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Articles 1 - 30 of 32
Full-Text Articles in Law
Nonprofit Executive Pay As An Agency Problem: Evidence From U.S. Colleges And Universities, David I. Walker, Brian D. Galle
Nonprofit Executive Pay As An Agency Problem: Evidence From U.S. Colleges And Universities, David I. Walker, Brian D. Galle
Faculty Scholarship
We analyze the determinants of the compensation of private college and university presidents from 1999 through 2007. We find that the fraction of institutional revenue derived from current donations is negatively associated with compensation and that presidents of religiously-affiliated institutions receive lower levels of compensation. Looking at the determinants of contributions, we find a negative association between presidential pay and subsequent donations. We interpret these results as consistent with the hypotheses that donors to nonprofits are sensitive to executive pay and that stakeholder outrage plays a role in constraining that pay. We discuss the implications of these findings for the …
Sales Suppression As A Service (Ssaas) & The Apple Store Solution, Richard Thompson Ainsworth
Sales Suppression As A Service (Ssaas) & The Apple Store Solution, Richard Thompson Ainsworth
Faculty Scholarship
The problem of sales suppression fraud is estimated to cost state and local governments $20 billion annually ($2 billion in New York restaurants alone). Modern sales suppression (skimming) is carried out with technology (Zappers and Phantom-ware). Nine undercover sting operations in and around Manhattan and the Bronx by investigators working for New York’s Department of Taxation and Finance (NY-DT&F) have identified the SSaaS variant of modern skimming.
A striking example of SSaaS may be unfolding in the $1 million sales suppression case against Congressman Michael Grimm (R-NY). It is alleged that Grimm skimmed sales from his Healthalicious restaurant in Manhattan, …
Confronting The Two Faces Of Corporate Fraud, Miriam H. Baer
Confronting The Two Faces Of Corporate Fraud, Miriam H. Baer
Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
The Structure Of Stockholder Litigation: When Do The Merits Matter, Minor Myers, Charles R. Korsmo
The Structure Of Stockholder Litigation: When Do The Merits Matter, Minor Myers, Charles R. Korsmo
Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
Is The Independent Director Model Broken?, Roberta Karmel
Is The Independent Director Model Broken?, Roberta Karmel
Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
The Emergence Of New Corporate Social Responsibility Regimes In China And India, Shruti Rana, Afra Afsharipour
The Emergence Of New Corporate Social Responsibility Regimes In China And India, Shruti Rana, Afra Afsharipour
Faculty Scholarship
In an era of financial crises, widening income disparities, and environmental and other calamities linked to corporations, calls for greater corporate social responsibility (“CSR”) are increasing rapidly around the world. Though CSR efforts have generally been viewed as voluntary actions undertaken by corporations, a new CSR model is emerging in China and India. In a marked departure from CSR as it is known in the United States and as it has been developing through global norms, China and India are moving towards mandatory, not voluntary, CSR regimes. They are doing so not only in a time of great global economic …
Finding Order In The Morass: The Three Real Justifications For Piercing The Corporate Veil, Jonathan Macey, Joshua Mitts
Finding Order In The Morass: The Three Real Justifications For Piercing The Corporate Veil, Jonathan Macey, Joshua Mitts
Faculty Scholarship
Few doctrines are more shrouded in mystery or litigated more often than piercing the corporate veil. We develop a new theoretical framework that posits that veil piercing is done to achieve three discrete public policy goals, each of which is consistent with economic efficiency: (1) achieving the purpose of an existing statute or regulation; (2) preventing shareholders from obtaining credit by misrepresentation; and (3) promoting the bankruptcy values of achieving the orderly, efficient resolution of a bankrupt's estate. We analyze the facts of veil-piercing cases to show how the outcomes are explained by our taxonomy. We demonstrate that a supposed …
Ongoing Issues In Russian Corporate Governance, Merritt B. Fox
Ongoing Issues In Russian Corporate Governance, Merritt B. Fox
Faculty Scholarship
This Article concerns Russian corporate governance today. It starts by arguing that there are fundamental differences between the policy questions raised by SOEs and those raised by non-SOEs and that the analysis needs to separate out these two kinds of corporations. The Article then goes on to consider several ongoing issues relating to non-SOEs. To start, it suggests the need for a set of rules, backed by reliably applied stiff sanctions, requiring disclosure of all situations where a person, by himself or as a member of a coordinated group, is the beneficial owner of sufficient shares to be able to …
Corporate Governance And Executive Compensation: Evidence From Japan, Robert J. Jackson Jr., Curtis J. Milhaupt
Corporate Governance And Executive Compensation: Evidence From Japan, Robert J. Jackson Jr., Curtis J. Milhaupt
Faculty Scholarship
Lawmakers around the world are now urging corporations to adopt governance and executive pay standards drawn largely from the American corporate law context. Yet little is known about how corporate governance actually influences executive compensation decisions outside of the United States-and whether adoption of these standards is likely to be desirable for investors abroad.
