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The Filibuster And The Framing: Why The Cloture Rule Is Unconstitutional And What To Do About It, Dan T. Coenen
The Filibuster And The Framing: Why The Cloture Rule Is Unconstitutional And What To Do About It, Dan T. Coenen
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The U.S. Senate’s handling of filibusters has changed dramatically in recent decades. As a result, the current sixty-vote requirement for invoking cloture of debate does not produce protracted speechmaking on the Senate floor, as did predecessors of this rule in earlier periods of our history. Rather, the upper chamber now functions under a “stealth filibuster” system that in practical effect requires action by a supermajority to pass proposed bills. This Article demonstrates why this system offends a constitutional mandate of legislative majoritarianism in light of well-established Framing-era understandings and governing substance-over-form principles of interpretation. Having established the presence of a …
The Originalist Case Against Congressional Supermajority Voting Rules, Dan T. Coenen
The Originalist Case Against Congressional Supermajority Voting Rules, Dan T. Coenen
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Controversy over the Senate’s filibuster practice dominates modern discussion of American legislative government. With increasing frequency, commentators have urged that the upper chamber’s requirement of sixty votes to close debate on pending matters violates a majority-rulebased norm of constitutional law. Proponents of this view, however, tend to gloss over a more basic question: Does the Constitution’s Rules of Proceedings Clause permit the houses of Congress to adopt internal parliamentary requirements under which a bill is deemed “passed” only if it receives supermajority support? This question is important. Indeed, the House already has such a rule in place, and any challenge …
The Most Rational Branch: Guinn V. Legislature And The Judiciary's Role As Helpful Arbiter Of Conflict, Jeffrey W. Stempel
The Most Rational Branch: Guinn V. Legislature And The Judiciary's Role As Helpful Arbiter Of Conflict, Jeffrey W. Stempel
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When the Nevada Supreme Court decided Guinn v. Legislature, one would have thought from reading the popular press accounts that the court had forcibly displaced the State legislature by means of a violent coup d'etat. Newspaper accounts of the decision referred to it as a usurpation of power in violation of clear constitutional language, belittling the court in language sometimes more appropriate to the baseball bleachers than to serious editorial commentary. Following suit, politicized elements of the citizenry began a recall effort (seemingly unsuccessful as of this writing) directed at the court as well as joining the chorus of criticisms. …