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Full-Text Articles in Law

Daedalean Tinkering, Sean J. Griffith Jan 2005

Daedalean Tinkering, Sean J. Griffith

Faculty Scholarship

This Review describes David Skeel's account of corporate scandal and evaluates his policy recommendations in his recent book, Icarus in the Boardroom. It argues that although the book provides a compelling history of corporate scandal, its focus on federal responses to scandal--from the enactment of the Interstate Commerce Act to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act--misses an important part of the story. As corporate law scholars have long pointed out, corporations exist within a network of constraints, based in part on law and in part on markets, norms, and other non-legal sanctions. Because it omits any sustained discussion of the reaction of these …


Judicial Federalism In The Ecj's Berlusconi Case: Toward More Credible Corporate Governance And Financial Reporting Recent Development, Martin Gelter, Mathias M. Siems Jan 2005

Judicial Federalism In The Ecj's Berlusconi Case: Toward More Credible Corporate Governance And Financial Reporting Recent Development, Martin Gelter, Mathias M. Siems

Faculty Scholarship

In recent years, the general public in many countries has become increasingly aware of issues concerning business accounting and financial reporting. Americans hardly need to be reminded of the Enron debacle, where members of the company's senior management engaged in fraudulent off-balance sheet transactions to disguise the true state of the company's financial condition, a scheme that auditors failed to uncover until the company's implosion. This and other major corporate governance cases involving questionable or fraudulent accounting practices led to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. This law was an unprecedented Congressional intervention into corporate governance, an arena that had previously …


Structure Of Regulatory Competition In European Corporate Law, The , Martin Gelter Jan 2005

Structure Of Regulatory Competition In European Corporate Law, The , Martin Gelter

Faculty Scholarship

In its opinions in the cases Centros, Uberseering and Inspire Art, the ECJ has begun to open European corporate law for regulaton of competition, as it has been discussed in the US for several ldecades. This article analyses the stuictual conditions of competition on the supply and demand sides of the market for corporate law, and the impact of supranational influence. In doing so, it identifies several factors that have received little attention in the incipient European debate. The supply-side analysis shows that a European Delaware is implausible because of the interdependence of competitive advantages and the incentives to compete. …


Good Faith Business Judgment: A Theory Of Rhetoric In Corporate Law Jurisprudence, Sean J. Griffith Jan 2005

Good Faith Business Judgment: A Theory Of Rhetoric In Corporate Law Jurisprudence, Sean J. Griffith

Faculty Scholarship

This Article develops a theory of rhetoric in corporate law jurisprudence. It begins by examining a recent innovation in Delaware case law: the emerging principle of “good faith.” Good faith is an old notion in law generally, but it offers to bring significant change to corporate law, including realignment of the business judgment rule and a shift in the traditional balance between the authority of boards and the accountability of boards to courts. This Article argues, however, that good faith functions as a rhetorical device rather than a substantive standard. That is, it operates as a speech act, a performance, …


Uncovering A Gatekeeper: Why The Sec Should Mandate Disclosure Of Details Concerning Directors' And Officers' Liability Insurance Policies, Sean J. Griffith Jan 2005

Uncovering A Gatekeeper: Why The Sec Should Mandate Disclosure Of Details Concerning Directors' And Officers' Liability Insurance Policies, Sean J. Griffith

Faculty Scholarship

This Article explores the connection between corporate governance and directors’ and officers’ (D&O) insurance. It argues that D&O insurers act as gatekeepers and guarantors of corporate governance, screening and pricing corporate governance risks to maintain the profitability of their risk pools. As a result, in a well-working insurance market, D&O insurance premiums would convey the insurer's assessment of a firm's governance quality. Simply stated, firms with better corporate governance would pay relatively low D&O premiums, while firms with worse corporate governance would pay more. This simple relationship could signal important information to investors and other capital market participants. Unfortunately, the …


Law And The Rise Of The Firm , Henry Hansmann, Reiner Kraakman, Richard Squire Jan 2005

Law And The Rise Of The Firm , Henry Hansmann, Reiner Kraakman, Richard Squire

Faculty Scholarship

Organizational law empowers firms to hold assets and enter contracts as entities that are legally distinct from their owners and managers. Legal scholars and economists have commented extensively on one form of this partitioning between firms and owners: namely, the rule of limited liability that insulates firm owners from business debts. But a less-noticed form of legal partitioning, which we call "entity shielding," is both economically and historically more significant than limited liability. While limited liability shields owners' personal assets from a firm's creditors, entity shielding protects firm assets from the owners' personal creditors (and from creditors of other business …


New Business Entities In Evolutionary Perspective, Henry Hansmann, Reiner Kraakman, Richard Squire Jan 2005

New Business Entities In Evolutionary Perspective, Henry Hansmann, Reiner Kraakman, Richard Squire

Faculty Scholarship

The new types of business forms that have developed over the past thirty years all combine the freedom of contracting that is traditional to the partnership with the pattern of creditors' rights that is traditional to the business corporation. Legal scholars differ on the issue of whether these new business forms are more partnership-like or corporation-like. Those taking the partnership-like view argue that the degree of freedom of contract is the essential difference between the traditional corporation and partnership forms, while those adhering to the corporation-like view argue that the pattern of creditors' rights is the essential difference. The authors …