Law Commons^™

Section 230 Of The Communications Decency Act: Why California Courts Interpreted It Correctly And What That Says About How We Should Change It, E. Alex Murcia

Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review

In 1996, Congress passed the Communications Decency Act (CDA). In 1997, the United States Supreme Court struck down most of the CDA. However, section 230, which protects providers and users of interactive computer services from liability for defamatory content posted to their platforms by third parties, remains in effect. In the California and federal judicial systems, courts interpret section 230’s immunity provisions broadly—so that the statute conveys broad immunity. This Note argues that the broad application of section 230’s protections is consistent with the intent of the statute’s drafters. However, it also contends that (1) this interpretation of section 230 …

Democracy, Deference, And Compromise: Understanding And Reforming Campaign Finance Jurisprudence, Scott P. Bloomberg

Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review

In Citizens United, the Supreme Court interpreted the government’s interest in preventing corruption as being limited to preventing quid pro quo— cash-for-votes—corruption. This narrow interpretation drastically circumscribed legislatures’ abilities to regulate the financing of elections, in turn prompting scholars to propose a number of reforms for broadening the government interest in campaign finance cases. These reforms include urging the Court to recognize a new government interest such as political equality, to adopt a broader understanding of corruption, and to be more deferential to legislatures in defining corruption.

Building upon that body of scholarship, this Article begins with a descriptive …

The Need For A Historical Exception To Grand Jury Secrecy In The Federal Rules Of Criminal Procedure, Daniel Aronsohn

Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review

No abstract provided.

A Child Litigant's Right To Counsel, Kevin Lapp

Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review

As the Supreme Court put it a half century ago, the right tocounsel for juveniles reflects “society’s special concern for children” and “is of the essence of justice.” In a variety of legal proceedings, from delinquency matters to child welfare proceedings to judicial bypass hearings, the law requires the appointment of counsel to child litigants. While coherent in the whole, the law regarding counsel for child litigants is a patchwork of state and federal constitutional rulings by courts and statutory grants. Legal scholarship about a child litigant’s right to counsel is similarly fragmented. Predominantly, legal scholars have examined arguments for …

Insider Trading Law That Works: Using Newman And Salman To Update Dirks'S Personal Benefit Standard, Mark Hayden Adams

Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review

No abstract provided.

Chipping Away At The Rock: Perez V. Mortgage Bankers Association And The Seminole Rock Deference Doctrine, Kevin O. Leske

Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review

Largely escaping judicial and scholarly examination for close to seventy years, the Seminole Rock deference doctrine directs federal courts to defer to an administrative agency’s interpretation of its own regulation unless such interpretation “is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.” But at long last the United States Supreme Court is poised to re-evaluate the doctrine.

In March 2015, in Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Association, the Court addressed whether a federal agency was required to follow the notice-and-comment procedures of the Administrative Procedure Act after it changed a prior interpretation of its regulation under the “Paralyzed Veterans doctrine.” Although …

Expanding Territorial Bounds: The Recognition Doctrine After Zivotofsky V. Kerry, Nicole Kirkilevich

Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review

No abstract provided.

Fixing Hollingsworth: Standing In Initiative Cases, Karl Manheim, John S. Caragozian, Donald Warner

Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review

In Hollingsworth v. Perry, the Supreme Court dismissed an appeal filed by the “Official Proponents” of California’s Proposition 8, which banned same-sex marriage in California. Chief Justice Roberts’ majority opinion held that initiative sponsors lack Article III standing to defend their ballot measures even when state officials refuse to defend against constitutional challenges. As a result, Hollingsworth provides state officers with the ability to overrule laws that were intended to bypass the government establishment—in effect, an “executive veto” of popularly-enacted initiatives.

The Article examines this new “executive veto” in depth. It places Hollingsworth in context, discussing the initiative process …