Law Commons^™

The Administrative Conference And The Political Thumb, Peter L. Strauss

Faculty Scholarship

In his valuable contribution to this special issue, Richard Pierce underscores the role the Administrative Conference of the United States (“ACUS”) has played over the years in encouraging on the ground fact-finding by its consultants, who have usually been academics consulted at the beginning of careers that ever after would be marked by this encounter with the realities of the administrative process. As the mentee of Walter Gellhorn, who directed the remarkable empirical studies of federal agency procedures that underlay the eventual Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) and who was a member of the ACUS Council from its initiation in 1964 …

Administrative Law, Public Administration, And The Administrative Conference Of The United States, Gillian E. Metzger

Faculty Scholarship

From its birth, administrative law has claimed a close connection to governmental practice. Yet as administrative law has grown and matured it has moved further away from how agencies actually function. The causes of administrative law’s disconnect from actual administration are complex and the divide is now longstanding, but it is also a source of concern given the increasing importance of internal administration for ensuring accountable government. This Article analyzes the contemporary manifestations and historical origins of administrative law’s divide from public administration, as well as the growing costs of this disconnect. It also describes the Administrative Conference of the …

Embracing Administrative Common Law, Gillian E. Metzger

Faculty Scholarship

This Foreword begins with the descriptive claim that much of administrative law is really administrative common law: doctrines and requirements that are largely judicially created, as opposed to those specified by Congress, the President, or individual agencies. Although governing statutes exert some constraining force on judicial creativity, the primary basis of these judge-fashioned doctrines lies in judicial conceptions of appropriate institutional roles, along with pragmatic and normative concerns, that are frequently constitutionally infused and developed incrementally through precedent. Yet the judicially created character of administrative law is rarely acknowledged and often condemned by courts.

Turning from descriptive to more normative, …

Overseer, Or "The Decider"? The President In Administrative Law, Peter L. Strauss

Faculty Scholarship

All will agree that the Constitution creates a unitary chief executive officer, the President, at the head of the government Congress defines to do the work its statutes detail. Disagreement arises over what his function entails. Once Congress has defined some element of government and specified its responsibilities, we know that the constitutional roles of both Congress and the courts are those of oversight of the agency and its assigned work, not the actual performance of that work. But is it the same for the President? When Congress confers authority on the Environmental Protection Agency to regulate various forms of …

The Accardi Principle, Thomas W. Merrill

Faculty Scholarship

This article is organized as follows. Part I reviews the history of the Accardi principle in the Supreme Court. We learn that the Court has intimated three different theories about the source of the Accardi principle, and has left many questions about its dimensions unanswered. Part II surveys the use of the principle by the D.C. Circuit. This provides additional insights into how the Accardi principle works in practice, including the importance of questions about the meaning of agency regulations and whether agency regulations can render otherwise unreviewable agency action subject to judicial review. Part III seeks to restate the …