In this Article, we take advantage of a recent change in Japanese law to provide the first direct empirical evidence on executive pay in Japan. The evidence provides striking detail on the amount and structure of Japanese executive compensation. The data point to a previously unappreciated …
Assessing The Optimism Of Payday Loan Borrowers, Ronald J. Mann
Assessing The Optimism Of Payday Loan Borrowers, Ronald J. Mann
Faculty Scholarship
This Article compares the results from a survey administered to payday loan borrowers at the time of their loans to subsequent borrowing and repayment behavior. It thus presents the first direct evidence of the accuracy of payday loan borrowers’ understanding of how the product will be used. The data show, among other things, that about 60 percent of borrowers accurately predict how long it will take them finally to repay their payday loans. The evidence directly contradicts the oft-stated view that substantially all extended use of payday loans is the product of lender misrepresentation or borrower self-deception about how the …
Toward A Constitutional Review Of The Poison Pill Essay, Lucian A. Bebchuk, Robert J. Jackson Jr.
Toward A Constitutional Review Of The Poison Pill Essay, Lucian A. Bebchuk, Robert J. Jackson Jr.
Faculty Scholarship
We argue that the state-law rules governing poison pills are vulnerable to challenges based on preemption by the Williams Act. Such challenges, we show, could well have a major impact on the corporate law landscape.
The Williams Act established a federal regime regulating unsolicited tender offers, but states subsequently developed a body of state antitakeover laws that impose additional impediments to such offers. In a series of well-known cases during the 1970s and 1980s, the federal courts, including the Supreme Court, held some of these state antitakeover laws preempted by the Williams Act. To date, however, federal courts and commentators …
The Governance Structure Of Shadow Banking, Steven L. Schwarcz
The Governance Structure Of Shadow Banking, Steven L. Schwarcz
Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
The Governance Structure Of Shadow Banking: Rethinking Assumptions About Limited Liability, Steven L. Schwarcz
The Governance Structure Of Shadow Banking: Rethinking Assumptions About Limited Liability, Steven L. Schwarcz
Faculty Scholarship
In an earlier article, I argued that shadow banking — the provision of financial services and products outside of the traditional banking system, and thus without the need for bank intermediation between capital markets and the users of funds — is so radically transforming finance that regulatory scholars need to rethink their basic assumptions. This article attempts to rethink the corporate governance assumption that owners of firms should always have their liability limited to the capital they have invested. In the relatively small and decentralized firms that dominate shadow banking, equity investors tend to be active managers. Limited liability gives …
Does Board Independence Reduce The Cost Of Debt?, Michael Bradley, Dong Chen
Does Board Independence Reduce The Cost Of Debt?, Michael Bradley, Dong Chen
Faculty Scholarship
Using the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the associated change in listing standards as a natural experiment, we find that while board independence decreases the cost of debt when credit conditions are strong or leverage low, it increases the cost of debt when credit conditions are poor or leverage high. We also document that independent directors set corporate policies that increase firm risk. These results suggest that, acting in the interest of shareholders, independent directors are increasingly costly to bondholders with the intensification of the agency conflict between these two stakeholders.
