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Do Class Action Lawyers Make Too Little?, Brian T. Fitzpatrick
Do Class Action Lawyers Make Too Little?, Brian T. Fitzpatrick
Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications
Class action lawyers are some of the most frequently derided players in our system of civil litigation. It is often asserted that class action lawyers take too much from class judgments as fees, that class actions are little more than a device for the lawyers to enrich themselves at the expense of the class. In this Article, I argue that some of this criticism of class action lawyers is misguided. In particular, I perform a normative examination of fee percentages in class action litigation using the social-welfarist utilitarian account of litigation known as deterrence-insurance theory. I argue that in perhaps …
The Multienforcer Approach To Securities Fraud Deterrence: A Critical Analysis, Amanda Rose
The Multienforcer Approach To Securities Fraud Deterrence: A Critical Analysis, Amanda Rose
Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications
Participants in the U.S. capital markets can be sued for securities fraud by a mishmash of enforcers, including the SEC, class action plaintiffs, and state regulators. Does this multi-enforcer approach make sense from a deterrence perspective? This Article suggests that the answer is probably no. Although in theory there are conditions under which a multi-enforcer approach would promote optimal deterrence, it is unclear at best that those conditions exist in the United States. And further empirical research, while warranted, is unlikely to resolve the issue definitively. The status quo tends to persevere in the face of this sort of irreducible …