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Suspect Spheres, Not Enumerated Powers: A Guide For Leaving The Lamppost, Richard Primus, Roderick M. Hills Jr. May 2021

Suspect Spheres, Not Enumerated Powers: A Guide For Leaving The Lamppost, Richard Primus, Roderick M. Hills Jr.

Michigan Law Review

Despite longstanding orthodoxy, the Constitution’s enumeration of congressional powers does virtually nothing to limit federal lawmaking. That’s not because of some bizarrely persistent judicial failure to read the Constitution correctly. It’s because the enumeration of congressional powers is not a well-designed technology for limiting federal legislation. Rather than trying to make the enumeration do work that it will not do, decisionmakers should find better ways of thinking about what lawmaking should be done locally rather than nationally. This Article suggests such a rubric, one that asks not whether Congress has permission to do a certain thing but whether a certain …


The Doctrine Of Clarifications, Pat Mcdonell Feb 2021

The Doctrine Of Clarifications, Pat Mcdonell

Michigan Law Review

Clarifications are a longstanding but little-studied concept in statutory interpretation. Most courts have found that clarifying amendments to preexisting statutes bypass retroactivity limitations. Therein lies their power. Because clarifications simply restate the law, they do not implicate the presumption against retroactivity that Landgraf v. USI Film Products embedded in civil-statute interpretation. The problem that courts have yet to address is how exactly clarifying legislation can be distinguished from legislation that substantively changes the law. What exactly is a clarification? The courts’ answers implicate many of the entrenched debates in statutory interpretation. This Note offers three primary contributions. First, it summarizes …


Possible Reliance: Protecting Legally Innocent Johnson Claimants, Keagan Potts Nov 2020

Possible Reliance: Protecting Legally Innocent Johnson Claimants, Keagan Potts

Michigan Law Review

The writ of habeas corpus presents the last chance for innocent defendants to obtain relief from invalid convictions and sentences. The writ constitutes a limited exception to the finality of judgments. Given the role finality plays in conserving judicial resources and deterring criminal conduct, exceptions created by habeas must be principally circumscribed. Since the Supreme Court’s invalidation of the Armed Career Criminal Act’s residual clause in Johnson v. United States, the federal courts of appeals have attempted to develop a test that protects the writ from abuse by Johnson claimants.

This Note first contributes a new understanding of the …


Change, Creation, And Unpredictability In Statutory Interpretation: Interpretive Canon Use In The Roberts Court's First Decade, Nina A. Mendelson Jan 2018

Change, Creation, And Unpredictability In Statutory Interpretation: Interpretive Canon Use In The Roberts Court's First Decade, Nina A. Mendelson

Michigan Law Review

In resolving questions of statutory meaning, the lion’s share of Roberts Court opinions considers and applies at least one interpretive canon, whether the rule against surplusage or the presumption against state law preemption. This is part of a decades-long turn toward textualist statutory interpretation in the Supreme Court. Commentators have debated how to justify canons, since they are judicially created rules that reside outside the statutory text. Earlier studies have cast substantial doubt on whether these canons can be justified as capturing congressional practices or preferences; commentators have accordingly turned toward second-order justifications, arguing that canons usefully make interpretation constrained …


Election Law Federalism, Justin Weinstein-Tull Feb 2016

Election Law Federalism, Justin Weinstein-Tull

Michigan Law Review

This Article provides the first comprehensive account of non-Voting Rights Act federal voting laws. Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act—long the most effective voting rights law in American history—was disabled by the Supreme Court in Shelby County v. Holder. Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act is in the crosshairs. As the Supreme Court becomes more hostile to race-based antidiscrimination laws like the Voting Rights Act, Congress will turn to race-neutral, election administration-based reforms to strengthen the right to vote. Indeed, many proposals for reform post-Shelby County have taken this form. The federal laws this Article examines—the National Voter …


Congress And The Reconstruction Of Foreign Affairs Federalism, Ryan Baasch, Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash Jan 2016

Congress And The Reconstruction Of Foreign Affairs Federalism, Ryan Baasch, Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash

