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Full-Text Articles in Law
Judicial Federalism In The Ecj's Berlusconi Case: Toward More Credible Corporate Governance And Financial Reporting Recent Development, Martin Gelter, Mathias M. Siems
Judicial Federalism In The Ecj's Berlusconi Case: Toward More Credible Corporate Governance And Financial Reporting Recent Development, Martin Gelter, Mathias M. Siems
Faculty Scholarship
In recent years, the general public in many countries has become increasingly aware of issues concerning business accounting and financial reporting. Americans hardly need to be reminded of the Enron debacle, where members of the company's senior management engaged in fraudulent off-balance sheet transactions to disguise the true state of the company's financial condition, a scheme that auditors failed to uncover until the company's implosion. This and other major corporate governance cases involving questionable or fraudulent accounting practices led to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. This law was an unprecedented Congressional intervention into corporate governance, an arena that had previously …
Qualified Legal Compliance Committee: Using The Attorney Conduct Rules To Restructure The Board Of Directors, The Thirty-Third Annual Administrative Law Issue Agencies, Economic Justice, And Private Initiatives, Jill E. Fisch, Caroline M. Gentile
Qualified Legal Compliance Committee: Using The Attorney Conduct Rules To Restructure The Board Of Directors, The Thirty-Third Annual Administrative Law Issue Agencies, Economic Justice, And Private Initiatives, Jill E. Fisch, Caroline M. Gentile
Faculty Scholarship
The Securities and Exchange Commission introduced a new corporate governance structure, the qualified legal compliance committee, as part of the professional standards of conduct for attorneys mandated by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. QLCCs are consistent with the Commission's general approach to improving corporate governance through specialized committees of independent directors. This Article suggests, however, that assessing the benefits and costs of creating QLCCs may be more complex than is initially apparent. Importantly, QLCCs are unlikely to be effective in the absence of incentives for active director monitoring. This Article concludes by considering three ways of increasing these incentives.