Law Commons^™

Myth, Inference And Evidence In Sexual Assault Trials, Lisa Dufraimont

Articles & Book Chapters

In sexual assault cases, the ability to distinguish myths and stereotypes from legitimate lines of reasoning continues to be a challenge for Canadian courts. The author argues that this challenge could be overcome by clearly identifying problematic inferences in sexual assault cases as prohibited lines of reasoning, while allowing the defence to bring forward evidence that is logically relevant to the material issues so long as it does not raise these prohibited inferences.

This paper advances that judges should take a broad view of relevance as an evidentiary approach in the adjudication of sexual assault cases. This approach allows for …

What Humility Isn’T: Responsibility And The Judicial Role, Benjamin Berger

Articles & Book Chapters

In recent years, academic literature has given some attention to humility as an important adjudicative principle or virtue. Drawing inspiration from a Talmudic tale, this chapter suggests that the picture of judicial humility painted in this literature is not only incomplete, but even potentially dangerous so. Seeking to complete the picture of what this virtue might entail, this piece explores the idea that humility is found in awareness of one’s position and role in respect of power, and a willingness to accept the burdens of responsibility that flow from this. The chapter examines elements of Chief Justice McLachlin’s criminal justice …

Limited Admissibility And Its Limitations, Lisa Dufraimont

Articles & Book Chapters

Among the challenges facing juries and judges in adjudicating cases is the obligation to use evidence for limited purposes. Evidence inadmissible for one purpose is frequently admissible for other purposes, a situation known as "limited admissibility". Where limited admissibility arises in jury trials, courts generally deliver limiting instructions outlining the inferences that can legitimately be drawn from the evidence and identifying prohibited lines of reasoning to be avoided. Limiting instructions represent an expedient solution to limited-admissibility problems, but they create obvious problems of their own. A thoughtful observer might suspect-as psychological studies confirm-that limiting instructions are likely to fail in …

Realizing The Potential Of The Principled Approach To Evidence, Lisa Dufraimont

Articles & Book Chapters

Ron Delisle's concern that lawyers and judges be constantly mindful of the purposes and policies underlying the rules of evidence led him to become one of the pioneers of the principled approach to evidence. This paper seeks to evaluate the extent to which the efforts of Canadian courts to incorporate principles into evidence law have alleviated the problem of the complexity of the traditional rules. Evidentiary rules are complex because they are dense or technical. Evidentiary principles are more capable of flexible and contextual application than evidentiary rules, but principles too are complex in the sense that they are less …

Regulating Unreliable Evidence: Can Evidence Rules Guide Juries And Prevent Wrongful Convictions, Lisa Dufraimont

Articles & Book Chapters

Recent years have seen increasing concern over the prevalence of wrongful convictions in Canadian criminal courts. This concern is particularly pronounced in jury trials, as jurors are untrained and often lack the familiarity, experience and knowledge required to evaluate evidence of doubtful reliability. Research has suggested that three forms of evidence - eyewitness identification, confessions and jailhouse-informant testimony -pose particular reliability concerns in jury trials. The special problem, common to all three, is the tendency of jurors to overlook the factors that make them unreliable. Canadian criminal evidence law purports to address this problem, but the author argues that the …

The Rule In Hodge's Case: Rumours Of Its Death Are Greatly Exaggerated, Benjamin Berger

Articles & Book Chapters

Certain academic commentators and Canadian courts have announced the death of the rule in Hodge's Case. The author challenges this proclamation of death, observing that Hodge's rule is a particular manifestation of the epistemology that informs our law of evidence. He argues not only that the rule is doctrinally intact, but that the principles and spirit that animate Hodge's rule have broad influence in our law of evidence and have utility in the appellate review of unreasonable verdicts. Hodge's rule, Hodge-like reasoning, and the associated epistemology, are alive and well in Canada.