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Articles 1 - 7 of 7
Full-Text Articles in Law
Amending Corporate Charters And Bylaws, Albert H. Choi, Geeyoung Min
Amending Corporate Charters And Bylaws, Albert H. Choi, Geeyoung Min
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Recently, courts have embraced the contractarian theory that corporate charters and bylaws constitute a “contract” between the shareholders and the corporation and have been more willing to uphold bylaws unilaterally adopted by the directors. This paper examines the contractarian theory by drawing a parallel between amending charters and bylaws, on the one hand, and amending contracts, on the other. In particular, the paper compares the right to unilaterally amend corporate bylaws with the right to unilaterally modify contract terms, and highlights how contract law imposes various limitations on the modifying party’s discretion. More generally, when the relationship of contracting parties …
Distributive Justice And Donative Intent, Alexander Boni-Saenz
Distributive Justice And Donative Intent, Alexander Boni-Saenz
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The inheritance system is beset by formalism. Probate courts reject wills on technicalities and refuse to correct obvious drafting mistakes by testators. These doctrines lead to donative errors, or outcomes that are not in line with the decedent’s donative intent. While scholars and reformers have critiqued the intent-defeating effects of formalism in the past, none have examined the resulting distribution of donative errors and connected it to broader social and economic inequalities. Drawing on egalitarian theories of distributive justice, this Article develops a novel critique of formalism in the inheritance law context. The central normative claim is that formalistic wills …
The Perverse Consequences Of Disclosing Standard Terms, Tess Wilkinson-Ryan
The Perverse Consequences Of Disclosing Standard Terms, Tess Wilkinson-Ryan
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Although assent is the doctrinal and theoretical hallmark of contract, its relevance for form contracts has been drastically undermined by the overwhelming evidence that no one reads standard terms. Until now, most political and academic discussions of this phenomenon have acknowledged the truth of universally unread contracts, but have assumed that even unread terms are at best potentially helpful, and at worst harmless. This Article makes the empirical case that unread terms are not a neutral part of American commerce; instead, the mere fact of fine print inhibits reasonable challenges to unfair deals. The experimental study reported here tests the …
Contract Consideration And Behavior, David A. Hoffman, Zev. J. Eigen
Contract Consideration And Behavior, David A. Hoffman, Zev. J. Eigen
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Contract recitals are ubiquitous. Yet, we have a thin understanding of how individuals behave with respect to these doctrinally important relics. Most jurists follow Lon Fuller in concluding that when read, contract recitals accomplish their purpose: to caution against inconsiderate contractual obligation. Notwithstanding the foundational role that this assumption has played in doctrinal and theoretical debates, it has not been tested. This Article offers what we believe to be the first experimental evidence of the effects of formal recitals of contract obligation — and, importantly too, disclaimers of contractual obligation — on individual behavior. In a series of online experiments, …
Bankruptcy On The Side, Kenneth Ayotte, Anthony J. Casey, David A. Skeel Jr.
Bankruptcy On The Side, Kenneth Ayotte, Anthony J. Casey, David A. Skeel Jr.
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This article provides a framework for analyzing side agreements in corporate bankruptcy, such as intercreditor and “bad boy” agreements. These agreements are controversial because they commonly include a promise by one party to remain silent – to waive some procedural right they would otherwise have under the Bankruptcy Code – at potentially crucial points in the reorganization process.
Using simplified examples, we show that side agreements create benefits in some instances, but parties to a side agreement may have incentive to contract for specific performance or excessive stipulated damages that impose negative externalities on non-parties to the agreement. A promise …
In Defense Of The Restatement Of Liability Insurance Law, Tom Baker, Kyle D. Logue
In Defense Of The Restatement Of Liability Insurance Law, Tom Baker, Kyle D. Logue
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For most non-contractual legal claims for damages that are brought against individuals or firms, there is some form of liability insurance coverage. The Restatement of the Law Liability Insurance is the American Law Institute’s first effort to “restate” the common law governing such liability insurance policies, and we are the reporters. In a recent essay funded by the insurance industry, Yale Law Professor George Priest launched a strident critique of the Restatement project, arguing that the rules adopted in the Restatement:
(a) are radically contrary to existing case law,
(b) have a naïve “pro-policyholder” bias that ignores basic economic insights …
Why Flexibility Matters: Inequality And Contract Pluralism, Jeremiah A. Ho
Why Flexibility Matters: Inequality And Contract Pluralism, Jeremiah A. Ho
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In the decade since the Great Recession, various contract scholars have observed that one reason the financial crisis was so “great” was due in part to contract law—or, more precisely, the failures of contract law for not curbing the risky lending practices in the American housing market. However, there is another reason why contracts made that recession so great: contracts furthered inequality. In recent years, when economic inequality has become a dominant national conversation topic, we can see development of that inequality in the Great Recession. And indeed, contract law was complicit. While contractual flexibility and innovation were available to …