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Full-Text Articles in Law
A Class Act? Social Class Affirmative Action And Higher Education, Maimon Schwarzschild
A Class Act? Social Class Affirmative Action And Higher Education, Maimon Schwarzschild
San Diego Law Review
Comparing class preferences with racial preferences helps to point up some of the reasons for the allure of class preferences but also points up some of the problems. A crucial consideration is the question of who is to receive class preference. For example, what about immigrants and their children? In general, social class is difficult to define, and this very difficulty would confer great discretion and power on faculties and academic administrators who undertake to bestow class preferences: discretion that would be open to abuse for political, ideological, and other ends. Finally, there is the question of whether preferential treatment …
Has Affirmative Action Been Negated? A Closer Look At Public Employment, H Lee Sarokin, Jane K. Babin, Allison H. Goddard
Has Affirmative Action Been Negated? A Closer Look At Public Employment, H Lee Sarokin, Jane K. Babin, Allison H. Goddard
San Diego Law Review
First, this Article argues that affirmative action is right and necessary in certain circumstances. Second, it examines whether affirmative action has survived under current case law. Part II.A reviews the Supreme Court decisions that define the test of strict scrutiny in the public employment context. Part II.B discusses the current focus of the Court's debate on affirmative action. Part III looks at how strict scrutiny analysis and the Supreme Court's precedents are being applied by the lower federal courts. Part IV concludes that more guidance is needed from the Supreme Court on the first prong of the strict scrutiny analysis …
Market Affirmative Action, Robert Cooter
Market Affirmative Action, Robert Cooter
San Diego Law Review
This Article applies the economic theory of regulation to laws forbidding discrimination or requiring affirmative action. It argues for using transferable rights in order to achieve diversity rather than quotas. Based on economic theories, the Article finds that the most efficient remedies for discrimination are the ones already developed by economists for other problems. The author suggests that discriminatory cartels can be prohibited or undermined, discriminatory signals can be overcome by supplementing market information, and external effects of prejudice can be internalized by tax subsidies. He concludes that perfect competition causes discriminators to pay for segregation, and some current antidiscrimination …