Law Commons^™

The Death Of Suspicion, Fabio Arcila Jr.

Scholarly Works

This article argues that neither the presumptive warrant requirement nor the presumptive suspicion requirement are correct. Though representative of the common law, they do not reflect the totality of our historic experience, which includes civil search practices. More importantly, modern developments - such as urban life and technological advancements, the rise of the regulatory state, and security concerns post-9/11 - have sufficiently changed circumstances so that these rules are not just unworkable now, they are demonstrably wrong. Worst of all, adhering to them has prevented us from formulating a more coherent Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. A new paradigm confronts us, in …

The Framers' Search Power: The Misunderstood Statutory History Of Suspicion & Probable Cause, Fabio Arcila, Jr.

Scholarly Works

Originalist analyses of the Framers’ views about governmental search power have devoted insufficient attention to the civil search statutes they promulgated for regulatory purposes. What attention has been paid concludes that the Framers were divided about how accessible search remedies should be. This Article explains why this conventional account is mostly wrong and explores the lessons to be learned from the statutory choices the Framers made with regard to search and seizure law. In enacting civil search statutes, the Framers chose to depart from common law standards and instead largely followed the patterns of preceding British civil search statutes. The …

The Automobile Exception In Nevada: A Critique Of The Harnisch Cases, Thomas B. Mcaffee, John P. Lukens, Thaddeus J. Yurek Iii

Scholarly Works

This Article offers a critique of Nevada's Harnisch cases and calls for the Nevada Supreme Court to reconsider its ruling. The authors begin by examining the historical development of the automobile exception, beginning with Carroll v. United States. There the Supreme Court reasoned that both probable cause and the exigency of the mobility of automobiles justified a search without a warrant. But almost seventy-five years later, in Maryland v. Dyson, the Court clarified its conclusion that the automobile exception has no separate exigency requirement. In turn, the authors will then examine Nevada's application of the automobile exception prior to 1998's …

A Response To Professor Steinberg’S Fourth Amendment Chutzpah, Fabio Arcila

Scholarly Works

Professor David Steinberg believes that the Fourth Amendment was intended only to provide some protection against physical searches of homes through imposition of a specific warrant requirement because the Framers' only object in promulgating the Fourth Amendment was to ban physical searches of homes under general warrants or no warrants at all. This response essay takes issue with his thesis by (1) discussing its implications, (2) reviewing some concerns with his methodology in reviewing the historical record, and (3) examining the theoretical implication underlying his thesis that, except as to homes, we have a majoritarian Fourth Amendment, and questioning whether …

In The Trenches: Searches And The Misunderstood Common-Law History Of Suspicion And Probable Cause, Fabio Arcila

Scholarly Works

A detailed analysis of the common law during the Framers’ era, and of how it reflected the Fourth Amendment’s restrictions, shows that many judges believed they could issue search warrants without independently assessing the adequacy of probable cause, and that this view persisted even after the Fourth Amendment became effective. This conclusion challenges the leading originalist account of the Fourth Amendment, which Professor Thomas Davies published in the Michigan Law Review in 1999.

Learned treatises in particular, and to a lesser extent a few case decisions, had articulated a judicial duty to monitor probable cause. But it is a mistake …

Special Needs And Special Deference: Suspicionless Civil Searches In The Modern Regulatory State, Fabio Arcila

Scholarly Works

This Article examines the Supreme Court’s application of the "special needs" principle, which is part of its Fourth Amendment search and seizure jurisprudence, with an emphasis on suspicionless searches. It argues that both courts and commentators have insufficiently acknowledged the tension between the modern regulatory state, which is significantly dependent upon such searches, and adequately protecting liberty interests. The commentators who criticize the Court’s deference ignore that a deferential approach can be justified. Suspicionless civil searches, for example, are not necessarily incompatible with original intent. Moreover, the many proposals for reforming suspicionless civil search jurisprudence, such as reinvigorating the individualized …