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Full-Text Articles in Law
Designing Corporate Bailouts, Antonio E. Bernardo, Eric L. Talley, Ivo Welch
Designing Corporate Bailouts, Antonio E. Bernardo, Eric L. Talley, Ivo Welch
Faculty Scholarship
Although common economic wisdom suggests that government bailouts are inefficient because they reduce incentives to avoid failure and induce excessive entry by marginal firms, in practice bailouts are difficult to avoid for systemically significant enterprises. Recent experience suggests that bailouts also induce litigation from shareholders and managers complaining about expropriation and wrongful termination by the government. Our model shows how governments can design tax-financed corporate bailouts to reduce these distortions and points to the causes of inefficiencies in real-world implementations such as the Troubled Asset Relief Program. Bailouts with minimal distortion depend critically on the government’s ability to expropriate shareholders …
Regulating Public Offerings Of Truly New Securities: First Principles, Merritt B. Fox
Regulating Public Offerings Of Truly New Securities: First Principles, Merritt B. Fox
Faculty Scholarship
The public offering of truly new securities involves purchases by investors in sufficient number and in small enough blocks that each purchaser’s shares can reasonably be expected to be freely tradable in a secondary market that did not exist before the offering. Increasing the ability of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) to make such offerings has been the subject of much recent discussion.
At the time that a firm initially contemplates such an offering, unusually large information asymmetries exist between its insiders and potential investors. These can lead to severe adverse-selection problems that prevent a substantial portion of worthy offerings …