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Articles 1 - 9 of 9

Full-Text Articles in Law

Will Convergence Of Financial Disclosure Standards Change Sec Regulation Of Foreign Issuers, Roberta S. Karmel Jan 2000

Will Convergence Of Financial Disclosure Standards Change Sec Regulation Of Foreign Issuers, Roberta S. Karmel

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.


Stock Markets And The Globalization Of Retirement Savings: Implications Of Privatization Of Government Pensions For Securities Regulators, Roberta S. Karmel Jan 2000

Stock Markets And The Globalization Of Retirement Savings: Implications Of Privatization Of Government Pensions For Securities Regulators, Roberta S. Karmel

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.


Will Convergence Of Financial Disclosure Standards Change Sec Regulation Of Foreign Issuers?, Roberta S. Karmel Jan 2000

Will Convergence Of Financial Disclosure Standards Change Sec Regulation Of Foreign Issuers?, Roberta S. Karmel

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.


Stock Market Insider Trading: Victims, Violators And Remedies–Including An Analogy To Fraud In The Sale Of A Used Car With A Generic Defect, William K.S. Wang Jan 2000

Stock Market Insider Trading: Victims, Violators And Remedies–Including An Analogy To Fraud In The Sale Of A Used Car With A Generic Defect, William K.S. Wang

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.


Convergence And Its Critics: What Are The Preconditions To The Separation Of Ownership And Control?, John C. Coffee Jr. Jan 2000

Convergence And Its Critics: What Are The Preconditions To The Separation Of Ownership And Control?, John C. Coffee Jr.

Faculty Scholarship

Recent commentary has argued that deep and liquid securities markets and a dispersed shareholder base are unlikely to develop in civil law countries and transitional economies for a variety of reasons, including (1) the absence of adequate legal protections for minority shareholder, (2) the inability of dispersed shareholders to hold control or pay an equivalent control premium to that which a prospective controlling shareholder will pay and (3) the political vulnerability of dispersed shareholder ownership in left-leaning "social democracies." Nonetheless, this article finds that significant movement in the direction of dispersed ownership has occurred and is accelerating across Europe. To …


Accounting For Greed: Unraveling The “Rogue Trader” Mystery, Kimberly D. Krawiec Jan 2000

Accounting For Greed: Unraveling The “Rogue Trader” Mystery, Kimberly D. Krawiec

Faculty Scholarship

In this article, I analyze the motivations underlying the actions of "rogue traders" - market professionals who engage in unauthorized purchases or sales of securities, commodities or derivatives, often for a financial institution's proprietary trading account - and the motivations of the managers or supervisors who are assigned to oversee such traders. After beginning with the observation that rogue trading incidents are neither new nor isolated events, I argue that the continued existence of pervasive rogue trading has remained a mystery for industry observers, particularly given both the extensive legal regime and formal institutional policies apparently designed to curb such …


The Direction Of Corporate Law: The Scholars' Perspective, John C. Coffee Jr., Richard A. Booth Marbury Research Professor Of Law, R. Franklin Balotti, David C. Mcbride, Edward P. Welch Jan 2000

The Direction Of Corporate Law: The Scholars' Perspective, John C. Coffee Jr., Richard A. Booth Marbury Research Professor Of Law, R. Franklin Balotti, David C. Mcbride, Edward P. Welch

Faculty Scholarship

Transcript of a panel on a scholar's approach to corporation law.


A Theory Of Legal Presumptions, Antonio E. Bernardo, Eric L. Talley, Ivo Welch Jan 2000

A Theory Of Legal Presumptions, Antonio E. Bernardo, Eric L. Talley, Ivo Welch

Faculty Scholarship

This article analyzes how legal presumptions can mediate between costly litigation and ex ante incentives. We augment a moral hazard model with a redistributional litigation game in which a presumption parameterizes how a court 'weighs' evidence offered by the opposing sides. Strong prodefendant presumptions foreclose lawsuits altogether, but also engender shirking. Strong proplaintiff presumptions have the opposite effects. Moderate presumptions give rise to equilibria in which both shirking and suit occur probabilisitically. The socially optimal presumption trades off agency costs against litigation costs, and could be either strong or moderate, depending on the social importance of effort, the costs of …


Weapons To Fight Insider Trading In The 21st Century: A Call For The Repeal Of Section 16(B), Michael H. Dessent Jan 2000

Weapons To Fight Insider Trading In The 21st Century: A Call For The Repeal Of Section 16(B), Michael H. Dessent

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.