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Vanderbilt Law Review

1998

Bankruptcy

Articles 1 - 2 of 2

Full-Text Articles in Law

Re-Reading Reading: "Fairness To All Persons" In The Context Of Administrative Expense Priority For Postpetition Punitive Fines In Bankruptcy, Stephen D. Hurd Oct 1998

Re-Reading Reading: "Fairness To All Persons" In The Context Of Administrative Expense Priority For Postpetition Punitive Fines In Bankruptcy, Stephen D. Hurd

Vanderbilt Law Review

Who gets the money when there isn't enough to go around? This is the practical question that the bankruptcy system seeks to answer every day.' In answering this question, the Bankruptcy Code draws a particularly bright line at the filing of a bankruptcy petition. The filing of a petition creates the bankruptcy estate, which is a distinct legal entity from the debtor. Creditors with claims against the debtor arising before filing ("prepetition) receive payment of their claim, if at all, through bankruptcy's collective distribution scheme. In contrast, persons whose claims arose after filing ("postpetition"), but before completion of the bankruptcy …


An Evolutionary Theory Of Corporate Law And Corporate Bankruptcy, David A. Skeel, Jr. Oct 1998

An Evolutionary Theory Of Corporate Law And Corporate Bankruptcy, David A. Skeel, Jr.

Vanderbilt Law Review

In this Article, Professor Skeel argues that the important recent literature exploring historical and political influences on American corporate law has neglected a crucial component of corporate governance: corporate bankruptcy. Only by appreciating the complementary relationship between corporate law and corporate bankruptcy can we understand how corporate governance operates in any given nation.

To show this, the Article contrasts American corporate governance with that of Japan and Germany. America's market-driven corporate governance can only function effectively if the bankruptcy framework includes a manager-driven reorganization option. The relational shareholding that characterizes Japanese and German corporate governance, by contrast, requires a much …