Law Commons^™

Due Process Discontents In Mass-Tort Bankruptcy, J. Maria Glover

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

No abstract provided.

A Process For Politics, Anna Gelpern

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

I argue that consistent and public process observance has a distinctly valuable function in sovereign debt restructuring, with no precise equivalent in national insolvency regimes. National regimes reflect the distribution bargains of their enactment, presumptively legitimate and binding. Debtors and creditors allocate insolvency losses in their shadow, with liquidation as a backstop and politics just outside the frame. All else equal, the restructuring process has a harder job with sovereign debt. There is no liquidation backstop and no default distribution scenario. Each crisis resolution episode must allocate losses from scratch among the country’s citizens, foreign and domestic creditors, and other …

Cacs And Doorknobs, Anna Gelpern, Jeromin Zettelmeyer

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

In response to debt crises, policy makers often feature Collective Action Clauses (CACs) in sovereign bonds among the pillars of international financial architecture. However, the content of official pronouncements about CACs suggests that CACs are more like doorknobs: a process tool with limited impact on the incidence or ultimate outcome of a debt restructuring. We ask whether CACs are welfare improving and, if so, whether they are pillars or doorknobs. The history of CACs in corporate debt suggests that CACs can be good, bad or unimportant depending on their vulnerability to abuse and the available alternatives, including bankruptcy and debt …

Courts And Sovereigns In The Pari Passu Goldmines, Anna Gelpern

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

U.S. federal court rulings against Argentina since 2012 have turned the pari passu clause in sovereign bond contracts into the most promising debt collection tool against immune governments since the days of gunboat diplomacy. The large literature on pari passu (“equal step” in Latin) assumes that the clause had not been used for enforcement before the late 1990s, and that it was first construed by a Belgian court in a case against Peru in the year 2000. The Belgian decision was criticized for wrongly concluding that pari passu promised ratable payment to all holders of Peru’s external debt. A decade …

Sovereign Debt: Now What?, Anna Gelpern

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

The sovereign debt restructuring regime looks like it is coming apart. Changing patterns of capital flows, old creditors’ weakening commitment to past practices, and other stakeholders’ inability to take over, or coalesce behind a viable alternative, have challenged the regime from the moment it took shape in the mid-1990s. By 2016, its survival cannot be taken for granted. Crises in Argentina, Greece, and Ukraine since 2010 exposed the regime’s perennial failures and new shortcomings. Until an alternative emerges, there may be messier, more protracted restructurings, more demands on public resources, and more pressure on national courts to intervene in disputes …

A Skeptic’S Case For Sovereign Bankruptcy, Anna Gelpern

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

This essay describes fundamental flaws in the sovereign debt restructuring regime, but questions the prevailing arguments for sovereign bankruptcy. The author concludes that efficient debt outcomes may well come about without bankruptcy, but that a statutory regime is necessary to achieve sovereign autonomy and political legitimacy.

Contract Hope And Sovereign Redemption, Anna Gelpern

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

Sovereign immunity has served as a partial substitute for bankruptcy protection, but it has encouraged a minority of creditors to pursue unorthodox legal remedies with spillover effects far beyond the debtor-creditor relationship. The attempt to enforce Argentina’s pari passu clause in New York is an example of such a remedy, which relies primarily on collateral damage to other creditors and market infrastructure to obtain settlement from a debtor that would not pay. The District Court decision, now on appeal before the Second Circuit, may not make holding out more attractive in future restructurings – but it would make participation less …

Bankruptcy, Backwards: The Problem Of Quasi-Sovereign Debt, Anna Gelpern

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

This Feature considers the debts of quasi-sovereign states in light of proposals to let them file for bankruptcy protection. States that have ceded some but not all sovereign prerogatives to a central government face distinct challenges as debtors. It is unhelpful to analyze these challenges mainly through the bankruptcy lens. State bankruptcy posits an institutional fix for a problem that remains theoretically undefined and empirically contested. I suggest a way of mapping the problem that does not work back from a solution. I highlight the implications of sovereign immunity, immortality, concurrent authority, macroeconomic policy, and democratic accountability for quasi-sovereign debt …

Home Foreclosures: Will Voluntary Mortgage Modification Help Families Save Their Homes? Part Ii? : Hearing Before The H. Comm. On The Judiciary Subcomm. On Commercial And Administrative Law, 111th Cong., Dec. 11, 2009 (Statement Of Associate Professor Adam J. Levitin, Geo. U. L. Center), Adam J. Levitin

Testimony Before Congress

The results to date from MHAP are deeply disappointing. Even the most optimistic view of HAMP and HARP’s potential would now project the programs as having only a minor impact on the foreclosure crisis. Until and unless the problems of unemployment; negative equity, and servicer capacity, incentives, and contract restrictions are addressed, we are unlikely to see noticeably different results. These issues cannot be addressed within the current structure of HAMP.

