Frank Easterbrook proposed that courts and enforcers adopt a simple set of screening rules for application in antitrust cases, in order to minimize error and decision costs and thereby maximize antitrust's social value. Over time, federal courts in general, and the U.S. Supreme Court in particular, under Chief Justice Roberts have in substantial part adopted Easterbrook's "limits of antitrust" approach, thereby helping to reduce costly antitrust uncertainty. Recently, however, antitrust enforcers in the Obama Administration (unlike their predecessors in the Reagan, Bush, and Clinton Administrations) have been less attuned to …


Revising The U.S. Vertical Merger Guidelines: Policy Issues And An Interim Guide For Practitioners, Steven C. Salop, Daniel P. Culley Nov 2015

Revising The U.S. Vertical Merger Guidelines: Policy Issues And An Interim Guide For Practitioners, Steven C. Salop, Daniel P. Culley

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

Mergers and acquisitions are a major component of antitrust law and practice. The U.S. antitrust agencies spend a majority of their time on merger enforcement. The focus of most merger review at the agencies involves horizontal mergers, that is, mergers among firms that compete at the same level of production or distribution.

Vertical mergers combine firms at different levels of production or distribution. In the simplest case, a vertical merger joins together a firm that produces an input (and competes in an input market) with a firm that uses that input to produce output (and competes in an output market). …


Online Platforms And The Eu Digital Single Market, Maurice Stucke, Ariel Ezrachi Oct 2015

Online Platforms And The Eu Digital Single Market, Maurice Stucke, Ariel Ezrachi

College of Law Faculty Scholarship

Our submission to the U.K. House of Lords, Internal Market Sub-Committee is based on our joint research, which explores the effects Big Data and technology have on competition dynamics. It reviews the use of technology to facilitate collusion, conscious parallelism, and unilateral price discrimination as well as the effects of online and mobile platforms.Our submission addresses the following issues: • What role does data play in the business model of online platforms? • Can data-driven online platforms have excessive market power? • If so, how can they abuse this power? • If so, how does this happen and what effect …


Online Platforms And The Eu Digital Single Market, Maurice Stucke, Ariel Ezrachi Oct 2015

Online Platforms And The Eu Digital Single Market, Maurice Stucke, Ariel Ezrachi

Scholarly Works

Our submission to the U.K. House of Lords, Internal Market Sub-Committee is based on our joint research, which explores the effects Big Data and technology have on competition dynamics. It reviews the use of technology to facilitate collusion, conscious parallelism, and unilateral price discrimination as well as the effects of online and mobile platforms.

Our submission addresses the following issues: • What role does data play in the business model of online platforms? • Can data-driven online platforms have excessive market power? • If so, how can they abuse this power? • If so, how does this happen and what …


Balancing Effects Across Markets, Daniel A. Crane Oct 2015

Balancing Effects Across Markets, Daniel A. Crane

Articles

In Philadelphia National Bank (PNB), the Supreme Court held that it is improper to weigh a merger's procompetitive effects in one market against the merger's anticompetitive effects in another. The merger in question, which ostensibly reduced retail competition in the Philadelphia area, could not be justified on the grounds that it increased competition against New York banks and hence perhaps enhanced competition in business banking in the mid-Atlantic region. I will refer to the Supreme Court's prohibition on balancing effects across markets as a "market-specificity" rule. Under this rule, efficiencies that may counterbalance anticompetitive aspects must be specific to …


Exclusionary Conduct Of Dominant Firms, R&D Competition, And Innovation, Jonathan Baker Aug 2015

Exclusionary Conduct Of Dominant Firms, R&D Competition, And Innovation, Jonathan Baker

Articles in Law Reviews & Other Academic Journals

This paper evaluates the innovation consequences of antitrust enforcement against the exclusionary conduct of dominant firms through a Nash equilibrium model of research and development (R&D) competition to create new products. In the two-firm model, whether one firm regards the other firm’s R&D investment as a strategic complement or strategic substitute turns on an increasing differences condition: whether the first firm’s incremental benefit of increased R&D investment is greater if its rival’s R&D effort succeeds or if its rival’s R&D effort fails. Antitrust prohibitions on pre-innovation exclusion and post-innovation exclusion are found to be effective in different strategic settings: preventing …


