Law Commons^™

Delusions Of Grand Juries, Niki Kuckes

Law Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Rhetorically Reasonable Police Practices: Viewing The Supreme Court's Multiple Discourse Paths, Kathryn R. Urbonya

Faculty Publications

This Article analyzes the United States Supreme Court's numerous and shifting rhetorical discourse paths for declaring whether particular governmental practices constituted unreasonable searches or seizures under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. It examines how the Court has manipulated classic discourse paths arising from text, history, precedent and structure. It reveals that among and within each of these categories, the Court has created conflicting approaches. The Article argues that the Court's construction of Fourth Amendment reasonableness has depended upon which discourse paths it has selected as well as how it has characterized the values embedded within the discourse …

Section 2: Judicial Confirmation Process, Institute Of Bill Of Rights Law, William & Mary Law School

Supreme Court Preview

No abstract provided.

Section 1: Moot Court, Locke V. Davey, Institute Of Bill Of Rights Law, William & Mary Law School

Supreme Court Preview

No abstract provided.

Section 5: First Amendment & Election Law, Institute Of Bill Of Rights Law, William & Mary Law School

Supreme Court Preview

No abstract provided.

Section 3: Gay Rights After Lawrence, Institute Of Bill Of Rights Law, William & Mary Law School

Supreme Court Preview

No abstract provided.

Section 4: Civil Rights & Employment Law, Institute Of Bill Of Rights Law, William & Mary Law School

Supreme Court Preview

No abstract provided.

Section 7: Federalism In The Rehnquist Court, Institute Of Bill Of Rights Law, William & Mary Law School

Supreme Court Preview

No abstract provided.

Section 10: Also This Term, Institute Of Bill Of Rights Law, William & Mary Law School

Supreme Court Preview

No abstract provided.

Section 8: Business Law, Institute Of Bill Of Rights Law, William & Mary Law School

Supreme Court Preview

No abstract provided.

Section 9: Looking Ahead, Institute Of Bill Of Rights Law, William & Mary Law School

Supreme Court Preview

No abstract provided.

Section 6: Criminal Procedure, Institute Of Bill Of Rights Law, William & Mary Law School

Supreme Court Preview

No abstract provided.

The Rhetorical Uses Of Marbury V. Madison: The Emergence Of A "Great Case", Davison M. Douglas

Faculty Publications

Marbury v. Madison is today indisputably one of the "great cases" of American constitutional law because of its association with the principle of judicial review. But for much of its history, Marbury has not been regarded as a seminal decision. Between 1803 and 1887, the Supreme Court never once cited Marbury for the principle of judicial review, and nineteenth century constitutional law treatises were far more likely to cite Marbury for the decision's discussion of writs of mandamus or the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction than for its discussion of judicial review. During the late nineteenth century, however, the exercise of …

Border Patrol, Carl E. Schneider

Articles

Recently, the Supreme Court has encountered cases that concern perhaps our weightiest bioethical issue-how medical care is to be rationed. But this does not mean that the Court must therefore assess the justice of rationing, as many people incited by many journalists now fondly and firmly believe. In explaining why, we begin with a story about how Learned Hand remembered saying one day to Justice Holmes, "Well, sir, goodbye. Do justice!" Holmes turned quite sharply and said: "That is not my job. My job is to play the game according to the rules." If the Court doesn't do justice, what …

Attitudes About Attitudes, Michael J. Gerhardt

Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.

Gender Bias: Continuing Challenges And Opportunities, Rebecca Korzec

All Faculty Scholarship

In 1873 the U.S. Supreme Court denied Myra Bradwell the right to practice law, holding "the paramount destiny and mission of women are to fulfill the noble and benign office of wife and mother." Now, just slightly more a century later, two women sit on the Supreme Court, and almost half of all law students and law school faculty are women.

Congress And The Making Of The Second Rehnquist Court, Neal Devins

Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.

A Six-Three Rule: Reviving Consensus And Deference On The Supreme Court, Jed Handelsman Shugerman

Faculty Scholarship

Over the past three decades, the Supreme Court has struck down federal statutes by a bare majority with unprecedented frequency. This Article shows that five-four decisions regularly overturning acts of Congress are a relatively recent phenomenon, whereas earlier Courts generally exercised judicial review by supermajority voting.

One option is to establish the following rule: The Supreme Court may not declare an act of Congress unconstitutional without a two-thirds majority. The Supreme Court itself could establish this rule internally, just as it has created its nonmajority rules for granting certiorari and holds, or one Justice who would otherwise be the fifth …

Brief For Respondents, Grutter V. Bollinger, 539 Us 306 (2003) (No. 02-241)., Maureen E. Mahoney, Evan Caminker, Marvin Krislov, Jonathan Alger, Philip J. Kessler, Leonard M. Niehoff, J. Scott Ballenger, Nathaniel A. Vitan, John H. Pickering, John Payton, Brigida Benitez, Stuart Delery, Craig Goldblatt, Anne Harkavy, Terry A. Maroney

Appellate Briefs

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Whether this Court should reaffirm its decision in Regents of University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) and hold that the educational benefits that flow from a diverse student body to an institution of higher education, its students, and the public it serves, are sufficiently compelling to permit the school to consider race and/or ethnicity as one of many factors in making admissions decisions through a "properly devised" admissions program.

