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Full-Text Articles in Law

The Constitution And The Language Of The Law, John O. Mcginnis, Michael B. Rappaport Mar 2018

The Constitution And The Language Of The Law, John O. Mcginnis, Michael B. Rappaport

William & Mary Law Review

A long-standing debate exists over whether the Constitution is written in ordinary or legal language. Yet no article has offered a framework for determining the nature of the Constitution’s language, let alone systematically canvassed the evidence.

This Article fills the gap. First, it shows that a distinctive legal language exists. This language in the Constitution includes terms, like “Letters of Marque and Reprisal,” that are unambiguously technical, and terms, like “good behavior,” that are ambiguous in that they have both an ordinary and legal meaning but are better interpreted according to the latter. It also includes legal interpretive rules such …


Judicial Departmentalism: An Introduction, Kevin C. Walsh Apr 2017

Judicial Departmentalism: An Introduction, Kevin C. Walsh

William & Mary Law Review

This Article introduces the idea of judicial departmentalism and argues for its superiority to judicial supremacy. Judicial supremacy is the idea that the Constitution means for everybody what the Supreme Court says it means in deciding a case. Judicial departmentalism, by contrast, is the idea that the Constitution means in the judicial department what the Supreme Court says it means in deciding a case. Within the judicial department, the law of judgments, the law of remedies, and the law of precedent combine to enable resolutions by the judicial department to achieve certain kinds of settlements. Judicial departmentalism holds that these …


In Defense Of Judicial Supremacy, Erwin Chemerinsky Apr 2017

In Defense Of Judicial Supremacy, Erwin Chemerinsky

William & Mary Law Review

“Judicial supremacy” is the idea that the Supreme Court should be viewed as the authoritative interpreter of the Constitution and that we should deem its decisions as binding on the other branches and levels of government, until and unless constitutional amendment or subsequent decision overrules them. This is desirable because we want to have an authoritative interpreter of the Constitution and the Court is best suited to play this role. Under this view, doctrines which keep federal courts from enforcing constitutional provisions—such as denying standing for generalized grievances, the political question doctrine, and the state secrets doctrine—are misguided and should …


Judicial Supremacy And Taking Conflicting Rights Seriously, Rebecca L. Brown Apr 2017

Judicial Supremacy And Taking Conflicting Rights Seriously, Rebecca L. Brown

William & Mary Law Review

The best arguments in favor of judicial supremacy rely on its essential role of protecting rights in a democracy. The doctrinal technique of strict scrutiny, developed to do the work of judicial supremacy, has been an important tool in our constitutional jurisprudence in the service of rights protection. When the Supreme Court reviews laws that themselves seek to enhance or preserve constitutional rights, however, strict scrutiny does not provide the right approach. Rather, the Court should consider very carefully the rights claims in favor of the statute as well as those launched by a challenger. In such cases of conflicting …


The Annoying Constitution: Implications For The Allocation Of Interpretive Authority, Frederick Schauer Apr 2017

The Annoying Constitution: Implications For The Allocation Of Interpretive Authority, Frederick Schauer

William & Mary Law Review

Constitutional constraints often restrict unwise or immoral official policies and actions, but also often invalidate laws and other official acts that are sound as a matter of both morality and policy. These second-order side constraints—or trumps—on even official acts that are sound as a matter of first-order policy reflect deeper or longerterm values, and they are central to understanding the very idea of constitutionalism. Moreover, once we see the Constitution as restricting not only the unsound and the unwise but also the sound and the wise, we can understand why expecting those whose sound ideas and policies are nevertheless unconstitutional …


Much Ado About Nothing: Signing Statements, Vetoes, And Presidential Constitutional Interpretation, Keith E. Whittington Apr 2017

Much Ado About Nothing: Signing Statements, Vetoes, And Presidential Constitutional Interpretation, Keith E. Whittington

William & Mary Law Review

During the Bush presidency, presidential signing statements became briefly controversial. The controversy has faded, but the White House continues to issue statements when signing legislation. Those statements frequently point out constitutional difficulties in new statutes and sometimes warn that the executive branch will administer the statutes so as to avoid those constitutional difficulties. This Article argues that the criticisms of signing statements were mostly misguided. Signing statements as such present few problems and offer some benefits to the workings of the American political system. While there might be reason to object to the substantive constitutional positions adopted in any given …