Cguppi: Scoring Incentives To Engage In Parallel Accommodating Conduct, Serge Moresi, David Reitman, Steven C. Salop, Yianis Sarafidis Aug 2015

Cguppi: Scoring Incentives To Engage In Parallel Accommodating Conduct, Serge Moresi, David Reitman, Steven C. Salop, Yianis Sarafidis

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

We propose an index for scoring coordination incentives, which we call the “coordination GUPPI” or cGUPPI. While the cGUPPI can be applied to a wide range of coordinated effects concerns, it is particularly relevant for gauging concerns of parallel accommodating conduct (PAC), a concept that received due prominence in the 2010 U.S. Horizontal Merger Guidelines. PAC is a type of coordinated conduct whereby a firm raises price with the expectation—but without any prior agreement—that one or more other firms will follow and match the price increase. The cGUPPI is the highest uniform price increase that all the would-be coordinating firms …


Not Treble Damages: Cartel Recoveries Are Mostly Less Than Single Damages, John M. Connor, Robert H. Lande Jul 2015

Not Treble Damages: Cartel Recoveries Are Mostly Less Than Single Damages, John M. Connor, Robert H. Lande

All Faculty Scholarship

Antitrust law provides treble damages for victims of antitrust violations, but the vast majority of private cases settle. The average or median size of these settlements relative to the overcharges involved has, until now, been only the subject of anecdotes or speculation. To ascertain what we term "Recovery Ratios," we assembled a sample consisting of every completed private U.S. cartel case discovered from 1990 to mid-2014 for which we could find the necessary information. For each of these 71 cases we collected, we assembled neutral scholarly estimates of affected commerce and overcharges. We compared these to the damages secured in …


Debunking The Myths Over Big Data And Antitrust, Maurice Stucke, Allen Grunes May 2015

Debunking The Myths Over Big Data And Antitrust, Maurice Stucke, Allen Grunes

College of Law Faculty Scholarship

What are the implications of Big Data on competition policy? Some argue little, if any, and offer several reasons why Big Data is a passing fad. We disagree.As we discuss, competition law can play an important role in maximizing the benefits of a data-driven economy, while mitigating its risks. Our aim here is to first address the competitive significance of Big Data and, second, take on ten myths downplaying Big Data’s antitrust significance.


Antitrust Federalism And State Restraints Of Interstate Commerce: An Essay For Herbert Hovenkamp, Alan J. Meese May 2015

Antitrust Federalism And State Restraints Of Interstate Commerce: An Essay For Herbert Hovenkamp, Alan J. Meese

Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.


All I Really Need To Know About Antitrust I Learned In 1912, Daniel A. Crane May 2015

All I Really Need To Know About Antitrust I Learned In 1912, Daniel A. Crane

Articles

Herbert Hovenkamp has indisputably earned the deanship of contemporary antitrust scholarship. One could point to many different attributes by which he has earned his laurels: fantastic scholarly productivity; clarity and precision in the craft of writing; analytical depth in both law and economics; moderation in a field apt to polarization; and custodianship of the influential Areeda treatise. In this Essay, I hope to honor another quality that has contributed significantly to Herb’s tremendous success as an antitrust scholar—his engagement with history. Much contemporary antitrust scholarship bursts with excitement at the discovery of new phenomena or theories that in all actuality …


Judicial Treatment Of The Antitrust Treatise, Hillary Greene, D. Daniel Sokol May 2015

Judicial Treatment Of The Antitrust Treatise, Hillary Greene, D. Daniel Sokol

UF Law Faculty Publications

This essay examines Herbert Hovenkamp's influence in antitrust law and policy in the courts. This essay focuses its attention primarily with the Treatise and primarily in the area of merger law – procedural with issues of antitrust injury and substantively with merger efficiencies. The essay provides a case count citation analysis of Hovenkamp's scholarship and compares Hovenkamp to other major figures in antitrust scholarship (Bork and Posner) and to the other antitrust treatises (Kintner and Sullivan) in the courts. Our meta-level findings show that Hovenkamp is far more cited than other treatise writers or scholars who have been recognized for …


