Law Commons^™

Golden Parachutes And The Limits Of Shareholder Voting, Albert H. Choi, Andrew C.W. Lund, Robert Schonlau

Articles

With the passage of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act in 2010, Congress attempted to constrain change-in-control payments (also known as “golden parachutes”) by giving shareholders the right to approve or disapprove such payments on an advisory basis. This Essay is the first to empirically examine the experience with the Say-on-Golden-Parachute (“SOGP”) vote. We find that unlike shareholder votes on proposed mergers, there is a significant amount of variation with respect to votes on golden parachutes. Notwithstanding the variation, however, the SOGP voting regime is likely ineffective in controlling golden parachute (“GP”) compensation. First, proxy advisors seem …

Tournament Of Managers: Lessons From The Academic Leadership Market, Usha Rodrigues

Scholarly Works

Why do firms usually make, not buy, their chief executive officers (CEOs)? Public corporations hire their CEOs from within the firm 78% of the time. They do so although earlier studies have found no clear evidence that internal hires perform better than external ones. So why do firms prefer them? Few scholars have focused on this simple question.

The reason why firms favor internal candidates matters not only in its own right, but also for an overlooked reason: it informs the controversial question of executive compensation. Currently board-compensation committees look to peer benchmarks to set executive pay. But, taking cues …

Corporate Officers As Agents, Deborah A. Demott

Faculty Scholarship

Although officers are crucial to corporate operations, scholarly and theoretical accounts tend to slight officers and amalgamate them with directors into a single category, "managers." This essay anchors officers within the common law of agency-as does black-letter law-which crisply differentiates officers from directors. Understanding that agency is central of the legal account of officers' positions and responsibilities is crucial to seeing why, like directors, officers are fiduciaries, but distinctively so, not as instances of generic "corporate fiduciaries." Officers, like directors, owe duties of loyalty, but also particularized duties of care, competence, and diligence. Additionally, officers' duties of performance encompass two …

Executive Trade Secrets, Tom C.W. Lin

UF Law Faculty Publications

The law discriminates among a corporation’s secrets. In the eyes of the law, commercial secrets of corporations are legitimate secrets that deserve legal protection and nondisclosure, but personal secrets of executives are not as deserving of legal protection and nondisclosure. This divergent treatment of secrets has resulted in a legal landscape of perplexing, paradoxical paths for corporations and executives concerning executive disclosures — a precarious landscape that has left corporations and investors dangerously susceptible to revelations of private facts that shock market valuation and institutional stability.

This Article explores this divergent treatment of secrets in the context of public corporations …

The Corporate Governance Of Iconic Executives, Tom C.W. Lin

UF Law Faculty Publications

This Essay explores the special corporate governance challenges posed by iconic executives. Iconic executives are complex, bittersweet figures in corporate governance narratives. They are alluring, larger-than-life corporate figures who often govern freely. Iconic executives frequently rule like monarchs over their firms, offering lofty promises to shareholders, directors, and managers under their reign. But like many stories of powerful and influential figures, the narratives of iconic executives also contain adversity and danger. Part of the acquiescence and enchantment with such figures is rooted in the virtuous promises embodied by their presence, promises of unity, accountability, and effectiveness in corporate governance. Unfortunately, …

(Not) Advising Corporate Officers About Fiduciary Duties, Lyman P.Q. Johnson, Robert V. Ricca

Scholarly Articles

This Article explores the intersection of an important, unresolved corporate law issue and an overlooked professional responsibility issue persistently arising in the corporate milieu. The corporate law question currently unaddressed in Delaware law is whether the fiduciary duties of corporate officers, as agents, are the same as, or different from, the fiduciary duties of corporate directors. A related question is whether, in reviewing officer conduct, courts will apply the business judgment rule in the same broad (and protective) manner in which it is applied to assessing director behavior.

The professional responsibility issue concerns whether, and how well, lawyers are advising …

The Social Responsibility Of Corporate Law Professors, Lyman P.Q. Johnson

Scholarly Articles

Most statements of corporate social responsibility focus on the responsibilities of corporate decision makers or their advisors Professor Johnson argues that corporate law professors-the persons who educate the students who will become lawyers counseling corporate decision makers-also have a social responsibility. He believes that professors should find various ways to raise the subject of corporate social responsibility in the basic corporations course, and he advocates rejecting a classroom approach that addresses only shareholder-manager relations After describing several possible ways to do this, Professor Johnson spotlights fiduciary laws as a fruitful area to enrich student understandings of director duties in a …

Executive Compensation In America: Optimal Contracting Or Extraction Of Rents?, Lucian A. Bebchuk, Jesse M. Fried, David I. Walker

Faculty Scholarship

This paper develops an account of the role and significance of rent extraction in executive compensation. Under the optimal contracting view of executive compensation, which has dominated academic research on the subject, pay arrangements are set by a board of directors that aims to maximize shareholder value by designing an optimal principal-agent contract. Under the alternative rent extraction view that we examine, the board does not operate at arm's length; rather, executives have power to influence their own compensation, and they use their power to extract rents. As a result, executives are paid more than is optimal for shareholders and, …

Dealing With The Differences In Compensating Corporate Executives And Llc Members, Samuel P. Starr, Joseph Walshe, Jay M. Lyman Payne

William & Mary Annual Tax Conference

No abstract provided.

Corporate Philanthropy, Executives' Pet Charities And The Agency Problem, Jayne W. Barnard

Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.

Private Practice For Public Consumption: Two Views Of Corporate Law, Jayne W. Barnard

Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.

The Corporate Officer's Independent Duty As A Tonic For The Anemic Law Of Executive Compensation, Douglas C. Michael

Law Faculty Scholarly Articles

History repeats itself in the law as in other arenas. In the law of executive compensation, such a repetition may be imminent. Ever since the advent of the large industrial corporation in the United States, there has been periodic outrage at payments made to its top executives. This repetition suggests that the law has failed to keep pace with the observed problems. Part I of this Article describes the current and historic uproar over executive compensation in large corporations in the United States. Part II provides the economic background of the process of negotiating executive compensation. Part III analyzes the …

Redefining Corporate Law, David K. Millon

Scholarly Articles

None available.

The Delaware Judiciary And The Meaning Of Corporate Life And Corporate Law, Lyman P.Q. Johnson

Scholarly Articles

No abstract provided.

The Case Beyond Time, Lyman P.Q. Johnson, David K. Millon

Scholarly Articles

The Delaware Supreme Court's opinion in Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc.' treats several important questions that arise in connection with hostile corporate takeovers. At the same time, it leaves three critical issues unanswered. In this article, we first briefly describe what the Time decision did, comparing Chancellor William Allen's somewhat discursive Chancery Court opinion with the more peremptory ruling of the Supreme Court. Next, we identify three unarticulated but potentially far-reaching implications of both the Supreme Court's and Chancellor Allen's reasoning that threaten to destabilize seemingly settled doctrine governing the conduct of target company management.

Curbing Management Conflicts Of Interest -- The Search For An Effective Deterrent, Jayne W. Barnard

Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.

The Eventual Clash Between Judicial And Legislative Notions Of Target Management Conduct, Lyman P.Q. Johnson

Scholarly Articles

No abstract provided.