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Full-Text Articles in Law
Caremark'S Butterfly Effect, Angela N. Aneiros, Karen E. Woody
Caremark'S Butterfly Effect, Angela N. Aneiros, Karen E. Woody
Scholarly Articles
In 1996, the Delaware Court of Chancery detailed the minimum standard for corporate boards of directors (“board”) with regard to corporate compliance programs and monitoring protocols. The landmark Caremark decision held that directors would not face liability for a breach of fiduciary duties unless they failed to implement a system of controls and compliance, or knowingly failed to monitor that system. In order to bring a successful Caremark claim, plaintiffs must prove that the board operated in bad faith by failing to exercise oversight in a sustained or systemic way. The Delaware Court of Chancery opinion noted that the theory …
Corporate Law For Good People, Yuval Feldman, Adi Libson, Gideon Parchomovsky
Corporate Law For Good People, Yuval Feldman, Adi Libson, Gideon Parchomovsky
All Faculty Scholarship
This article offers a novel analysis of the field of corporate governance by viewing it through the lens of behavioral ethics. It calls for both shifting the focus of corporate governance to a new set of loci of potential corporate wrongdoing and adding new tools to the corporate governance arsenal. The behavioral ethics scholarship emphasizes the large share of wrongdoing generated by "good people" whose intention is to act ethically. Their wrongdoing stems from "bounded ethicality" -- various cognitive and motivational processes that lead to biased decisions that seem legitimate. In the legal domain, corporate law provides the most fertile …
Re-Examining The Law And Economics Of The Business Judgment Rule: Notes For Its Implementation In Non-Us Jurisdictions, Aurelio Gurrea-Martinez
Re-Examining The Law And Economics Of The Business Judgment Rule: Notes For Its Implementation In Non-Us Jurisdictions, Aurelio Gurrea-Martinez
Research Collection Yong Pung How School Of Law
The business judgment rule, as it has been traditionally understood, seems to be based on three underlying assumptions that make this rule economically desirable. First, directors are subject to a credible threat of being sued for a breach of the duty of care. Second, the primary role of the corporation is to maximise shareholder value. Third, shareholders want the directors to pursue those investment projects with the highest net present value regardless of their volatility. This article challenges these assumptions and argues that the business judgment rule might not be desirable in some jurisdictions outside the United States and even …
A Rule-Based Method For Comparing Corporate Laws, Lynn M. Lopucki
A Rule-Based Method For Comparing Corporate Laws, Lynn M. Lopucki
UF Law Faculty Publications
Part I explains the processes for specifying a Scenario. It introduces the Scenario that will serve as the illustration in the remainder of this Article—a comparison of the liability of directors for the exercise of poor judgment in a Delaware corporation with the corresponding liability in a United Kingdom public limited company. Part II explains and illustrates the necessity of selecting specific entity types for comparison. Part III describes and illustrates the method for resolving the Scenario in both jurisdictions. Part IV explains and illustrates the novel process for close comparison—the extraction, juxtaposition, and comparison of decisional rules from the …
Corporate Officers As Agents, Deborah A. Demott
Corporate Officers As Agents, Deborah A. Demott
Faculty Scholarship
Although officers are crucial to corporate operations, scholarly and theoretical accounts tend to slight officers and amalgamate them with directors into a single category, "managers." This essay anchors officers within the common law of agency-as does black-letter law-which crisply differentiates officers from directors. Understanding that agency is central of the legal account of officers' positions and responsibilities is crucial to seeing why, like directors, officers are fiduciaries, but distinctively so, not as instances of generic "corporate fiduciaries." Officers, like directors, owe duties of loyalty, but also particularized duties of care, competence, and diligence. Additionally, officers' duties of performance encompass two …
The Shareholder Value Myth, Lynn A. Stout
The Shareholder Value Myth, Lynn A. Stout
Cornell Law Faculty Publications
No abstract provided.
Is The Corporate Director's Duty Of Care A 'Fiduciary' Duty? Does It Matter?, Christopher M. Bruner
Is The Corporate Director's Duty Of Care A 'Fiduciary' Duty? Does It Matter?, Christopher M. Bruner
Scholarly Articles
While reference to "fiduciary duties" (plural) is routinely employed in the United States as a convenient short-hand for a corporate director's duties of care and loyalty, other common-law countries generally treat loyalty as the sole "fiduciary duty." This contrast prompts some important questions about the doctrinal structure for duty of care analysis adopted in Delaware, the principal jurisdiction of incorporation for U.S. public companies. Specifically, has the evolution of Delaware's convoluted and problematic framework for evaluating disinterested board conduct been facilitated by styling care a "fiduciary" duty? If so, then how should Delaware lawmakers and judges respond moving forward?
