Law Commons^™

Brief Of Prof. Steven L. Schwarcz As Amicus Curiae, Steven L. Schwarcz

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Evaluating The 2013 Euro Cac Experiment, Elena Carletti, Paolo Colla, Mitu Gulati

Faculty Scholarship

On January 1, 2013, it became mandatory that every new sovereign bond issued by a member of the European Monetary Union include a new contract clause called a Collective Action Clause or CAC. This, we believe, constituted the biggest one-time change to the terms of sovereign debt contracts in history, impacting a market of many trillions of euros. And it was not just that the change was big in terms of the size of the market it impacted; it was big in terms of its impact on the documentation of each individual Euro area sovereign bond contract. To illustrate, prior …

The Relevance Of Law To Sovereign Debt, W. Mark C. Weidemaier, Mitu Gulati

Faculty Scholarship

The literature on sovereign debt treats law as of marginal significance, largely because the doctrine of sovereign immunity leaves creditors few potent legal remedies against sovereign borrowers. Although sovereign debts can indeed by hard to enforce, the goal of this Essay is to demonstrate that law plays a central, and constantly evolving, role in structuring sovereign debt markets. To list just a few examples, legal rules and institutions (i) decide when a borrower is sovereign, (ii) define the consequences of sovereignty by drawing (or refusing to draw) artificial boundaries between the sovereign and other legal entities, (iii) play some role …

Reprofiling Sovereign Debt, Lee C. Buchheit, Mitu Gulati, Ignacio Tirado

Faculty Scholarship

• The IMF staff’s 2013 proposal to reprofile (i.e., stretch out for a short period without haircutting principal or interest) the maturing debt of a country that has lost market access is a sensible policy in cases where the IMF is uncertain whether the country’s debt stock is sustainable.

• The motivation for the policy is to avoid situations, such as occurred during the Eurozone debt crisis, in which Fund resources are used to bail-out commercial creditors in full.

• But a debt reprofiling is a species of debt restructuring and as such is susceptible to holdout creditor behaviour.

• …

Keynote Reflections: The Public Governance Duty, Steven L. Schwarcz

Faculty Scholarship

Firms must take ever greater risks to try to innovate and create value in our increasingly competitive and complex global economy. Corporate governance law generally delegates control over excessive risk-taking to the firm’s investors, principally its risk-seeking shareholders. But this does not cover the type of risk-taking that led to the global financial crisis and that is becoming ever more common - risk-taking that could have systemic consequences to the financial system. I argue for a “public governance duty,” requiring managers of systemically important firms to assess the impact of risk-taking on the public as well as on investors, and …

When Governments Write Contracts: Policy And Expertise In Sovereign Debt Markets, W. Mark C. Weidemaier, Mitu Gulati, Anna Gelpern

Faculty Scholarship

At least three times in the past two decades, national governments and institutions at the regional and international levels have tried to reform sovereign bond contracts to facilitate debt restructuring. Increasingly, these efforts have focused on promoting majority modifications clauses, a species of collective action clause (CAC) that facilitates a binding debt restructuring. Rather than legislate or regulate, governments have convened expert commissions, produced model CACs, and aggressively marketed these clauses to debtors and creditors. When events prove the existing CAC template inadequate or irrelevant, the process begins anew. This paper considers this mode of government intervention, which has a …

The Failed Reform: Congressional Crackdown On Repeat Chapter 13 Bankruptcy Filers, Sara Sternberg Greene

Faculty Scholarship

After decades of lobbying to “get tough” on bankruptcy repeat filers, Congress passed the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (BAPCPA). The Bankruptcy Code now requires that the automatic stay, which prevents creditors from pursuing the property of bankruptcy debtors, expires after thirty days for petitioners who file for bankruptcy within one year of a previously failed petition. Debtors can file a motion to extend the stay, but there is a presumption of a bad faith filing, only overcome if a debtor can show there has been a “substantial change in his or her financial or personal …

Corporate Risk-Taking And The Decline Of Personal Blame, Steven L. Schwarcz

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Derivatives And Collateral: Balancing Remedies And Systemic Risk, Steven L. Schwarcz

Faculty Scholarship

U.S. bankruptcy law grants special rights and immunities to creditors in derivatives transactions, including virtually unlimited enforcement rights. This Article examines whether exempting those transactions from bankruptcy’s automatic stay, including the stay of foreclosure actions against collateral, is necessary or appropriate in order to minimize systemic risk.

Corporate Risk-Taking And Public Duty, Steven L. Schwarcz

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Banking And Financial Regulation, Steven L. Schwarcz

Faculty Scholarship

This chapter provides a basic overview of banking and financial regulation for the forthcoming Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics (Francesco Paris, ed.). Among other things, the chapter compares traditional and shadow banking and their regulation, differentiating “micro prudential” regulation (which focuses on protecting individual components of the financial system, such as banks) and “macro prudential” regulation (which focuses on protecting against systemic risk). The chapter also examines how regulation can help to correct market failures that undermine financial efficiency. In that context, it discusses, among other things, capital requirements, ring-fencing, and stress testing. Finally, the chapter examines how regulation …

A Model-Law Approach To Restructuring Unsustainable Sovereign Debt, Steven L. Schwarcz

Faculty Scholarship

Unresolved sovereign debt problems are hurting debtor nations, their citizens and their creditors, and also can pose serious systemic threats to the international financial system. The existing contractual restructuring approach is insufficient to make sovereign debt sustainable. Although a more systematic legal resolution framework is needed, a formal multilateral approach, such as a treaty, is not currently politically viable. An informal model-law approach should be legally, politically and economically feasible. This informal approach would not require multilateral acceptance. Because most sovereign debt contracts are governed by either New York or English law, it would be sufficient if one or both …

The Volcker Rule: A Brief Political History, Kimberly D. Krawiec, Guangya Liu

Faculty Scholarship

Today, more than five years after Dodd-Frank was first signed into law, uncertainty surrounds many aspects of the Volcker Rule’s application and ultimate impact on financial markets and bank stability. Many more years will likely pass before that uncertainty is resolved. We demonstrate through a quantitative and qualitative analysis that these difficulties were presaged by the Volcker Rule’s political history. The Volcker Rule -- originally rejected by Congressional lawmakers and economists within the Obama administration as unworkable -- arose as a political concession designed to quiet critics who contended that Dodd-Frank did not do enough to control risky bank activity. …

Excessive Corporate Risk-Taking And The Decline Of Personal Blame, Steven L. Schwarcz

Faculty Scholarship

Government agencies and prosecutors are being criticized for seeking so few indictments against individuals in the wake of the 2008-09 financial crisis and its resulting banking failures. This article analyzes why — contrary to a longstanding historical trend — personal liability may be on the decline, and whether agencies and prosecutors should be doing more. The analysis confronts fundamental policy questions concerning changing corporate and social norms. The public and the media perceive the crisis’s harm as a “wrong” caused by excessive risk-taking. But that view can be too simplistic, ignoring the reality that firms must take greater risks to …