Whose Trojan Horse? The Dynamics Of Resistance Against Ifrs, Martin Gelter, Zehra Kavame Eroglu
Whose Trojan Horse? The Dynamics Of Resistance Against Ifrs, Martin Gelter, Zehra Kavame Eroglu
Faculty Scholarship
The introduction of International Financial Reporting Standards (“IFRS”) has been debated in the United States since at least the accounting scandals of the early 2000s. While publicly traded firms around the world are increasingly switching to IFRS, often because they are required to do so by law or by their stock exchange, the Securities Exchange Com-mission (“SEC”) seems to have become more reticent in recent years. Only foreign issuers have been permitted to use IFRS in the United States since 2007. By contrast, the EU has mandated the use of IFRS in the consolidated financial statements of publicly traded firms …
The Development And Evolution Of The U.S. Law Of Corporate Criminal Liability, Sara Sun Beale
The Development And Evolution Of The U.S. Law Of Corporate Criminal Liability, Sara Sun Beale
Faculty Scholarship
In the United States, corporate criminal liability developed in response to the industrial revolution and the rise in the scope and importance of corporate activities. This article focuses principally on federal law, which bases corporate criminal liability on the respondeat superior doctrine developed in tort law. In the federal system, the formative period for the doctrine of corporate criminal liability was the early Twentieth Century, when Congress dramatically expanded the reach of federal law, responding to the unprecedented concentration of economic power in corporations and combinations of business concerns as well as new hazards to public health and safety. Both …
Private Equity Firms As Gatekeepers, Elisabeth De Fontenay
Private Equity Firms As Gatekeepers, Elisabeth De Fontenay
Faculty Scholarship
Notwithstanding the considerable attention private equity receives, there continues to be substantial confusion about what private equity does and whether this creates value. Calls for more aggressive regulation of the industry reflect a skeptical view of private equity as—at best—a zero-sum game, in which profits are generated only at the expense of other constituencies. The standard defense of private equity points to its corporate governance advantages as a source of value. This Article identifies an overlooked and increasingly important way in which private equity creates value: private equity firms act as gatekeepers in the debt markets. As repeat players, private …
A Difficult Conversation: Corporate Directors On Race And Gender, Kimberly D. Krawiec, John M. Conley, Lissa L. Broome
A Difficult Conversation: Corporate Directors On Race And Gender, Kimberly D. Krawiec, John M. Conley, Lissa L. Broome
Faculty Scholarship
This symposium essay summarizes our ongoing ethnographic research on corporate board diversity, discussing the central tension in our respondents’ views – their overwhelmingly enthusiastic support of board diversity coupled with an inability to articulate coherent accounts of board diversity benefits that might rationalize that enthusiasm. As their reactions make clear, frank dialogue about race and gender – even a seemingly benign discussion of diversity’s benefits – can be a difficult conversation.
The Case For An Unbiased Takeover Law (With An Application To The European Union), Luca Enriques, Ronald J. Gilson, Alessio M. Pacces
The Case For An Unbiased Takeover Law (With An Application To The European Union), Luca Enriques, Ronald J. Gilson, Alessio M. Pacces
Faculty Scholarship
Takeover regulation should neither hamper nor promote takeovers, but instead allow individual companies to decide the contestability of their control. Based on this premise, we advocate a takeover law exclusively made of default and menu rules supporting an effective choice of the takeover regime at the company level. For political economy reasons, we argue that different default rules should apply to newly public companies and companies that are already public when the new regime is introduced. Newly public companies should be governed by default rules that favor the interests of (minority) shareholders over those of management and controlling shareholders, because …
Protecting Reliance, Victor P. Goldberg
Protecting Reliance, Victor P. Goldberg
Faculty Scholarship
Reliance plays a central role in contract law and scholarship. One party relies on the other's promised performance, its statements, or its anticipated entry into a formal agreement. Saying that reliance is important, however, says nothing about what we should do about it. The focus of this Essay is on the many ways that parties choose to protect reliance. The relationship between what parties do and what contract doctrine cares about is tenuous at best. Contract performance takes place over time, and the nature of the parties 'future obligations can be deferred to take into account changing circumstances. Reliance matters …
Corporate Headhunting, Daniel C. Richman
Corporate Headhunting, Daniel C. Richman
Faculty Scholarship
A wide range of commentators – including some pretty sophisticated ones – have raked through the ruins of the 2008 financial collapse, confident that there are significant criminal prosecutions to bring against individuals and that the Justice Department should be faulted for its failure to bring them. Their confidence that blockbuster criminal cases could have been made rests on shaky grounds. So, too, does their faith that the hunting of heads is a socially productive response to the collapse. If anything, a focus on headhunting will only distract from, and reduce the pressure for, efforts to explain the collapse and …
Fee-Shifting Bylaw And Charter Provisions: Can They Apply In Federal Court? – The Case For Preemption, John C. Coffee Jr.
Fee-Shifting Bylaw And Charter Provisions: Can They Apply In Federal Court? – The Case For Preemption, John C. Coffee Jr.