Why Congress Does Not Challenge Judicial Supremacy, Neal Devins Apr 2017

Why Congress Does Not Challenge Judicial Supremacy, Neal Devins

William & Mary Law Review

Members of Congress largely acquiesce to judicial supremacy both on constitutional and statutory interpretation questions. Lawmakers, however, do not formally embrace judicial supremacy; they rarely think about the courts when enacting legislation. This Article explains why this is so, focusing on why lawmakers have both strong incentive to acquiesce to judicial power and little incentive to advance a coherent view of congressional power. In particular, lawmakers are interested in advancing favored policies, winning reelection, and gaining personal power within Congress. Abstract questions of institutional power do not interest lawmakers and judicial defeats are seen as opportunities to find some other …


Judicial Supremacy Revisited: Independent Constitutional Authority In American Constitutional Law And Practice, Mark A. Graber Apr 2017

Judicial Supremacy Revisited: Independent Constitutional Authority In American Constitutional Law And Practice, Mark A. Graber

William & Mary Law Review

The Supreme Court exercises far less constitutional authority in American law and practice than one would gather from reading judicial opinions, presidential speeches, or the standard tomes for and against judicial supremacy. Lower federal court judges, state court justices, federal and state elected officials, persons charged with administering the law, and ordinary citizens often have the final say on particular constitutional controversies or exercise temporary constitutional authority in ways that have more influence on the parties to that controversy than the eventual Supreme Court decision. In many instances, Supreme Court doctrine sanctions or facilitates the exercise of independent constitutional authority …


Soft Supremacy, Corinna Barrett Lain Apr 2017

Soft Supremacy, Corinna Barrett Lain

William & Mary Law Review

The debate over judicial supremacy has raged for more than a decade now, yet the conception of what it is we are arguing about remains grossly oversimplified and formalistic. My aim in this symposium contribution is to push the conversation in a more realistic direction; I want those who claim that judicial supremacy is antidemocratic to take on the concept as it actually exists. The stark truth is that judicial supremacy has remarkably little of the strength and hard edges that dominate the discourse in judicial supremacy debates. It is porous, contingent—soft. And the upshot of soft supremacy is this: …


The Affordable Care Act, The Constitutional Meaning Of Statutes, And The Emerging Doctrine Of Positive Constitutional Rights, Edward Rubin Apr 2012

The Affordable Care Act, The Constitutional Meaning Of Statutes, And The Emerging Doctrine Of Positive Constitutional Rights, Edward Rubin

William & Mary Law Review

No abstract provided.


Interpretive Contestation And Legal Correctness, Matthew D. Adler Mar 2012

Interpretive Contestation And Legal Correctness, Matthew D. Adler

William & Mary Law Review

No abstract provided.


Contingent Constitutionalism: State And Local Criminal Laws And The Applicability Of Federal Constitutional Rights, Wayne A. Logan Oct 2009

Contingent Constitutionalism: State And Local Criminal Laws And The Applicability Of Federal Constitutional Rights, Wayne A. Logan

William & Mary Law Review

Americans have long been bound by a shared sense of constitutional commonality, and the Supreme Court has repeatedly condemned the notion that federal constitutional rights should be allowed to depend on distinct state and local legal norms. In reality, however, federal rights do indeed vary, and they do so as a result of their contingent relationship to the diversity of state and local laws on which they rely. Focusing on criminal procedure rights in particular, this Article examines the benefits and detriments of constitutional contingency, and casts in new light many enduring understandings of American constitutionalism, including the effects of …


Citizen As Lawyer, Lawyer As Citizen, Mark Tushnet Mar 2009

Citizen As Lawyer, Lawyer As Citizen, Mark Tushnet

William & Mary Law Review

No abstract provided.


Reconstructing The Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine, Brannon P. Denning Nov 2008

Reconstructing The Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine, Brannon P. Denning

William & Mary Law Review

In this Article, I argue that the alleged incoherence and unpredictability of the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine (DCCD) is rooted in the Supreme Court's search, through the years, for a stable set of rules enabling it to distinguish permissible from impermissible state regulations of interstate commerce and commercial actors. Its lack of success, the Article argues, is due in large part to the Court's inability to settle on the constitutional command the doctrine was to enforce. Historically, the Court would promulgate a set of rules, apply them for a time, then alter or modify them as the rules became unsatisfactory. …


Constitution Writing In Post-Conflict Settings: An Overview, Jennifer Widner Mar 2008

Constitution Writing In Post-Conflict Settings: An Overview, Jennifer Widner

William & Mary Law Review

No abstract provided.


