Law Commons^™

Professor Waller's Un-American Approach To Antitrust, Robert H. Lande

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Professor Waller asks an un-American question - what can the United States antitrust program learn from the rest of the world? This question is un-American because we in the United States rarely look to others for advice. Besides, we invented antitrust and we were practically alone in the world in enforcing antitrust for almost a century. Only during the current generation have many other nations had active and vigorous antitrust programs. Moreover, the United States is in the business of exporting our accumulated century of antitrust wisdom through a wide variety of methods, and we revel in playing this role. …

Legalizing Merger To Monopoly And Higher Prices: The Canadian Competition Tribunal Gets It Wrong, Alan A. Fisher Ph.D., Robert H. Lande, Stephen F. Ross

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This article analyzes the Canadian Superior Propane decision, apparently the first merger decision in world history to consider explicitly what to do when a merger was predicted to lead to both higher consumer prices and to net efficiencies. The article advocates analyzing the merger under a "price to consumers" or "consumer welfare" standard, rather than a total efficiency standard, and advocates that the enforcers and the courts block such mergers.

After Microsoft Wins, Robert H. Lande

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No abstract provided.

Afterword: Antitrust And American Business Abroad Revisited, David J. Gerber

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No abstract provided.

The Three Types Of Collusion: Fixing Prices, Rivals, And Rules, Robert H. Lande, Howard P. Marvel

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Collusion can profitably be classified into three distinct types. In our classification, "Type I" collusion is the familiar direct agreement among colluding firms (a cartel) to raise prices or, equivalently, restrict output. Alternatively, firms can collude to disadvantage rivals in ways that causes those rivals to cut output. We term this "Type II" collusion. Its indirect effect is an increase in market prices.

A number of important collusion cases neither direct manipulation of prices or output, nor direct attacks on rivals. Examples include Supreme Court cases such as National Society of Professional Engineers v. US, Bates v. State Bar of …