Quality-Enhancing Merger Efficiencies, Roger D. Blair, D. Daniel Sokol May 2015

Quality-Enhancing Merger Efficiencies, Roger D. Blair, D. Daniel Sokol

UF Law Faculty Publications

The appropriate role of merger efficiencies remains unresolved in US antitrust law and policy. The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) has led to a significant shift in health care delivery. The ACA promises that increased integration and a shift from quantity of performance through increased competition will create a system in which quality will go up and prices will go down. Increasingly, due to the economic trends that respond to the ACA, including considerable consolidation both horizontally and vertically, it is imperative that the antitrust agencies provide an economically sound and administrable legal approach to efficiency enhancing mergers. …


Licensing Health Care Professionals, State Action And Antitrust Policy, Roger D. Blair, Christine Piette Durrance May 2015

Licensing Health Care Professionals, State Action And Antitrust Policy, Roger D. Blair, Christine Piette Durrance

UF Law Faculty Publications

In this Essay, we raise some economic concerns about the wisdom of conferring antitrust immunity on professional licensing boards, which are often comprised of members of the profession and therefore apt to be motivated by self-interest rather than the public interest. In Part II, we examine the political economy of special interest legislation, which suggests that little public good results from replacing competitive market forces with self-regulation. In Part III, we employ a basic economic model to generate predictions of the economic effects of professional licensing. Part IV provides a survey of the empirical research in this area, which confirms …


Debunking The Myths Over Big Data And Antitrust, Maurice Stucke, Allen Grunes May 2015

Debunking The Myths Over Big Data And Antitrust, Maurice Stucke, Allen Grunes

Scholarly Works

What are the implications of Big Data on competition policy? Some argue little, if any, and offer several reasons why Big Data is a passing fad. We disagree.

As we discuss, competition law can play an important role in maximizing the benefits of a data-driven economy, while mitigating its risks. Our aim here is to first address the competitive significance of Big Data and, second, take on ten myths downplaying Big Data’s antitrust significance.


No Mistake About It: The Important Role Of Antitrust In The Era Of Big Data, Maurice Stucke, Allen Grunes Apr 2015

No Mistake About It: The Important Role Of Antitrust In The Era Of Big Data, Maurice Stucke, Allen Grunes

College of Law Faculty Scholarship

Competition authorities in Europe (and to a lesser extent in other jurisdictions) are beginning to make data, its uses, and its implications for competition law, a key focus. Some, however, argue that competition law has a limited role to play in the era of big data. We respectfully disagree. Competition law will play an integral role to ensure that we capture the benefits of a data-driven economy while mitigating its associated risks.After outlining several implications of big data on competition policy, we address some of the myths about big data and competition law. These myths paint with a broad brush …


Rediscovering Capture: Antitrust Federalism And The North Carolina Dental Case, Herbert J. Hovenkamp Apr 2015

Rediscovering Capture: Antitrust Federalism And The North Carolina Dental Case, Herbert J. Hovenkamp

All Faculty Scholarship

This brief essay analyzes the Supreme Court's 2015 decision in the North Carolina Dental case, assessing its implications for federalism. The decision promises to re-open old divisions that had once made the antitrust "state action" doctrine a controversial lightning rod for debate about state economic sovereignty.

One provocative issue that neither the majority nor the dissenters considered is indicated by the fact that nearly all the cartel customers in the Dental case were located within the state. By contrast, the cartel in Parker v. Brown, which the dissent held up as the correct exemplar of the doctrine, benefited California growers …


The Actavis Inference: Theory And Practice, Aaron S. Edlin, C. Scott Hemphill, Herbert J. Hovenkamp, Carl Shapiro Apr 2015

The Actavis Inference: Theory And Practice, Aaron S. Edlin, C. Scott Hemphill, Herbert J. Hovenkamp, Carl Shapiro

All Faculty Scholarship

In FTC v. Actavis, Inc., the Supreme Court considered "reverse payment" settlements of patent infringement litigation. In such a settlement, a patentee pays the alleged infringer to settle, and the alleged infringer agrees not to enter the market for a period of time. The Court held that a reverse payment settlement violates antitrust law if the patentee is paying to avoid competition. The core insight of Actavis is the Actavis Inference: a large and otherwise unexplained payment, combined with delayed entry, supports a reasonable inference of harm to consumers from lessened competition.

