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Series

Civil Rights and Discrimination

Constitutional Law

2016

Articles 1 - 2 of 2

Full-Text Articles in Law

A Civil Rights Act For The 21st Century: The Privileges And Immunities Clause And A Constitutional Guarantee To Be Free From Discriminatory Impact, Mark Dorosin Jan 2016

A Civil Rights Act For The 21st Century: The Privileges And Immunities Clause And A Constitutional Guarantee To Be Free From Discriminatory Impact, Mark Dorosin

Journal Publications

As the nation reflects on the fiftieth anniversaries of the various civil rights legislation of the 1960s' and considers the challenges that remain for fully addressing our history of racial discrimination, segregation, and suppression, we must begin with a very fundamental question: What is the harm that we are seeking to address, and how effectively do our current civil rights laws work towards achieving that goal? Given our collective success in addressing some of the most egregious intentional discrimination, as well as the intransigent, and evolving nature of institutional racism, it is time for a new Civil Rights Act that …


Justice And Accountability: Activist Judging In The Light Of Democratic Constitutionalism And Democratic Experimentalism, William H. Simon Jan 2016

Justice And Accountability: Activist Judging In The Light Of Democratic Constitutionalism And Democratic Experimentalism, William H. Simon

Faculty Scholarship

This essay examines the charge that activist judging is inconsistent with democracy in the light of two recent perspectives in legal scholarship. The perspectives – Democratic Constitutionalism and Democratic Experimentalism – suggest in convergent and complementary ways that the charge ignores or oversimplifies relevant features of both judging and democracy. In particular, the charge exaggerates the pre-emptive effect of activist judging, and it implausibly conflates democracy with electoral processes. In addition, it understands consensus as a basis for judicial legitimacy solely in terms of pre-existing agreement and ignores the contingent legitimacy that can arise from the potential for subsequent agreement.