Michigan Law Review

Though the Constitution conspicuously bars some state involvement in foreign affairs, the states clearly retain some authority in foreign affairs. Correctly supposing that state participation may unnecessarily complicate or embarrass our nation’s foreign relations, the Supreme Court has embraced aggressive preemption doctrines that sporadically oust the states from discrete areas in foreign affairs. These doctrines are unprincipled, supply little guidance, and generate capricious results. Fortunately, there is a better way. While the Constitution permits the states a limited and continuing role, it never goes so far as guaranteeing them any foreign affairs authority. Furthermore, the Constitution authorizes Congress to enact …


Standing In The Way Of The Ftaia: Exceptional Applications Of Illinois Brick, Jennifer Fischell Oct 2015

Standing In The Way Of The Ftaia: Exceptional Applications Of Illinois Brick, Jennifer Fischell

Michigan Law Review

In 1982, Congress enacted the Foreign Antitrust Trade Improvements Act (FTAIA) to resolve uncertainties about the international reach and effect of U.S. antitrust laws. Unfortunately, the FTAIA has provided more questions than answers. It has been ten years since the Supreme Court most recently interpreted the FTAIA, and crucial questions and circuit splits abound. One of these questions is how to understand the convergence of the direct purchaser rule (frequently referred to as the Illinois Brick doctrine) and the FTAIA. Under the direct purchaser rule, only those who purchase directly from antitrust violators are typically permitted to sue under section …


Are Unions A Constitutional Anomaly?, Cynthia Estlund Oct 2015

Are Unions A Constitutional Anomaly?, Cynthia Estlund

Michigan Law Review

This term in Friedrichs v. California Teachers Ass’n, the Supreme Court will consider whether ordinary public employees may constitutionally be required to pay an “agency fee,” as a condition of employment, to the union that represents them in collective bargaining. The Court established the terms of engagement in the 2014 decision Harris v. Quinn, which struck down an agency fee on narrower grounds while describing the current doctrine approving agency fees, blessed many times by the Court itself, as an “anomaly.” This Article asks whether labor unions are themselves anomalies in our legal system, particularly in their constitutional entitlements. Its …


Delegating Tax, James R. Hines Jr., Kyle D. Logue Oct 2015

Delegating Tax, James R. Hines Jr., Kyle D. Logue

Michigan Law Review

Congress delegates extensive and growing lawmaking authority to federal administrative agencies in areas other than taxation, but tightly limits the scope of Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and Treasury regulatory discretion in the tax area, specifically not permitting these agencies to select or adjust tax rates. This Article questions why tax policy does and should differ from other policy areas in this respect, noting some of the potential policy benefits of delegation. Greater delegation of tax lawmaking authority would allow administrative agencies to apply their expertise to fiscal policy and afford timely adjustment to changing economic circumstances. Furthermore, delegation of the …


Preemption And Textualism, Daniel J. Meltzer Oct 2013

Preemption And Textualism, Daniel J. Meltzer

Michigan Law Review

In the critically important area of preemption, the Supreme Court’s approach to statutory interpretation differs from the approach it follows elsewhere. Whether in politically salient matters, like challenges to Arizona’s immigration laws, or in more conventional cases, such as those in which state tort liability overlaps with federal regulation, the Court’s preemption decisions reflect a highly purposive approach to reading statutes, most notably through the application of “obstacle preemption” analysis. Recently, however, Justice Thomas has objected to the Court’s failure in preemption cases to respect its more textualist approach to issues of statutory interpretation, and he has urged that obstacle …


Assessing Divisibility In The Armed Career Criminal Act, Ted Koehler Jun 2012

Assessing Divisibility In The Armed Career Criminal Act, Ted Koehler

Michigan Law Review

When courts analyze whether a defendant's prior conviction qualifies as a "violent felony" under the Armed Career Criminal Act's "residual clause," they use a "categorical approach," looking only to the statutory language of the prior offense, rather than the facts disclosed by the record of conviction. But when a defendant is convicted under a "divisible" statute, which encompasses a broader range of conduct, only some of which would qualify as a predicate offense, courts may employ the "modified categorical approach." This approach allows courts to view additional documents to determine whether the jury convicted the defendant of the Armed Career …