This paper is an effort to assist courts …


No Mistake About It: The Important Role Of Antitrust In The Era Of Big Data, Maurice Stucke, Allen Grunes Apr 2015

No Mistake About It: The Important Role Of Antitrust In The Era Of Big Data, Maurice Stucke, Allen Grunes

Scholarly Works

Competition authorities in Europe (and to a lesser extent in other jurisdictions) are beginning to make data, its uses, and its implications for competition law, a key focus. Some, however, argue that competition law has a limited role to play in the era of big data. We respectfully disagree. Competition law will play an integral role to ensure that we capture the benefits of a data-driven economy while mitigating its associated risks.

After outlining several implications of big data on competition policy, we address some of the myths about big data and competition law. These myths paint with a broad …


Predatory Pricing Under The Areeda-Turner Test, Herbert J. Hovenkamp Mar 2015

Predatory Pricing Under The Areeda-Turner Test, Herbert J. Hovenkamp

All Faculty Scholarship

Few works of legal scholarship have had the impact enjoyed by Areeda and Turner's 1975 article on predatory pricing. Proof of predatory pricing under the Areeda-Turner test requires two things. The plaintiff must show a market structure such that the predator could rationally foresee "recouping the losses through higher profits earned in the absence of competition." This requirement, typically called "recoupment," requires the plaintiff to show that, looking from the beginning of the predation campaign, the predator can reasonably anticipate that the costs of predation will be more than offset by the present value of a future period of monopoly …


Brief Of Antitrust Scholars As Amici Curiae In Support Of Appellees, Supporting Affirmance, Chris Sagers, K. Craig Wildfang, Ryan W. Marth, David Martinez Jan 2015

Brief Of Antitrust Scholars As Amici Curiae In Support Of Appellees, Supporting Affirmance, Chris Sagers, K. Craig Wildfang, Ryan W. Marth, David Martinez

Law Faculty Briefs and Court Documents

Amici urge affirmance for three principal reasons. First, we elaborate a point to dispel Appellant's suggestion that antitrust somehow does not belong here. Second, we show that ordinary rule of reason treatment was appropriate. Relying rather daringly on a case that it overwhelmingly lost, Appellant asks this Court to find within NCAA v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U. S. 85 (1984), a rule that its "amateurism" or "eligibility" restraints are "valid...as a matter of law." NCAA Br. at 14, 22. Board of Regents did not say that, and even Appellant's own amici admit it. See Wilson …


Financial Market Bottlenecks And The 'Openness' Mandate, Felix B. Chang Jan 2015

Financial Market Bottlenecks And The 'Openness' Mandate, Felix B. Chang

Faculty Articles and Other Publications

Financial market infrastructures (“FMIs”), which facilitate the execution of financial transactions, exhibit such strong economies of scale that they are natural monopolies. In each market, production is controlled by a few dominant players. Federal courts have traditionally checked the abuses of natural monopolies under the Sherman Act. Yet recent Supreme Court decisions have reined in the role of antitrust in regulated industries, where administrative bodies set and enforce standards. To this effect, financial regulations require certain FMIs to grant open, nondiscriminatory access to users.

This Article argues that weak “openness” regulations must be buttressed by their antitrust counterpart — specifically, …


Promoting Innovation, Matthew Sag, Spencer Weber Waller Jan 2015

Promoting Innovation, Matthew Sag, Spencer Weber Waller

Faculty Articles

This Essay proceeds as follows. We briefly introduce the concept of creative destruction and its place in Schumpeter’s work in Part II. In Part III we explain why a truly Schumpeterian competition policy demands more than a laissez faire approach. We explain why the law must preserve opportunities and incentives for creative destruction at all stages of innovation and we review four key policy areas of antitrust law from this innovation-focused perspective: unilateral conduct cases (Part III.A), cases at the intersection of IP and antitrust (Part III.B), Sherman Act section 1 cases (Part III.C), and merger policy (Part III.D). In …


Buyer Power And Healthcare Prices, John B. Kirkwood Jan 2015

Buyer Power And Healthcare Prices, John B. Kirkwood

Faculty Articles

One major reason why healthcare costs are much higher in America than in other countries in that our prices are exceptionally high. In this article, I address whether we ought to rely more heavily on buyer power to reduce those prices, as other nations do. I focus on two sectors where greater buyer could easily be exercised: prescription drugs covered by Medicare and hospital and physician services covered by private insurance. I conclude that the biggest buyer of all, the federal government, should be allowed to negotiate Medicare prescription drug prices. That would substantially reduce the prices of many branded …


