Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®
Articles 1 - 2 of 2
Full-Text Articles in Law
A Comparison Of Milestone-Based And Buyout Options Contracts For Coordinating R&D Partnerships, Shantanu Bhattacharya, Vibha Gaba, Sameer Hasija
A Comparison Of Milestone-Based And Buyout Options Contracts For Coordinating R&D Partnerships, Shantanu Bhattacharya, Vibha Gaba, Sameer Hasija
Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business
We analyze optimal contractual arrangements in a bilateral research and development (R&D) partnership between a risk-averse provider that conducts early-stage research followed by a regulatory verification stage and a risk-neutral client that performs late-stage development activities, including production, distribution, and marketing. The problem is formulated as a sequential investment game with the client as the principal, where the investments are observable but not verifiable. The model captures the inherent incentive alignment problems of double-sided moral hazard, risk aversion, and holdup. We compare the efficacy of milestone-based options contracts and buyout options contracts from the client's perspective and identify conditions under …
Joint Product Improvement By Client And Customer Support Center: The Role Of Gain-Share Contracts In Coordination, Shantanu Bhattacharya, Alok Gupta, Sameer Hasija
Joint Product Improvement By Client And Customer Support Center: The Role Of Gain-Share Contracts In Coordination, Shantanu Bhattacharya, Alok Gupta, Sameer Hasija
Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business
We study the role of different contract types in coordinating the joint product improvement effort of a client and a customer support center. The customer support center's costly efforts at joint product improvement include transcribing and analyzing customer feedback, analyzing market trends, and investing in product design. Yet this cooperative role must be adequately incentivized by the client, since it could lead to fewer service requests and hence lower revenues for the customer support center. We model this problem as a sequential game with double-sided moral hazard in a principal-agent framework (in which the client is the principal). We follow …