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Full-Text Articles in Law
Purposivism In The Executive Branch: How Agencies Interpret Statutes, Kevin M. Stack
Purposivism In The Executive Branch: How Agencies Interpret Statutes, Kevin M. Stack
Northwestern University Law Review
After decades of debate, the lines of distinction between textualism and purposivism have been carefully drawn with respect to the judicial task of statutory interpretation. Far less attention has been devoted to the question of how executive branch officials approach statutory interpretation. While scholars have contrasted agencies’ interpretive practices from those of courts, they have not yet developed a theory of agency statutory interpretation.
This Article develops a purposivist theory of agency statutory interpretation on the ground that regulatory statutes oblige agencies to implement the statutes they administer in that manner. Regulatory statutes not only grant powers but also impose …
The Bayh–Dole Act & Public Rights In Federally Funded Inventions: Will The Agencies Ever Go Marching In?, Ryan Whalen
The Bayh–Dole Act & Public Rights In Federally Funded Inventions: Will The Agencies Ever Go Marching In?, Ryan Whalen
Northwestern University Law Review
For over thirty years, the Bayh–Dole Act has granted federal agencies the power to force the recipients of federal research funding to license the resulting inventions to third parties. Despite having this expansive power, no federal agency has ever seen fit to utilize it. This Note explores why Bayh–Dole march-in rights have never been used, and proposes reforms that would help ensure that, in the instances when they are most required, the public is able to access the inventions it bankrolled.
There have been five documented march-in petitions since the Bayh–Dole Act was passed into law. Each petition was dismissed …
Optimal Abuse Of Power, Adrian Vermeule
Optimal Abuse Of Power, Adrian Vermeule
Northwestern University Law Review
I will argue that in the administrative state, in contrast to classical constitutional theory, the abuse of government power is not something to be strictly minimized, but rather optimized. An administrative regime will tolerate a predictable level of misrule, even abuse of power, as the inevitable byproduct of attaining other ends that are desirable overall.
There are three principal grounds for this claim. First, the architects of the modern administrative state were not only worried about misrule by governmental officials. They were equally worried about “private” misrule—misrule effected through the self-interested or self-serving behavior of economic actors wielding and abusing …