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Price Effects Of Horizontal Mergers, Alan A. Fisher Ph.D., Frederick I. Johnson Ph.D., Robert H. Lande
Price Effects Of Horizontal Mergers, Alan A. Fisher Ph.D., Frederick I. Johnson Ph.D., Robert H. Lande
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When should the government challenge a merger that might increase market power but also generate efficiency gains? The dominant belief has been that the government and courts should evaluate these mergers solely in terms of economic efficiency. Congress, however, wanted the courts to stop any merger significantly likely to raise prices. Substantially likely efficiency gains should therefore affect the legality of mergers to the extent that they are likely to prevent price increases. This standard is more strict than the economic efficiency criterion, because the latter would permit mergers substantially likely to lead to higher prices, if sufficient efficiency gains …
Chicago's False Foundation: Wealth Transfers (Not Just Efficiency) Should Guide Antitrust, Robert H. Lande
Chicago's False Foundation: Wealth Transfers (Not Just Efficiency) Should Guide Antitrust, Robert H. Lande
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My role today will be comparable to the small child's in the classic story of the Emperor's new clothes; I too have a simple truth to tell. The sole goal of antitrust is not to enhance economic efficiency. Increased economic efficiency is not even the primary goal of the antitrust laws. The main purpose of the antitrust laws is to prevent firms from acquiring and using market power to force consumers to pay more for their goods and services. Congress was primarily concerned that corporations would use market power "unfairly" to extract wealth from consumers. These wealth transfers were of …
When Should States Challenge Mergers: A Proposed Federal/State Balance, Robert H. Lande
When Should States Challenge Mergers: A Proposed Federal/State Balance, Robert H. Lande
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This article critically analyzes the current system of United States merger enforcement, under which both federal and State antitrust enforcers scrutinizes and potentially can challenge any merger that affects interstate commerce. This article develops and proposes an alternative, a voluntary division of responsibility patterned after the European Union's approach. Under this alternative federal enforcers normally would defer to State enforcers for certain specified mergers, and State enforcers normally would defer to federal enforcers for other specified mergers.