Law Commons^™

Merging In The Shadow Of The Law: The Case For Consistent Judicial Efficiency Analysis, Jamie H. Moffitt

Vanderbilt Law Review

This Article examines current judicial interpretation of Section 7 of the Clayton Act through the lens of negotiation theory. The research exposes a gap between how courts state they are analyzing efficiency claims in Section 7 Clayton Act enforcement actions and what they are actually doing. During periods of lax antitrust enforcement, this pattern is not readily visible, since almost all proposed merger and acquisition ("M&A") deals are approved. With a shift to more aggressive antitrust policy, however, it is critical that merger review include appropriate weighing of transaction-generated efficiencies-something missing from courts' current antitrust analysis. Although only a small …

Kicking "Single-Entity" To The Sidelines: Reevaluating The Competitive Reality Of Major League Soccer After American Needle And The 2010 Collective Bargaining Agreement, Matthew J. Jakobsze

Northern Illinois University Law Review

The negotiation of the 2010 Collective Bargaining Agreement brought tense times for professional soccer in the United States. The Major League Soccer Players’ Union sought free agency as a part of the 2010 CBA, a term that would have brought considerable relief from the restrictions imposed through Major League Soccer’s centralized contracting system. In a steadfast effort to retain control, minimize labor costs, and avoid antitrust liability, Major League Soccer refused to yield to the players’ demands. As a result, the parties reached impasse. Devoid of decertification as an option to expose the teams to antitrust scrutiny, the players threatened …

Racial Cartels, Daria Roithmayr

Michigan Journal of Race and Law

This Article argues that we can better understand the dynamic of historical racial exclusion if we describe it as the anti-competitive work of "racial cartels." We can define racial cartels to include a range of all-White groups - homeowners' associations, school districts, trade unions, real estate boards and political parties - who gained signficant social, economic and political profit from excluding on the basis of race. Far from operating on the basis of irrational animus, racial cartels actually derived significant profit from racial exclusion. By creating racially segmented housing markets, for example, exclusive White homeowners' associations enjoyed higher property values …

Role Of Individuals Discrimination In Free Exercise Claims: Putting Iqbal In Its Place, The, Leila Mcneill

Missouri Law Review

Ashcroft v. Iqbal has been widely discussed for three reasons: (1) its extension of Twombly's pleading standard to cases outside the realm of antitrust suits, (2) its application of the collateral order doctrine to a district court order denying an official's motion to dismiss on the basis of qualified immunity in a Bivens claim, and (3) its implication for national security and postSeptember 11th terrorist detainments and investigations. However, Iqbal also implicates the nature of what constitutes unconstitutional religious discrimination under the First Amendment's Free Exercise Clause. Therefore, the Iqbal Court's discussion of religious liberty will present problems of interpretation …

Moore V. Williamsburg Regional Hospital, Andrew R. Deholl

South Carolina Law Review

No abstract provided.

Lorain, Aspen, And The Future Of Section 2 Enforcement, Xiao Jeff Liu

Michigan Telecommunications & Technology Law Review

The Sherman Antitrust Act § 2 makes monopolizing or attempting to monopolize a particular trade or aspects of a trade a federal felony. More specifically, Section 2 of the Act addresses a firm's unilateral conduct. Under the administration of former President George W. Bush, a comprehensive guideline titled Competition and Monopoly: Single-Firm Conduct under Section 2 of the Sherman Act ("Bush Guidelines") was adopted in September of 2008 for enforcing Section 2 violations. Under President Barack Obama's administration, however, the enforcement of antitrust laws is expected to undergo a radical transformation. On May 11, 2009, Christine A. Varney, the Assistant …

Did Trinko Really Kill Antitrust Price Squeeze Claims?, Caroline C. Rudaz

Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law

This Article presents a critical analysis of the Linkline case that refuses to recognize price squeeze claims as antitrust claims under § 2 of the Sherman Act. It argues that Linkline gives a distorted reading of Trinko without giving proper attention to the application of § 2 of the Sherman Act. The Linkline decision takes a dogmatic position and thus, while refuting the Alcoa decision, appears to be a missed opportunity to more precisely define price squeezing.

This Article offers a comparison between the U.S. Supreme Court's decision and the recent European decisions delivered in broadband access cases that are …

Churchill Downs, Inc. V. Thoroughbred Horsemen's Group, Llc "Antitrust Liability And The Horse Racing Industry", Tara N. Hester

Kentucky Journal of Equine, Agriculture, & Natural Resources Law

No abstract provided.

Strange Bedfellows: How The Ncaa And Ea Sports May Have Violated Antitrust And Right Of Publicity Laws To Make A Profit At The Exploitation Of Intercollegiate Amateurism, Andrew B. Carrabis

Barry Law Review

No abstract provided.

In The Wake Of Empagran – Lights Out On Foreign Activity Falling Under Sherman Act Jurisdiction? Courts Carve Out A Prevailing Standard, Kelly L. Tucker

Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law

No abstract provided.

One Trilogy That Should Go Without A Sequel: Why The Baseball Antitrust Exemption Should Be Repealed, Brittany Van Roo

Marquette Sports Law Review

No abstract provided.

The Rocky Path For Private Directors General: Procedure, Politics, And The Uncertain Future Of Eu Antitrust Damages Actions, Marc A. Sittenreich

Fordham Law Review

For the better part of the past decade, the European Commission has engaged in a dialogue with European Union (EU) citizens and businesses in an attempt to strengthen an almost nonexistent private competition enforcement system. In the United States, where private antitrust lawsuits are most prevalent, litigation is justified on the grounds of both deterrence and compensation. While the Commission wants to make private damages actions the primary vehicle for the compensation of aggrieved parties, recent political pressure has made EU officials claim that government enforcement will remain the predominant means for the deterrence of EU antitrust violations. Furthermore, many …