The Curious Case Of Competition And Quality, Maurice Stucke, Ariel Ezrachi Jan 2015

The Curious Case Of Competition And Quality, Maurice Stucke, Ariel Ezrachi

College of Law Faculty Scholarship

Alongside the consideration of price, competition authorities recognize that quality can be as, if not more, important in some markets. But as competition authorities also recognize, identifying the dimensions of competition important to many consumers is difficult. Even when these dimensions of quality are identified, measuring them represents additional challenges.To circumvent these challenges, competition authorities rely on several heuristics when assessing a merger’s, cartel’s or monopolistic restraint’s impact on quality. Often the heuristics work well for the competition authorities.Our paper, however, identifies several scenarios where these heuristics break down, when competition and quality are not positively correlated, and when an …


Antitrust, Competition Policy, An Inequality, Jonathan Baker, Steven Salop Jan 2015

Antitrust, Competition Policy, An Inequality, Jonathan Baker, Steven Salop

Articles in Law Reviews & Other Academic Journals

Economic inequality recently has entered the political discourse in a highly visible way. This political impact is not a surprise. As the U.S. economy has begun to recover from the Great Recession since mid-2009, economic growth has effectively been appropriated by those already well off, leaving the median household less well off. The serious economic, political and moral issues raised by inequality can be addressed through a panoply of public policies including competition policy, the focus of this article. The article describes the channels through which market power contributes to inequality, and sets forth a range of possible antitrust policy …


Taking The Error Out Of 'Error Cost' Analysis: What's Wrong With Antitrust's Right, Jonathan Baker Jan 2015

Taking The Error Out Of 'Error Cost' Analysis: What's Wrong With Antitrust's Right, Jonathan Baker

Articles in Law Reviews & Other Academic Journals

This article catalogues a series of erroneous assumptions about the current competition policy environment made by today’s antitrust conservatives. These errors inappropriately tilt the application of a neutral economic tool, decision theory, toward non-interventionist outcomes.


O’Bannon V. National Collegiate Athletic Association: Why The Ninth Circuit Should Not Block The Floodgates Of Change In College Athletics, Christopher Sagers, Michael A. Carrier Jan 2015

O’Bannon V. National Collegiate Athletic Association: Why The Ninth Circuit Should Not Block The Floodgates Of Change In College Athletics, Christopher Sagers, Michael A. Carrier

Law Faculty Articles and Essays

In O’Bannon v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, then-Chief Judge Claudia Wilken of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California issued a groundbreaking decision, potentially opening the floodgates for challenges to National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) amateurism rules. The NCAA was finally put to a full evidentiary demonstration of its amateurism defense, and its proof was found emphatically wanting. We agree with Professor Edelman that O’Bannon could bring about significant changes, but only if the Ninth Circuit affirms. We write mainly to address the NCAA’s vigorous pending appeal and the views of certain amici, and to explain our …


Antitrust And The Patent System: A Reexamination, Herbert J. Hovenkamp Jan 2015

Antitrust And The Patent System: A Reexamination, Herbert J. Hovenkamp

All Faculty Scholarship

Since the federal antitrust laws were first passed they have cycled through extreme positions on the relationship between competition law and the patent system. Previous studies of antitrust and patents have generally assumed that patents are valid, discrete, and generally of high quality in the sense that they further innovation. As a result, increasing the returns to patenting increases the incentive to do socially valuable innovation. Further, if the returns to the patentee exceed the social losses caused by increased exclusion, the tradeoff is positive and antitrust should not interfere. If a patent does nothing to further innovation, however, then …


Progressive Legal Thought, Herbert J. Hovenkamp Jan 2015

Progressive Legal Thought, Herbert J. Hovenkamp

All Faculty Scholarship

A widely accepted model of American legal history is that "classical" legal thought, which dominated much of the nineteenth century, was displaced by "progressive" legal thought, which survived through the New Deal and in some form to this day. Within its domain, this was a revolution nearly on a par with Copernicus or Newton. This paradigm has been adopted by both progressive liberals who defend this revolution and by classical liberals who lament it.

Classical legal thought is generally identified with efforts to systematize legal rules along lines that had become familiar in the natural sciences. This methodology involved not …