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Articles 1 - 5 of 5
Full-Text Articles in Law
The Mandatory Structure Of Corporate Law, Jeffrey N. Gordon
The Mandatory Structure Of Corporate Law, Jeffrey N. Gordon
Faculty Scholarship
It has become standard in the law and economics literature to refer to the corporation as a "nexus of contracts." On this view, the corporate entity is nothing more than a gathering point for a series of contracts, express and implied, among assorted actors: shareholders, bondholders, managers, employees, suppliers and customers, for example. This view rankles some sensibilities, because the economists' conception of a "contract" as an arrangement between two or more actors supported by reciprocal expectations and behavior is far broader than the lawyer's conception, which focuses on the existence of judicially cognizable duties and obligations. Thus the lawyer, …
Unstable Coalitions: Corporate Governance As A Multi-Player Game, John C. Coffee Jr.
Unstable Coalitions: Corporate Governance As A Multi-Player Game, John C. Coffee Jr.
Faculty Scholarship
This is an article written in honor of Professor Donald Schwartz, a leading figure in academic corporate law for over two decades, but also a man nearly unique in his willingness to move beyond corporate law to the general study of corporate behavior. In this light, this article will not explore the latest wrinkle in the law – the most recent case, latest SEC ruling, or newest takeover defense tactic – but will instead ask if there are new ways in which we should try to talk about corporate law and corporate behavior. These were questions that Don Schwartz repeatedly …
The Mandatory/Enabling Balance In Corporate Law: An Essay On The Judicial Role, John C. Coffee Jr.
The Mandatory/Enabling Balance In Corporate Law: An Essay On The Judicial Role, John C. Coffee Jr.
Faculty Scholarship
A half-filled glass of water can be described as either half full or half empty. The structure of American corporate law – partly enabling, partly mandatory in character – can be viewed in much the same way. Some commentators see American corporate law as primarily composed of mandatory rules that the shareholders themselves cannot waive or modify, In their view, this mandatory component compensates both for the absence of true bargaining among the parties and for the inevitable divergence of interests between the principals (the shareholders) and their agents (the managers and directors). Conversely, other commentators, to whom this Article …
Delaware's Intermediate Standard For Defensive Tactics: Is There Substance To Proportionality Review?, Ronald J. Gilson, Reinier Kraakman
Delaware's Intermediate Standard For Defensive Tactics: Is There Substance To Proportionality Review?, Ronald J. Gilson, Reinier Kraakman
Faculty Scholarship
The courts have long struggled with a standard for reviewing management's efforts to deter or defeat hostile takeovers. The usual standards of review in corporate law, the business judgment rule and the intrinsic fairness test, do not seem adequate when courts must evaluate defensive measures that implicate both management's business acumen and its loyalty to shareholder interests. Because evaluating a sale of the company is a complex business decision, management's response to a takeover bid resembles the normal business decisions that the business judgment rule largely insulates from judicial review.At the same time, however, a hostile takeover creates a potential …
Coming Of Age In A Corporate Law Firm: The Economics Of Associate Career Patterns, Ronald J. Gilson, Robert H. Mnookin
Coming Of Age In A Corporate Law Firm: The Economics Of Associate Career Patterns, Ronald J. Gilson, Robert H. Mnookin
Faculty Scholarship
The traditional American corporate law firm, long an oasis of organizational stability, in recent years has been the subject of dramatic change. The manner in which firms divide profits, perhaps the most revealing aspect of law firm organization because it displays the balance the firm has selected between risk-sharing and incentives, has changed in a critical way. From a long standing reliance on seniority that emphasizes risk-sharing, profit division is shifting to a system based on the productivity of individual partners that emphasizes incentives. With what seems to be only a short time lag from the change in how profits …