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Articles 1 - 11 of 11

Full-Text Articles in Law

The Obliging Shell: An Informal Essay On Formal Equal Opportunity, Patricia Williams Aug 1989

The Obliging Shell: An Informal Essay On Formal Equal Opportunity, Patricia Williams

Michigan Law Review

I am struck by the Court's use of the word "equality" in the last line of its holding. It seems an extraordinarily narrow use of "equality," when it excludes from consideration so much clear inequality. It, again, resembles the process by which the Parol Evidence Rule limits the meaning of documents or words by placing beyond the bounds of reference anything that is inconsistent, or, depending on the circumstances, even that which is supplementary. It is this lawyerly language game of exclusion and omission that is the subject of the rest of this essay.


Decoding Richmond: Affirmative Action And The Elusive Meaning Of Constitutional Equality, Michel Rosenfeld Jun 1989

Decoding Richmond: Affirmative Action And The Elusive Meaning Of Constitutional Equality, Michel Rosenfeld

Michigan Law Review

This Article first briefly considers the conceptual and constitutional framework out of which the controversy in Croson emerges. Next, the Article turns to Croson itself, and focuses on the Court's adoption of the strict scrutiny test, on the disagreement among the Justices concerning the test's meaning and implications, and on the Court's use of decontextualization to manipulate the key conceptual and factual issues at stake. Finally, drawing upon the principle of equality of opportunity, the Article endeavors to demonstrate how the adoption of particular principles of substantive equality can lead to a comprehensive and coherent constitutional resolution of the affirmative …


Siskel And Ebert At The Supreme Court, Thomas E. Baker May 1989

Siskel And Ebert At The Supreme Court, Thomas E. Baker

Michigan Law Review

A Review of Redefining the Supreme Court's Role: A Theory of Managing the Federal Judicial Process by Samuel Estreicher and John Sexton


The Parable As Legal Scholarship, G. Edward White May 1989

The Parable As Legal Scholarship, G. Edward White

Michigan Law Review

A Review of Two Jewish Justices: Outcasts in the Promised Land by Robert Burt


Reimagining The Marshall Court, H. Jefferson Powell May 1989

Reimagining The Marshall Court, H. Jefferson Powell

Michigan Law Review

A Review of The Marshall Court and Cultural Change, 1815-1835 by G. Edward White


The Plessy Case: A Legal-Historical Interpretation, David D. Meyer May 1989

The Plessy Case: A Legal-Historical Interpretation, David D. Meyer

Michigan Law Review

A Review of The Plessy Case: A Legal-Historical Interpretation by Charles A. Lofgren


Harry Kalven, The Proust Of The First Amendment, Lee Bollinger May 1989

Harry Kalven, The Proust Of The First Amendment, Lee Bollinger

Michigan Law Review

A Review of A Worth Tradition: Freedom of Speech in America by Harry Kalven, Jr.


Police-Obtained Evidence And The Constitution: Distinguishing Unconstitutionally Obtained Evidence From Unconstitutionally Used Evidence, Arnold H. Loewy Apr 1989

Police-Obtained Evidence And The Constitution: Distinguishing Unconstitutionally Obtained Evidence From Unconstitutionally Used Evidence, Arnold H. Loewy

Michigan Law Review

The article will consider four different types of police-obtained evidence: evidence obtained from an unconstitutional search and seizure, evidence obtained from a Miranda violation, confessions and lineup identifications obtained in violation of the sixth amendment right to counsel, and coerced confessions. My conclusions are that evidence obtained from an unconstitutional search and seizure is excluded because of the police misconduct by which it was obtained. On the other hand, evidence obtained from a Miranda violation is (or ought to be) excluded because use of that evidence compromises the defendant's procedural right not to be compelled to be a witness against …


Rethinking Absolute Priority After Ahlers, John D. Ayer Apr 1989

Rethinking Absolute Priority After Ahlers, John D. Ayer

Michigan Law Review

There was no evident reason why the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers. It can be conceded that the issue was important: in the midst of an agricultural depression, a farmer was trying to hang onto his farm without paying the full amount of his bank debt. The farmer argued that he ought to be able to do so because he was offering to contribute "new value" beyond what he was obliged to contribute - specifically, his efforts as a farmer.

For Ahlers is a case with a past, as well as a future. Thus, in …


Confusing The Fifth Amendment With The Sixth: Lower Court Misapplication Of The Innis Definition Of Interrogation, Jonathan L. Marks Apr 1989

Confusing The Fifth Amendment With The Sixth: Lower Court Misapplication Of The Innis Definition Of Interrogation, Jonathan L. Marks

Michigan Law Review

This Note examines how these courts have applied or misapplied Innis, and concludes that, while many of these decisions are consistent with Miranda and Innis, too many others are not. In order to evaluate these cases, it is first necessary to understand the meaning and significance of Innis. Part I thus considers Innis and its background. Part II then examines lower court decisions applying the Innis test, dividing these decisions into six groups based on the most common factual scenarios. Because the cases deal with factually specific police practices, this method constitutes the most useful way to …


Legislative Inaction And The Patterson Case, Earl M. Maltz Feb 1989

Legislative Inaction And The Patterson Case, Earl M. Maltz

Michigan Law Review

In its October 1988 issue,1 the Michigan Law Review published a symposium on Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, a case in which the Supreme Court has requested reargument on the question of whether Runyon v. McCrary should be overruled or modified. Each of the three distinguished contributors to the symposium concludes that the Court should not overrule Runyon. In reaching this conclusion, Professor William N. Eskridge and Professor Daniel A. Farber rely heavily on the view that because Congress has recognized the existence of the Runyon doctrine and has refused to overrule the decision, the doctrine of stare decisis …