2. Whether the Court of Appeals correctly held that the University of Michigan Law School's admissions program is properly devised.

Supreme Court's 2002 Term Employment Law Cases: Is This Justice Scalia's Court?, Rafael Gely

Faculty Publications

In a recent article,' Erwin Chemerinsky argues that the Supreme Court's constitutional law decisions of the 2002 Term "cannot be explained by any overarching theory or underlying set of interpretative principles." Instead, he argues, "constitutional law is all about value choices made by the Justices." Professor Chemerinsky also argues that given the current composition of the Court, "it is the value choices of the middle" - Justice O'Connor and Justice Kennedy - that matter the most. Professor Chemerinsky ends his article with the assertion that "[f]or better or worse, this really is the O'Connor Court." In reviewing the cases decided …

The Implied Waiver Solution To The Problem Of Privilege In The Individual Bankruptcy Case, Laura B. Bartell

Law Faculty Research Publications

No abstract provided.

Peer Dialogue: The Quagmire Of Scientific Expert Testimony: Crumping The Supreme Court's Style, Paul Rice

Articles in Law Reviews & Other Academic Journals

No abstract provided.

Expert Information And Expert Evidence: A Preliminary Taxonomy, Samuel R. Gross, Jennifer L. Mnookin

Articles

Federal Rule of Evidence 702 speaks in very general terms. It governs every situation in which "scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact," and provides that, in that situation, "a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise . . . .' In 2000, following a trio of Supreme Court cases interpreting Rule 702, the Rule was amended to include a third requirement, in addition to the helpfulness of the testimony and the qualifications of the witness: reliability. Under Rule 702 …

"Charting The Course Of Commerce Clause Challenge (Symposium: The Commerce Clause: Past, Present, And Future), Richard D. Friedman

Articles

Recognizing Barry Cushman's formidable skills in both research and argument, and his enormous wealth of knowledge, I have long known that I would much rather be on the same side of an issue with him than on the opposite side. And I am glad that we have been on the same side of an important issue, for both of us doubt that Franklin Roosevelt's Court-packing plan had much to do with the constitutional transformation of the 1930s. But now I have expressed disagreement with some propositions he has asserted, and I have made some assertions with which he disagrees, he …

The Right To Receive Information, Susan Nevelow Mart

Publications

Ms. Mart examines the legal evolution of the right to receive information, particularly focusing on its application to libraries, beginning with the Supreme Court holding in Board of Education v. Pico, and followed by cases that have considered the meaning of Pico in a variety of library-related contexts.

You Can't Ask (Or Say) That: The First Amendment And Civil Rights Restrictions On Decisionmaker Speech, Helen Norton

Publications

Federal, state, and local civil rights laws regulate private decisionmaking about whom an employer may hire or fire, to whom a landlord may rent an apartment, or to whom a creditor may extend credit. In prohibiting discriminatory conduct, however, these laws also limit the speech of those making these decisions. In this Article, Professor Norton explores how we might think about these civil rights laws in the context of the First Amendment, and their place within the Supreme Court's commercial speech jurisprudence. She concludes that the speech restricted by these laws may be characterized as falling outside the protection of …

The Right To A Jury Decision On Questions Of Fact Under The Seventh Amendment, Paul F. Kirgis

Faculty Law Review Articles

In a series of decisions over the last decade, the Supreme Court has reconsidered an aspect of the Seventh Amendment that has been long overlooked: the allocation of particular questions to the judge or the jury in a case where the right to a jury trial applies. Breaking with historical practice, the Court has emphasized considerations other than the fact-law distinction as a basis for identifying the questions that must go to the jury. Most prominently, in Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., the Court focused on 'functional considerations" in assigning a question of patent claim construction to the judge. In …

The Dimension Of The Supreme Court, Paul H. Edelman

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

In a paper published in the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, Lawrence Sirovich introduced two novel mathematical techniques to study patterns in recent Supreme Court decisions. One of these methods, information theory, has never been applied previously. The other method, singular value decomposition, is closely related to other methods that have previously been employed.

In this paper I give an explication of these two methods and evaluate their use in the context of understanding the Supreme Court. I conclude that information theory holds some promise for furthering our understanding but singular value decomposition, as applied by Sirovich, is …

Judicial Independence And The Ambiguity Of Article Iii Protections, Tracey E. George

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

Is the federal judiciary truly an independent body? A quick glance at the Constitution would suggest the answer is yes. The Constitution provides for life tenure and a difficult removal process for federal judges that together, as the common wisdom goes, shield federal judges from the shifting winds of the more political branches and the public at large. The author of this essay argues, however, that on a closer examination of the protections provided for by the Constitution, judicial independence might be more mirage than truism. Threats to judicial independence arise not only externally through the actions of the other …

The Federal Court System: A Principal-Agent Perspective, Tracey E. George, Albert H. Yoon

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

Professor Merrill ably demonstrates that Supreme Court decisions should be examined as the product of an inherently political institution. Observers who assert that Justices are best understood as prophets of the law are practicing an intellectual sleight of hand that allows them to ignore the non­ doctrinal factors that affect judicial behavior. Such an effort is understandable. The Court is a much more complicated subject if its rulings reflect nonlegal factors as well as legal ones. The desire, however, to ignore the true character of the Court produces accounts of its behavior that are inadequate, incorrect, or wholly without content. …