Faculty Scholarship
In the first months after a decision of the Delaware Supreme Court upholding a fee-shifting bylaw under which the unsuccessful plaintiff shareholder was required to reimburse all defendants for their legal and other expenses in the litigation, some 24 public companies adopted a similar provision – either by means of a board-adopted bylaw or by placing such a provision in their certificate of incorporation (in the case of companies undergoing an IPO). In effect, private ordering is introducing a one-sided version of the “loser pays” rules. Indeed, as drafted, these provisions typically require a plaintiff who is not completely successful …
Irredeemably Inefficient Acts: A Threat To Markets, Firms, And The Fisc, Alex Raskolnikov
Irredeemably Inefficient Acts: A Threat To Markets, Firms, And The Fisc, Alex Raskolnikov
Faculty Scholarship
This Article defines and explores irredeemably inefficient acts – a conceptually distinct and empirically important category of socially undesirable conduct. Though inefficient behavior is, no doubt, pervasive, the standard view holds that inefficient conduct may be converted into efficient behavior by forcing actors to internalize the external harms of their decisions. For some acts, however such conversion is impossible. These acts are not just inefficient forms of otherwise socially beneficial activities – they are not just contingently inefficient. Rather, they are inefficient at their core; they reduce social welfare no matter what the regulator does. These irredeemably inefficient (or just …
Systemic Harms And Shareholder Value, John Armour, Jeffrey N. Gordon
Systemic Harms And Shareholder Value, John Armour, Jeffrey N. Gordon
Faculty Scholarship
The financial crisis has demonstrated serious flaws in the corporate governance of systemically important financial firms. In particular, the norm that managers should seek to maximize shareholder value, as measured by the stock price, proves to be a faulty guide for managerial action in systemically important firms. This is not only because the failure of such firms will have spillovers that defy the cost-internalization of the tort system, but also because these spillovers will harm their own majoritarian shareholders. The interests of diversified shareholders fundamentally diverge from the interests of managers and other controllers because the failure of a systemically …
Extraterritorial Financial Regulation: Why E.T. Can't Come Home, John C. Coffee Jr.
Extraterritorial Financial Regulation: Why E.T. Can't Come Home, John C. Coffee Jr.
Faculty Scholarship
This Essay begins with a deliberately off-putting title: extraterritorial financial regulation. Old-time "conflict of laws" scholars would call this an oxymoron, pointing to recent Supreme Court decisions – most notably, Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd. and Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. – that have applied a strong presumption against extraterritoriality to curb the reach of U.S. law. Even those international law scholars who are sympathetic to the regulation of multinational financial institutions might prefer to avoid this term and talk instead of "global financial regulation" because they conceptualize international financial regulation as implemented through networks of cooperating multinational …
Fixing Multi-Forum Shareholder Litigation, Minor Myers
Fixing Multi-Forum Shareholder Litigation, Minor Myers
Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
Value Creation By Business Lawyers In The 21st Century, Ronald J. Gilson
Value Creation By Business Lawyers In The 21st Century, Ronald J. Gilson
Faculty Scholarship
It’s a delight to be here. When I started working on Value Creation by Business Lawyers – or when I was in law school – we could have held today’s meeting in a telephone booth. There was nothing even remotely in the curriculum. Victor Brudney and Marvin Chirlestien’s Corporate Finance book was still in mimeograph form – note the dated technology reference. David Herwitz’s Business Planning book had been around for a while, but it was strictly legal. And that exhausted it. What I take the greatest pleasure from is the fact that a number of years later, enough to …
Time To Amend The Delaware Takeover Law, Stephen M. Shapiro, Dorothy S. Lund
Time To Amend The Delaware Takeover Law, Stephen M. Shapiro, Dorothy S. Lund
Faculty Scholarship
As Professor Subramanian demonstrates with cogent statistical evidence, now is the time for the courts to put Section 203 in the dock and examine its constitutional merits. Better still, the Delaware legislature should clean house and amend this provision's criteria. In practical effect, it forbids a competitive tender offer, injuring shareholders who benefit from tender offer premiums, and the national economy, which benefits from the gravitation of industrial resources to their highest-valued uses.
Following the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Edgar v. MITE Corp., which invalidated an Illinois takeover statute, the federal district court in Delaware routinely enjoined application of …
Merger Control Procedures And Institutions: A Comparison Of The Eu And Us Practice, William E. Kovacic, Petros C. Mavroidis, Damien J. Neven
Merger Control Procedures And Institutions: A Comparison Of The Eu And Us Practice, William E. Kovacic, Petros C. Mavroidis, Damien J. Neven
Faculty Scholarship
The objective of this paper is to discuss and compare the role that different constituencies play in US and EU procedures for merger control. We describe the main constituencies (both internal and external) involved in merger control in both jurisdictions and discuss how a typical merger case would be handled under these procedures. At each stage, we consider how the procedure unfolds, which parties are involved, and how they can affect the procedure. Our discussion reveals a very different ecology. EU and US procedures differ in terms of their basic design and in terms of the procedures that are naturally …
The Nordic Model Of Corporate Governance: The Role Of Ownership, Ronald J. Gilson
The Nordic Model Of Corporate Governance: The Role Of Ownership, Ronald J. Gilson
Faculty Scholarship
It is commonplace to credit the invention of the public corporation as an important engine of economic growth. The creation of a long-lived vehicle that gave investors both tradable shares and limited liability allowed talented managers to raise capital to fund enterprise. Writing in 1926, the Economist magazine heralded this role:
The economic historian of the future may assign to the nameless inventor of the principle of limited liability, as applied to trading corporations, a place of honor with Watt and Stephenson, and other pioneers of the Industrial Revolution. The genius of these men produced the means by which man’s …