Law Commons^™

Taxing & Zapping Marijuana: Blockchain Compliance In The Trump Administration Part 4, Richard Thompson Ainsworth, Brendan Magauran

Faculty Scholarship

This is the fourth of a five-part series dealing with the rescission by U.S. Attorney General Jeff Sessions of the Obama-era policy that discouraged federal prosecutors from bringing charges in all but the most serious marijuana cases.

This article focuses on retail-level frauds. It proposes a limited purpose crypto currency. At the retail level the MJ Freeway or METRC software essentially functions as a marijuana-industry-specific point of sale (POS) system. It is common in retail for different industry sectors (restaurants, hotels, convenience stores, or gasoline stations) to have market-specific POS systems that are molded to fit the unique characteristics of …

Taxing & Zapping Marijuana: Blockchain Compliance In The Trump Administration Part 2, Richard Thompson Ainsworth, Brendan Magauran

Faculty Scholarship

Legalization of marijuana burdens the States with the responsibility of (a) monitoring the physical flows of marijuana through the supply chain (making sure the marijuana does not enter inter-state commerce; making sure it stays out of the hands of minors, etc.), and (b) monitoring the fiscal flows (making sure the proceeds of marijuana production do not end up in criminal hands).

The type of controls favored by the states are track and trace (TAT), or seed-to-sale (STS) systems. These systems are reasonably complex, as well as technology-intensive. Nevertheless, there are questions about whether they are adequate to the enforcement needs. …

Taxing & Zapping Marijuana: Blockchain Compliance In The Trump Administration Part 5, Richard Thompson Ainsworth, Brendan Magauran

Faculty Scholarship

This is the fifth part of a five-part series dealing with the rescission by U.S. Attorney General Jeff Sessions of the Obama-era policy that discouraged federal prosecutors from bringing charges in all but the most serious marijuana cases.

This article focuses on the back-end leakage in the state’s obligation to control both the physical flows of legalized marijuana, as well as the related fiscal flows (the proceeds of legalized marijuana sales). These flows intersect dramatically in retail-level frauds.

There are very few new proposals on how to solve the physical flow problems with consumer re-sales into the black market. Traditional …

Taxing & Zapping Marijuana: Blockchain Compliance In The Trump Administration Part 3, Richard Thompson Ainsworth, Brendan Magauran

Faculty Scholarship

This is the third of a five-part series dealing with the rescission by U.S. Attorney General Jeff Sessions of the Obama-era policy that discouraged federal prosecutors from bringing charges in all but the most serious marijuana cases.

This article focuses on cyber-attacks on the main commercial chain, and the use of a private blockchain using HyperLedger Fabric as a platform.

This fraud is a direct, criminal attack; an attack designed to destroy/corrupt records of marijuana inventory and plant tags throughout the supply chain. The attack allows legalized marijuana to escape the system and be sold on the black market. A …

Taxing & Zapping Marijuana: Blockchain Compliance In The Trump Administration Part 1, Richard Thompson Ainsworth, Brendan Magauran

Faculty Scholarship

On January 4, 2018, the Trump Administration through Attorney General Sessions rescinded an Obama-era policy1 that discouraged federal prosecutors from bringing charges in all but the most serious marijuana cases under the federal Controlled Substances Act,2 as well as under the Bank Secrecy Act.3 Federal law is at odds with state law in the majority of states on the legalization and subsequent state taxation of marijuana.4 Twenty-eight states and the District of Columbia have at least partially legalized marijuana. Eight of these states have legalized both medicinal and recreational use.5 With limited exceptions, legalized sales of marijuana are taxed.

We …

Zappers, Phantomware And Other Sales Suppression Software In The State Of Washington, Richard Thompson Ainsworth, Robert Chicoine

Faculty Scholarship

Electronic sales suppression (ESS) is a fraud that has been a (prominent) feature of the North American retail business since at least 1996. The first EES case in the US dates from 1981. ESS is a global problem. Depending on the jurisdiction, and the research study consulted, ESS is estimated to be present in 34% (of Canadian), 50% (of German – two studies), and 70% (of Swedish and Slovenian) businesses. It may be the case today, that “you cannot leave home without” encountering (or participating in) ESS.

The most common types of sales suppression technology are Zappers and Phantomware programming. …

Basic (Non-Technical) Requirements – Electronic Monitoring Agreement For Zappers, Phantomware, And Other Sales Suppression Devices Appendix A, Richard Thompson Ainsworth, Robert Chicoine

Faculty Scholarship

The State of Washington v. Wong, Wash. Super. Ct., No. 16-1-00179-0 is the State of Washington’s first judicially resolved case involving an automated sales suppression device. Months of negotiations led to a plea agreement and the State’s first electronic sales monitoring agreement (August 30, 2017). The taxpayer violated RCW 82.32.290 (4)(a) by knowingly possessing, and knowingly using a Zapper to suppress sales.

The penalties in this case were severe. Not only were all taxes, penalties, and interest lawfully due required to be paid, but as a Class C felony incarceration of up to 5 years, a $10,000 fine, or both …

A Vatcoin Solution To Mtic Fraud: Past Efforts, Present Technology, And The Eu’S 2017 Proposal, Richard Thompson Ainsworth, Musaad Alwohaibi, Mike Cheetham, Camille Tirand

Faculty Scholarship

On October 4, 2017, in an effort to recover some of the VAT lost annually, the European Commission proposed “far-reaching reforms.” The immediate target is a €50 billion slice of an estimated €150 billion overall annual loss. In its proposal the Commission is looking only at Missing Trader Intra-Community (MTIC) fraud in goods.

Goods (alone) are targeted.

If we have learned anything about MTIC fraud since January 1, 1993, it is that fraudsters engaged in this activity are exceptionally agile. MTIC frauds migrate and mutate on command. For example, MTIC fraud in cell phones quickly migrated to computer chips in …