Law Commons^™

Inventing Norms, William Hubbard

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Patent law strives to promote the progress of technology by encouraging invention. Traditionally, scholars contend that patent law achieves this goal by creating financial incentives to invent in the form of exclusive rights to new technology. This traditional view of invention, however, fails to recognize that inventors are motivated by more than money. Like most people, inventors are also motivated by social norms, that is, shared normative beliefs favoring certain actions while disfavoring others. This Article argues that many Americans embrace social norms that favor and encourage successful invention. Because of these "inventing norms" inventors enjoy enhanced personal satisfaction and …

The Creativity Effect (With C. Sprigman), Christopher J. Buccafusco

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No abstract provided.

Post-Sale Restraints And Competitive Harm: The First Sale Doctrine In Perspective, Herbert J. Hovenkamp

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A post-sale restraint is a condition or contract provision that operates after a good has been sold. In antitrust law these restraints are roughly divided into two classes, “intrabrand” and “interbrand.” An intrabrand restraint limits the way a firm can distribute the restricted property. For example, resale price maintenance controls the price at which goods can be resold. Intrabrand nonprice restraints place other types of limits, such as the places from which goods can be sold, the uses for which they can be sold, and the identity of buyers. By contrast, an interbrand restraint limits a purchaser’s right to deal …

The Firm As Cartel Manager, Herbert J. Hovenkamp, Christopher R. Leslie

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Antitrust law is the primary legal obstacle to price fixing, which is condemned by Section 1 of the Sherman Act. Firms that engage in price fixing may try to reduce their probability of antitrust liability in a number of ways. First, members of a price-fixing conspiracy go to great lengths to conceal their illegal activities from antitrust enforcers. Second, because Section 1 condemns only concerted action, firms may structure their relationship to appear to be the action of a single entity that is beyond the reach of Section One.

In its American Needle decision the Supreme Court held that the …