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Series

Criminal Procedure

University of Richmond

Plea bargaining

Publication Year

Articles 1 - 3 of 3

Full-Text Articles in Law

Can Prosecutors Bluff? Brady V. Maryland And Plea Bargaining, John G. Douglass Apr 2007

Can Prosecutors Bluff? Brady V. Maryland And Plea Bargaining, John G. Douglass

Law Faculty Publications

The author discusses the symbolic value of the Brady rule in the pretrial context in the U.S. criminal justice system. Brady's symbolic power remains stronger than its corrective power in post-trial motions. It serves as a constitutional reminder to prosecutors because they cannot serve as architects of unfairness. Most prosecutors disclose more Brady material in pretrial discovery than the constitutional rule actually demands. This indicates that prosecutors can bluff.


Accuracy Where It Matters: Brady V. Maryland In The Plea Bargaining Context, Corinna Barrett Lain Jan 2002

Accuracy Where It Matters: Brady V. Maryland In The Plea Bargaining Context, Corinna Barrett Lain

Law Faculty Publications

Professor Lain argues that the role of Brady v. Maryland in protecting the innocent from wrongful conviction is just as essential in the plea bargaining context as it is at trial, and that therefore even defendants who plead guilty should be entitled to Brady's protections. However, she concludes that Brady's application in the plea bargaining context is destined to provide only a shadow of the protection Brady provides at trial because of the materiality standard currently used to judge post-plea Brady claims. In making both points, she employs a model of the plea bargaining defendant's decision-making process ...


Fatal Attraction? The Uneasy Courtship Of Brady And Plea Bargaining, John G. Douglass Jan 2001

Fatal Attraction? The Uneasy Courtship Of Brady And Plea Bargaining, John G. Douglass

Law Faculty Publications

Part I of this Article discusses the natural attraction between Brady-a rule requiring disclosure of evidence favorable to a defendant-and plea bargaining-a practice where such information is at a premium for defendants. Part II describes how an increasing number of courts have adapted Brady to fit in the world of a plea bargain, in the process changing Brady's point of reference from the jury's verdict to the defendant's tactical decision to plead guilty. Part ill argues that this change in focus narrows Brady's substantive coverage and renders the rule practically unenforceable following most guilty pleas. Part ...