Law Commons^™

The Alignment Of Law And Norms: Of Mirrors, Bulwarks, And Pressure Valves, Mark A. Edwards

Faculty Scholarship

Why does law mirror norms sometimes, but other times not? This article examines two types of intervening factors that sometimes cause a persistent misalignment between law and norms: pressure valves and bulwarks.

Pressure valves are mechanisms that relieve the pressure placed on the law to change despite a gap with social norms. Pressure valves are found in two distinct social phenomena.

First, pressure on law to change to reflect social norms is relieved when law is not enforced against behavior that is illegal, but socially acceptable. Formally deviant acts that are socially acceptable often do not generate an enforcement response. …

Eighth Circuit Trademark Opinions, Kenneth L. Port

Faculty Scholarship

The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals’ trademark jurisprudence has been truly fair and balanced since the 1946 passage of the Lanham Act. The court has created this fair and balanced jurisprudence by creating firm standards and sticking to them. Although not the most popular circuit in which to find a trademark case, the Eighth Circuit has kept a constant vigil to assure that trademark plaintiffs do not dominate over trademark defendants. This balanced approach to trademark law is consistent with the Minnesota Supreme Court, which recently held that “advertising injury” included trademark infringement, and therefore the defendant’s insurance carrier had …

Foreword: Poverty Law Issue, Ann Juergens

Faculty Scholarship

This Poverty Law Issue provides testimony as to why and how the legal profession, the government, and society can better provide justice for people of small means. Overall, this Poverty Law Issue contributes to understanding how we may ensure that the difficulty of poverty borne by our fellow citizens does not become compounded by injustice. For when justice is compromised for one group, its integrity as a whole may rightly be questioned.

The Human Dignity Of Clients, Kate Kruse

Faculty Scholarship

This essay reviews David Luban's forthcoming book, Legal Ethics and Human Dignity. At the heart of this new book is an argument that interactions between lawyers and clients ought to be at the center of jurisprudential inquiry. Pointing out that most cases do not go to trial and that much transactional work occurs outside the litigation context, he argues that law's defining moments occur when a "client sketches out a problem and a lawyer tenders advice," rather than when a judge decides a litigant's case. This review essay examines how Luban might elaborate a new "jurisprudence of lawyering" by examining …

Minnesota's Distortion Of Rule 609, Ted Sampsell-Jones

Faculty Scholarship

Rule of Evidence 609, which governs the admission of prior convictions of a witness for purposes of impeachment, occupies an important place in the day to day operation of American criminal trials. The rule is a compromise that reflects these competing values. It admits some prior convictions but not all. Crimen falsi offenses such as perjury and fraud are automatically admissible under 609(a)(2). All other felonies are analyzed under the balancing test of 609(a)(1), which allows the admission of a defendant-witness's crimes if the “probative value of admitting this evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to the accused.” The rule seeks …

Five Modern Notions In Search Of An Author: The Ideology Of The Intimate Society In Constitutional Speech Law, Marie Failinger

Faculty Scholarship

In this article, drawing heavily on the work of sociologist Richard Sennett, the author argues that the Court’s jurisprudence lends credence to, and exacerbates, five damaging “common sense” notions about American public social life: that public space and time are naked or empty, and can be imagined as no more than transportation tunnels or even the binoculars of a voyeur, as illustrated by the public forum doctrine; that massed acts of public communication, or “speech crowds” are dangerous and must be controlled by force, as the public forum and “clear and present danger” doctrines suggest; that “shadow” space for deviant …

Rosalie Wahl: Her Extraordinary Contributions To Legal Education, James F. Hogg

Faculty Scholarship

Justice Rosalie Wahl is well-known as the first woman to be appointed to the Minnesota Supreme Court, but she has made a lesser known, yet critical, contribution to the quality and effectiveness of legal education in this country. As chair of the American Bar Association's Section on Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar, Wahl created the MacCrate Commission. The MacCrate Report charts the way for improvement in law school teaching and learning, and the discussion following the report lead to the creation of an ABA Commission to take testimony and review the ABA Accreditation Standards. Wahl also chaired this …

Fundamental Rights In The "Gray" Area: The Right Of Privacy Under The Minnesota Constitution, Michael K. Steenson

Faculty Scholarship

This Article explores the constitutional aspects of Minnesota privacy law. Part II briefly explains federal privacy law to provide a baseline for consideration of privacy law in Minnesota. Part III examines the right of privacy as it has evolved in the Minnesota common law. Part IV evaluates the Minnesota Supreme Court's application of federal privacy standards and then examines the court's decisions that outline the right of privacy under the Minnesota Constitution. Part V concludes by raising questions concerning the potential application of the court's concept of privacy under the Minnesota Constitution as applied to two areas: same-sex marriages and …

A Tribute To Peter S. Popovich, James F. Hogg

Faculty Scholarship

A tribute to Peter S. Popovich, Chief Justice of the Minnesota Supreme Court 1989-1990 and William Mitchell College of Law alumni.

Rethinking Harmless Constitutional Error, A. Kimberley Dayton

Faculty Scholarship

This article examines the increasing role of the Chapman Rule and its effect on the harmless error doctrine and outlines a coherent doctrine of constitutional error responsive to the purposes of the various constitutional protections afforded criminal defendants. Part I evaluates the Court's existing harmless error jurisprudence. Part II proposes a harmless error doctrine that, unlike the Court's approach, responds to constitutional values unrelated to truth determination. The last two parts of the Article address two problems precipitated by the use of outcome-oriented rules to define and remedy constitutional error. Part III discusses when such a rule should be used …