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Full-Text Articles in Law

Regulatory Taxings, Eduardo M. Peñalver Dec 2004

Regulatory Taxings, Eduardo M. Peñalver

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

The tension between the Supreme Court's expansive reading of the Takings Clause and the state's virtually limitless power to tax has been repeatedly noted, but has received little systematic exploration. Although some scholars, most notably Richard Epstein, have used the tension between takings law and taxes to argue against the legitimacy of taxation as it is presently practiced, such an approach has failed to gain a significant following. Instead, the broad legal consensus is that legislatures effectively have unlimited authority to impose tax burdens. Nevertheless, this Article demonstrates that every attempt to formulate a "Reconciling Theory," a theory that would …


Property As Legal Knowledge: Means And Ends, Annelise Riles Dec 2004

Property As Legal Knowledge: Means And Ends, Annelise Riles

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

This article takes anthropologists’ renewed interest in property theory as an opportunity to consider legal theory-making as an ethnographic subject in its own right. My focus is on one particular construct – the instrument, or relation of means to ends, that animates both legal and anthropological theories about property. An analysis of the workings of this construct leads to the conclusion that rather than critique the ends of legal knowledge, the anthropology of property should devote itself to articulating its own means.


Is Land Special? The Unjustified Preference For Landownership In Regulatory Takings Law, Eduardo M. Peñalver Jan 2004

Is Land Special? The Unjustified Preference For Landownership In Regulatory Takings Law, Eduardo M. Peñalver

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

This article critiques the Court's attempt to cabin the Lucas "per se" takings rule by limiting it to real property. It argues that the distinction between real and personal property cannot be justified by history or the differing expectations of property owners. It then applies five theoretical frameworks (libertarian, personhood, utilitarian, public choice, and Thomistic-Aristotelian natural law) and finds that none of them supports the jurisprudential distinction between real and personal property. As a result, the article argues that "because the distinction between personal and real property is an unprincipled one, it cannot save the Court from the unpalatable implications …


Tahoe's Requiem: The Death Of The Scalian View Of Property And Justice, Laura S. Underkuffler Jan 2004

Tahoe's Requiem: The Death Of The Scalian View Of Property And Justice, Laura S. Underkuffler

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.