Unfortunately, none of the solutions for foreclosures due to unemployment are particularly satisfying, and without addressing unemployment, foreclosures will remain at elevated levels. Bankruptcy presents possible solutions to negative …

Worsening Foreclosure Crisis: Is It Time To Reconsider Bankruptcy Reform?: Hearing Before The Subcomm. On Administrative Oversight And The Courts Of The S. Comm. On The Judiciary, 111th Cong., July 23, 2009 (Statement Of Adam J. Levitin, Associate Prof. Of Law, Geo. U. L. Center), Adam J. Levitin

Testimony Before Congress

The clear finding from my research is that mortgage prices are largely insensitive to bankruptcy modification risk. Permitting bankruptcy modification is unlikely to result in higher mortgage costs or lower mortgage credit availability.

The foreclosure crisis is not about to stop any time soon. Judicially-supervised restructuring of mortgages is the only tool we have left in the box. It's a tool we know can work. It's a tool that can save hundreds of thousands of families their homes and help stabilize communities, housing markets, and the economy. It's time to use it.

H.R. 200, The "Helping Families Save Their Homes In Bankruptcy Act Of 2009," And H.R. 225, The "Emergency Homeownership And Equity Protection Act": Hearing Before The H. Comm. On The Judiciary, 111th Cong., Jan. 22, 2009 (Statement Of Associate Professor Adam J. Levitin, Geo. U. L. Center), Adam J. Levitin

Testimony Before Congress

Permitting modification of all mortgages in bankruptcy would create a low-cost, effective, fair, and immediately available method for resolving much of the current foreclosure crisis without imposing costs on taxpayers, creating a moral hazard for borrowers or lenders, or increasing mortgage credit costs or decreasing mortgage credit availability. As the foreclosure crisis deepens, bankruptcy modification presents the best and least invasive method of stabilizing the housing market and is a crucial step in stabilizing financial markets.

Helping Families Save Their Homes: The Role Of Bankruptcy Law: Hearing Before The S. Comm. On The Judiciary, 110th Cong., Nov. 19, 2008 (Statement Of Professor Adam Levitin, Geo. U. L. Center), Adam J. Levitin

Testimony Before Congress

No abstract provided.

Bankruptcy Reform: Hearing Before The S. Comm. On The Judiciary, 109th Cong., Feb. 10, 2005 (Statement Todd Zywicki, Visiting Prof. Of Law, Geo. U. L. Center), Todd J. Zywicki

Testimony Before Congress

No abstract provided.

Pari Passu And A Distressed Sovereign's Rational Choices, William W. Bratton

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

Part I describes the disruptive role the pari passu clause plays in sovereign debt compositions, stating the case favoring the narrow reading. Part II reconsiders the economic incentives in play at the time lenders close loans to sovereigns, stating a case for the broad reading. Part III works the competing readings through the legal framework of bond contract interpretation. The exercise shows that the matter comes down to a choice between an ex ante reading, conducted as of the time the contract is executed and delivered, and an ex post reading, conducted as of the later time of distress. The …

Domestic And External Debt: The Doomed Quest For Equal Treatment, Anna Gelpern, Brad Setser

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

Until recently, governments borrowed from domestic residents and foreign investors using very different instruments. Residents bought "domestic debt" - paper denominated in local currency and governed by domestic law. Foreign investors preferred "external debt", which offered foreign currency and foreign law. Because there was virtually no overlap between resident and nonresident holdings, it mattered little that lawyers and economists defined domestic and external debt differently: lawyers focused on features such as governing law and jurisdiction, economists on the holder's residence and currency of denomination. The legal and economic definitions of domestic and external debt were effectively bundled: "domestic debt" meant …