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Series

International Law

Faculty Scholarship

2012

Customary international law

Articles 1 - 3 of 3

Full-Text Articles in Law

Use Of Comparative Law In Determining The Customary International Law Of Human Rights, Kenneth S. Gallant Jan 2012

Use Of Comparative Law In Determining The Customary International Law Of Human Rights, Kenneth S. Gallant

Faculty Scholarship

Comparative law method is essential to determining the customary international law status of rules of human rights law. Doing the hard, detailed work of comparative law is necessary if we are to give up on the unfortunate tendency to make overly broad, unsupported claims that wide varieties of human rights have passed into customary international law.

The traditional use of only interstate practice in determining rules of customary international law is insufficient where the rules concern relationships between states and individuals, especially their own nationals. This, however, is the essence of human rights law.

Comparative law techniques allow, and are …


Comparative Law And International Human Rights Law: Non-Retroactivity And Lex Certa In Criminal Law, Kenneth S. Gallant Jan 2012

Comparative Law And International Human Rights Law: Non-Retroactivity And Lex Certa In Criminal Law, Kenneth S. Gallant

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.


Codifying Custom, Timothy Meyer Jan 2012

Codifying Custom, Timothy Meyer

Faculty Scholarship

Codifying decentralized forms of law, such as the common law and customary law, has been a cornerstone of the positivist turn in legal theory since at least the nineteenth century. Commentators laud codification’s purported virtues, including systematizing, centralizing, and clarifying the law. These attributes are thought to increase the general welfare of those subject to legal rules, and therefore to justify and explain codification. The codification literature, however, overlooks codification’s distributive consequences. In so doing, the literature misses the primary motive for codification: to define legal rules in a way that advantages individual codifying institutions, regardless of how codification affects …