The Theocratic Challenge To Constitution Drafting In Post-Conflict States, Ran Hirschl Mar 2008

The Theocratic Challenge To Constitution Drafting In Post-Conflict States, Ran Hirschl

William & Mary Law Review

No abstract provided.


Some Skepticism About Normative Constitutional Advice, Mark Tushnet Mar 2008

Some Skepticism About Normative Constitutional Advice, Mark Tushnet

William & Mary Law Review

No abstract provided.


St. George Tucker And The Second Amendment: Original Understandings And Modern Misunderstandings, Saul Cornell Feb 2006

St. George Tucker And The Second Amendment: Original Understandings And Modern Misunderstandings, Saul Cornell

William & Mary Law Review

No abstract provided.


State Courts Adopting Federal Constitutional Doctrine: Case-By-Case Adoptionism Or Prospective Lockstepping?, Robert F. Williams Feb 2005

State Courts Adopting Federal Constitutional Doctrine: Case-By-Case Adoptionism Or Prospective Lockstepping?, Robert F. Williams

William & Mary Law Review

No abstract provided.


The State And The Federal Courts In Governance: Vive La Difference!, Hans A. Linde Feb 2005

The State And The Federal Courts In Governance: Vive La Difference!, Hans A. Linde

William & Mary Law Review

No abstract provided.


Easing The Spring: Strict Scrutiny And Affirmative Action After The Redistricting Cases, Pamela S. Karlan Mar 2002

Easing The Spring: Strict Scrutiny And Affirmative Action After The Redistricting Cases, Pamela S. Karlan

William & Mary Law Review

No abstract provided.


Judicial Review And Institutional Choice, Adrian Vermeule Mar 2002

Judicial Review And Institutional Choice, Adrian Vermeule

William & Mary Law Review

No abstract provided.


The Radical Possibility Of Limited Community-Based Interpretation Of The Constitution, Mark D. Rosen Feb 2002

The Radical Possibility Of Limited Community-Based Interpretation Of The Constitution, Mark D. Rosen

William & Mary Law Review

No abstract provided.


Structural Review, Pseudo-Second-Look Decision Making, And The Risk Of Diluting Constitutional Liberty, Dan T. Coenen May 2001

Structural Review, Pseudo-Second-Look Decision Making, And The Risk Of Diluting Constitutional Liberty, Dan T. Coenen

William & Mary Law Review

No abstract provided.


Subconsitutional Constitutional Law: Supplement, Sham, Or Substitute?, Mark Tushnet May 2001

Subconsitutional Constitutional Law: Supplement, Sham, Or Substitute?, Mark Tushnet

William & Mary Law Review

No abstract provided.


A Constitution Of Collaboration: Protecting Fundamental Values With Second-Look Rules Of Interbranch Dialogue, Dan T. Coenen May 2001

A Constitution Of Collaboration: Protecting Fundamental Values With Second-Look Rules Of Interbranch Dialogue, Dan T. Coenen

William & Mary Law Review

No abstract provided.


Federalism And Foreign Affairs: Congress's Power To "Define And Punish...Offenses Against The Law Of Nations", Beth Stephens Oct 2000

Federalism And Foreign Affairs: Congress's Power To "Define And Punish...Offenses Against The Law Of Nations", Beth Stephens

William & Mary Law Review

No abstract provided.


Recalibrating The Cost Of Harm Advocacy: Getting Beyond Brandenburg, S. Elizabeth Wilborn Malloy, Ronald J. Krotoszynski Jr. Apr 2000

Recalibrating The Cost Of Harm Advocacy: Getting Beyond Brandenburg, S. Elizabeth Wilborn Malloy, Ronald J. Krotoszynski Jr.

William & Mary Law Review

No abstract provided.


On The Nature Of Federal Bankruptcy Jurisdiction: A General Statutory And Constitutional Theory, Ralph Brubaker Mar 2000

On The Nature Of Federal Bankruptcy Jurisdiction: A General Statutory And Constitutional Theory, Ralph Brubaker

William & Mary Law Review

No abstract provided.


The Fragmented Liberty Clause, Rebecca L. Brown Dec 1999

The Fragmented Liberty Clause, Rebecca L. Brown

William & Mary Law Review

No abstract provided.