In …
Corporate Control And The Need For Meaningful Board Accountability, Michelle M. Harner
Corporate Control And The Need For Meaningful Board Accountability, Michelle M. Harner
Faculty Scholarship
Corporations are vulnerable to the greed, self-dealing and conflicts of those in control of the corporation. Courts historically have regulated this potential abuse by designating the board of directors and senior management as fiduciaries. In some instances, however, shareholders, creditors or others outside of corporate management may influence corporate decisions and, in the process, extract corporate value. Courts generally address this type of corporate damage in one of two ways: they designate controlling shareholders as corporate fiduciaries and they characterize creditors, customers and others as contract parties with no fiduciary duties. The traditional roles of corporate shareholders and creditors may …
The Business Judgment Rule, Disclosure, And Executive Compensation, D. A. Jeremy Telman
The Business Judgment Rule, Disclosure, And Executive Compensation, D. A. Jeremy Telman
Law Faculty Publications
Despite its ubiquity in corporate law, the business judgment rule remains a doctrinal puzzle. Both courts and scholars offer different understandings of the Rule's role in litigation brought against corporate directors and different justifications for its deployment to insulate such directors from liability for breaches of fiduciary duties. This Article rejects all existing justifications for the Rule and argues that the Rule is no longer needed to protect directors from liability either because the justifications offered never made any sense or because directors are now protected by other, statutory means. Rather, the Rule is needed today not to protect directors, …
The Duty To Creditors Reconsidered - Filling A Much Needed Gap In Corporation Law, Richard A. Booth
The Duty To Creditors Reconsidered - Filling A Much Needed Gap In Corporation Law, Richard A. Booth
Faculty Scholarship
The most fundamental question of corporation law is to whom does the board of directors of a corporation owe its fiduciary duty. Recently, the question has tended to be whether and under what circumstances the board of directors has the duty to maximize stockholder wealth. But if a corporation is insolvent (or close to it), business decisions designed to maximize stockholder wealth may result in a reduction of creditor wealth. Although the conventional wisdom is that creditors must protect themselves by contractual means, there is a substantial body of case law that says that creditors can assert claims sounding in …
Corporate Officers And The Business Judgment Rule, Lyman P.Q. Johnson
Corporate Officers And The Business Judgment Rule, Lyman P.Q. Johnson
Scholarly Articles
This article argues that the business judgment rule - a cornerstone concept in corporate law - does not and should not extend to corporate officers in the same broad manner in which it is applied to directors. The argument proceeds along both descriptive and normative lines. After first reviewing judicial decisions, the article concludes that, notwithstanding frequent, broad assertions to the contrary, application of the rule to corporate officers is not firmly established in case law. The article next examines the policy case by assessing three conventional rationales for applying the rule to directors and concluding, on balance, that the …
The Quiet Transformation Of Corporate Law, Mark J. Loewenstein
The Quiet Transformation Of Corporate Law, Mark J. Loewenstein
Publications
No abstract provided.
In Praise Of Procedure: An Economic And Behavioral Defense Of Smith V. Van Gorkom And The Business Judgment Rule, Lynn A. Stout
In Praise Of Procedure: An Economic And Behavioral Defense Of Smith V. Van Gorkom And The Business Judgment Rule, Lynn A. Stout
Cornell Law Faculty Publications
No abstract provided.
The Rule That Isn't A Rule - The Business Judgment Rule, Douglas M. Branson
The Rule That Isn't A Rule - The Business Judgment Rule, Douglas M. Branson
Articles
On a doctrinal basis, few areas of corporate law are more confused then the duty of care applicable to corporate officials and its handmaiden, the business judgment rule. The tendency of many scholars and practitioners has been to collapse the duty of care into the business judgment rule, as Professor Stuart Cohn pointed out more than a decade ago. The business judgment rule is a separate legal construct that is related to, but separate from, the duty of care and one which protects only proactive and not somnambulant directors and officers. The business judgment rule stays at center stage for …
The Modest Business Judgment Rule, Lyman P.Q. Johnson
The Modest Business Judgment Rule, Lyman P.Q. Johnson
Scholarly Articles
This article argues that Delaware mis-formulates and mis-uses the business judgment rule. Properly understood, the business judgment rule's function in corporate law is quite modest. It is a narrowly-drawn judicial policy of nonreview which, in duty of care cases, shields the merits of board decisions from judicial scrutiny. The article contends that the business judgment rule, therefore, should be de-emphasized as an analytical construct in the law of director fiduciary duties and should be sharply differentiated from the broader-gauged duty of due care. Doing so will pave the way for Delaware courts to rethink the importance of articulating a robust, …
Rethinking Judicial Review Of Director Care, Lyman P.Q. Johnson
Rethinking Judicial Review Of Director Care, Lyman P.Q. Johnson
Scholarly Articles
This article offers an extended critique of the Delaware Supreme Court's unprecedented use of an entire fairness test in a breach of due care setting, as first articulated in Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc. 634 A.2d 345 (Del. 1993) and Cinerama, Inc. v. Technocolor, Inc., 663 A.2d 1156 (Del. 1995). The article then argues for a generalized reasonableness standard for director conduct and for judicially reviewing care claims, thereby providing Delaware law with something it has lacked historically ? a pervasive (yet still streamlined) duty of due care.
Thoughts Evoked By "Accounting And The New Corporate Law", Ted J. Fiflis
Thoughts Evoked By "Accounting And The New Corporate Law", Ted J. Fiflis
Publications
No abstract provided.
Why Not Good Faith?-The Foibles Of Fairness In Closely Held Corporations, Daniel S. Kleinberger
Why Not Good Faith?-The Foibles Of Fairness In Closely Held Corporations, Daniel S. Kleinberger
Faculty Scholarship
This essay describes the contours of the shareholder’s duty to be fair and explores some of the problems caused by the law’s imprecision in defining the duty of fairness. Because this duty is best understood as a rejection of old norms, part one of this essay describes the traditional doctrines of intra-corporate responsibility. Part two describes the special characteristics of a close corporation and outlines how those characteristics pushed close corporation law to new concepts of fairness and shareholder duties. Part three attempts to delineate those duties of fairness and also to highlight some of the dangers that arise when …
Toward An Auction Market For Corporate Control And The Demise Of The Business Judgment Rule, Mark J. Loewenstein
Toward An Auction Market For Corporate Control And The Demise Of The Business Judgment Rule, Mark J. Loewenstein
Publications
No abstract provided.