Inside Agency Preemption, Catherine M. Sharkey Feb 2012

Inside Agency Preemption, Catherine M. Sharkey

Michigan Law Review

A subtle shift has taken place in the mechanics of preemption, the doctrine that determines when federal law displaces state law. In the past, Congress was the leading actor, and courts and commentators focused almost exclusively on the precise wording of its statutory directives as a clue to its intent to displace state law. Federal agencies were, if not ignored, certainly no more than supporting players. But the twenty-first century has witnessed a role reversal. Federal agencies now play the dominant role in statutory interpretation. The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized the ascendancy of federal agencies in preemption disputes-an ascendancy …


Whither The Disability Rights Movement?, Robert W. Pratt Apr 2011

Whither The Disability Rights Movement?, Robert W. Pratt

Michigan Law Review

While reading this book in 2010, almost twenty years to the date after President George H.W. Bush signed the Americans with Disability Act ("ADA"), one realizes how much the world of politics has changed. It is difficult to remember a time when such major legislation passed the U.S. Senate by a vote of 91 to 6 and the House of Representatives by 377 to 28. Even more surprising, as we look back to 1990, is the fact that the executive branch was controlled by a different political party than the legislative branch. Contrast this legislative record with the milieu surrounding …


Pleading With Congress To Resist The Urge To Overrule Twombly And Iqbal, Michael R. Huston Jan 2010

Pleading With Congress To Resist The Urge To Overrule Twombly And Iqbal, Michael R. Huston

Michigan Law Review

In Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, the Supreme Court changed the rhetoric of the federal pleading system. Those decisions have been decried by members of the bar, scholars, and legislators as judicial activism and a rewriting of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Such criticism has led members of both houses of Congress to introduce legislation to overrule the decisions and return to some variation of the "notice pleading" regime that existed before Twombly. This Note argues that both of the current proposals to overrule Twombly and Iqbal should be rejected. Although the bills take different …


Engineering The Endgame, Ellen D. Katz Jan 2010

Engineering The Endgame, Ellen D. Katz

Michigan Law Review

This Article explores what happens to longstanding remedies for past racial discrimination as conditions change. It shows that Congress and the Supreme Court have responded quite differently to changed conditions when they evaluate such remedies. Congress has generally opted to stay the course, while the Court has been more inclined to view change as cause to terminate a remedy. The Article argues that these very different responses share a defining flaw, namely, they treat existing remedies as fixed until they are terminated. As a result, remedies are either scrapped prematurely or left stagnant despite dramatically changed conditions. The Article seeks …


Nothing Improper? Examining Constitutional Limits, Congressional Action, Partisan Motivation, And Pretextual Justification In The U. S. Attorney Removals, David C. Weiss Nov 2008

Nothing Improper? Examining Constitutional Limits, Congressional Action, Partisan Motivation, And Pretextual Justification In The U. S. Attorney Removals, David C. Weiss

Michigan Law Review

The forced mid-term resignations of nine U.S. Attorneys was an unprecedented event in American history. Nearly one year after the administration executed the removals, the House Judiciary Committee was still reviewing and publicizing emails, memoranda, and other documents in an effort to understand how the firings were effectuated. This Note examines many of those documents and concludes that the removals were likely carried out for partisan reasons. It then draws on the Constitution, Supreme Court precedent, and separation of powers principles to argue that Congress is constitutionally empowered to enact removal limitations for inferior officers such as U.S. Attorneys so …


Reply: Did The Fourteenth Amendment Repeal The First?, Jed Rubenfeld Jun 1998

Reply: Did The Fourteenth Amendment Repeal The First?, Jed Rubenfeld

Michigan Law Review

To get right to the point: Mr. Hacker does not disagree that the Establishment Clause would, in the absence of the Fourteenth Amendment, have prohibited Congress from passing a nationwide religion law like RFRA. He believes, however, that the Fourteenth Amendment has in part repealed the First. Of course, he doesn't want to say repealed. The language of repeal is not pleasant to the ears of those who would like to forget about First Amendment antidisestablishmentarianism. The Fourteenth Amendment did not "repeal any aspect of the text of the [Establishment] Clause," Hacker says, but only "change[d] profoundly the meaning of …


