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Common Ownership And Executive Incentives: The Implausibility Of Compensation As An Anticompetitive Mechanism, David I. Walker
Common Ownership And Executive Incentives: The Implausibility Of Compensation As An Anticompetitive Mechanism, David I. Walker
Faculty Scholarship
Mutual funds, pension funds and other institutional investors are a growing presence in U.S. equity markets, and these investors frequently hold large stakes in shares of competing companies. Because these common owners might prefer to maximize the values of their portfolios of companies, rather than the value of individual companies in isolation, this new reality has lead to a concern that companies in concentrated industries with high degrees of common ownership might compete less vigorously with each other than they otherwise would. But what mechanism would link common ownership with reduced competition? Some commentators argue that one of the most …
Tech, Regulatory Arbitrage, And Limits, Elizabeth Pollman
Tech, Regulatory Arbitrage, And Limits, Elizabeth Pollman
All Faculty Scholarship
Regulatory arbitrage refers to structuring activity to take advantage of gaps or differences in regulations or laws. Examples include Facebook modifying its terms and conditions to reduce the exposure of its user data to strict European privacy laws, and Uber and other platform companies organizing their affairs to categorize workers as non-employees. This essay explores the constraints and limits on regulatory arbitrage through the lens of the technology industry, known for its adaptiveness and access to strategic resources. Specifically, the essay explores social license and the bundling of laws and resources as constraining forces on regulatory arbitrage, and the legal …