Law Commons^™

Reforming Securities Litigation Reform: A Proposal For Restructuring The Relationship Between Public And Private Enforcement Of Rule 10b-5, Amanda M. Rose

Amanda M Rose

Forthcoming in Columbia Law Review, Vol. 108, No. 6 (Oct. 2008)

For years, commentators have debated how to reform the controversial Rule 10b-5 class action, without pausing to ask whether the game is worth the candle. Is private enforcement of Rule 10b-5 worth preserving, or might we be better off with exclusive public enforcement? This fundamental and neglected question demands attention today more than ever. An academic consensus has now emerged that private enforcement of Rule 10b-5 cannot be defended on compensatory grounds, at least in its most common form (a fraud-on-the-market class action brought against a non-trading issuer). That …

Corporate Corruption And The Complicity Of Congress And The Supreme Court - The Tortuous Path From Central Bank To Stoneridge Investment Partners, Charles W. Murdock

Charles W. Murdock

The main thrust of this article is that courts and legislatures, particularly the past Republican Congresses and the Supreme Court, as well as lower federal courts, are biased in favor of management; moreover that their failure to hold management to account has emboldened management to engage in illicit behavior and has led to supineness, or worse, by gatekeepers, such as accountants and boards of directors. The willingness of federal courts to disregard blatant corruption and give crooks a free pass by engaging in outcome determinative decision making and strained interpretations of the law is epitomized in the recent decision of …

“Stoneridge And Scheme Liability Under Rule 10b-5: The Case For Private Enforcement.”, Erica L. Finkelson

Erica L Finkelson

This note examines the issue of scheme liability in securities fraud, which was heard on October 9, 2007 before the Supreme Court in Stoneridge Investment Partners, LLS, (Stoneridge) v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc. and Motorola, Inc. Stoneridge represents shareholders who purchased stock in the cable company Charter Communications, Inc. (Charter). Stoneridge sued Scientific-Atlanta and Motorola for fraud because these companies knowingly agreed to let Charter overpay them for cable boxes and returned those funds to Charter as advertising payments so that Charter could inflate its revenue, misleading investors as to Charter’s book value. This note argues that Scientific-Atlanta and Motorola’s purposeful and …