A Response To Professor Rubenfeld, Jonathan D. Hacker Jun 1998

A Response To Professor Rubenfeld, Jonathan D. Hacker

Michigan Law Review

Professor Jed Rubenfeld has offered in these pages an ingenious explanation for why the Supreme Court was right to strike down the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) in City of Boerne v. Flores. Rubenfeld finds in the First Amendment's Establishment Clause a historical and inherent principle he calls "antidisestablishmentarianism": a prohibition on acts of Congress that "disestablish" religion in the several states. Rubenfeld reads the Establishment Clause as proscribing not only congressional acts that "establish" religion but also all congressional acts that "dictate a position on religion for states," including laws designed to ensure that states abide by the requirements …


Textualism, The Unknown Ideal?, William N. Eskridge Jr. May 1998

Textualism, The Unknown Ideal?, William N. Eskridge Jr.

Michigan Law Review

In May 1997, the New York Knickerbockers basketball team was poised to reach the finals of its division in the National Basketball Association (NBA). The Knicks led the rival Miami Heat by three games to two and needed one more victory to win the best-of seven semifinal playoff series. Game six would be in New York; with their star center, Patrick Ewing, playing well, victory seemed assured for the Knicks. A fracas during game five changed the odds. During a fight under the basket between Knicks and Heat players, Ewing left the bench and paced in the middle of the …


A Tempered "Yes" To The "Exculpatory No", Scott D. Pomfret Dec 1997

A Tempered "Yes" To The "Exculpatory No", Scott D. Pomfret

Michigan Law Review

What circumstances trigger a person's duty to tell the truth? Immanuel Kant claimed without qualification that all circumstances require truthtelling, even when speaking the truth injures the speaker. John Henry Cardinal Newman made exceptions for lies that achieved some positive end. Hugo Grotius permitted lies to adversaries. The philosophy of twentieth-century common sense largely permits white lies. Perhaps surprisingly, some courts have found that Kant's absolute prohibition of falsehood more accurately characterizes a speaker's duty to tell the truth to the federal government under 18 U.S.C. § 1001 than these other, more relaxed standards. According to this view, the prohibition …


Equal Protection, Class Legislation, And Colorblindness, Melissa L. Saunders Nov 1997

Equal Protection, Class Legislation, And Colorblindness, Melissa L. Saunders

Michigan Law Review

Scholars and judges have long assumed that the Equal Protection Clause is concerned only with state action that has the effect of singling out certain persons or groups of persons for special benefits or burdens. Under the traditional doctrinal framework, state action that has this purpose and effect bears a certain burden of justification under the clause, a burden whose stringency varies, depending on the criteria used to define the class being singled out for special treatment and the importance of the interest affected. But state action that lacks such a "discriminatory effect" is not, on the traditional understanding, subject …


The Path To Habeas Corpus Narrows: Interpreting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(D)(1), Sharad Sushil Khandelwal Nov 1997

The Path To Habeas Corpus Narrows: Interpreting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(D)(1), Sharad Sushil Khandelwal

Michigan Law Review

The enforcement of the U.S. Constitution within the criminal justice system is an odd subspecies of constitutional law. In areas other than criminal law, federal courts act as the ultimate guarantors of constitutional rights by providing remedies whenever violations occur. Criminal law, however, is different by necessity; the bulk of criminal justice occurs in state courthouses, leaving constitutional compliance largely to state judges. The U.S. Supreme Court, of course, may review these decisions if it chooses, but a writ of certiorari can be elusive, especially given the Court's shrinking docket. After World War II, however, this feature of criminal constitutional …


"A Government Of Limited And Enumerated Powers": In Defense Of United States V. Lopez, Steven G. Calabresi Dec 1995

"A Government Of Limited And Enumerated Powers": In Defense Of United States V. Lopez, Steven G. Calabresi

Michigan Law Review

The Supreme Court's recent decision in United States v. Lopez marks a revolutionary and long overdue revival of the doctrine that the federal government is one of limited and enumerated powers. After being "asleep at the constitutional switch" for more than fifty years, the Court's decision to invalidate an Act of Congress on the ground that it exceeded the commerce power must be recognized as an extraordinary event. Even if Lopez produces no progeny and is soon overruled, the opinion has shattered forever the notion that, after fifty years of Commerce Clause precedent, we can never go back to the …


Foreword, Louis H. Pollak Dec 1995

Foreword, Louis H. Pollak

Michigan Law Review

Introduction to the Symposium Reflections on United States v. Lopez


Enumerated Means And Unlimited Ends, H. Jefferson Powell Dec 1995

Enumerated Means And Unlimited Ends, H. Jefferson Powell

Michigan Law Review

United States v. Lopez can be read as a fairly mundane disagreement over the application of a long-settled test. The Government defended the statute under review in the case, the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990, along familiar lines as a permissible regulation of activity affecting interstate and foreign commerce.

In this essay, I do not address the question whether Lopez was an important decision. My concern instead is with the problem that underlies Lopez's particular issue of the scope of the commerce power: Given our commitment to limited national government, in what way is the national legislature actually limited? …


Commerce!, Deborah Jones Merritt Dec 1995

Commerce!, Deborah Jones Merritt

Michigan Law Review

In this article, I explore the Supreme Court's new definition of "Commerce ... among the several States."9 In Part I, I examine three new principles that Lopez announces and that could significantly rework the Court's Commerce Clause jurisprudence. Part II, however, shows that these principles must be understood in the context of almost a dozen factors narrowing the Supreme Court's Lopez decision. Part II also demonstrates that the lower courts have understood the contextual uniqueness of Lopez and already have distinguished the decision in upholding more than half a dozen broad exercises of congressional authority. Part III then shows that …


Supplemental Jurisdiction Over Claims By Plaintiffs In Diversity Cases: Making Sense Of 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (B), Darren J. Gold Jun 1995

Supplemental Jurisdiction Over Claims By Plaintiffs In Diversity Cases: Making Sense Of 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (B), Darren J. Gold

Michigan Law Review

This Note examines the language and legislative history of section 1367(b) and proposes a uniform test for determining the circumstances in which subsection (b) authorizes the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction. Part I of this Note explains the doctrines of pendent and ancillary jurisdiction and examines how the Supreme Court's decision in Finley v. United States called these doctrines into question. Part II examines the language and legislative history of section 1367 and concludes that the statute only prohibits the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction over claims by plaintiffs in diversity cases when doing so would permit plaintiffs to circumvent the complete …


Congressional Commentary On Judicial Interpretations Of Statutes: Idle Chatter Or Telling Response?, James J. Brudney Oct 1994

Congressional Commentary On Judicial Interpretations Of Statutes: Idle Chatter Or Telling Response?, James J. Brudney

Michigan Law Review

There are two principal aspects of my thesis. First, it is desirable to consider seriously these legislative signals of approval and disapproval, because a blanket rejection, or even systematic hostility, imposes significant opportunity costs on Congress. If the judiciary refuses to consider these signals, Congress will have to expend extra resources to achieve the same ends. That expense will diminish the institution's ability to enact other laws and in some cases will alter the character of the other laws that it is able to enact. The consequent diminution or depletion of Congress's legislative authority is unhealthy from a democratic perspective …


The Meaning Of "Under Color Of" Law, Steven L. Winter Dec 1992

The Meaning Of "Under Color Of" Law, Steven L. Winter

Michigan Law Review

The argument proceeds as follows. In Part I, I examine why the conceptual problem of who or what is "the State" is so intractable. In Part II, I present the historical evidence that establishes beyond doubt the pedigree and meaning of the phrase under color of law. I explain why Frankfurter would have indulged in such an obvious historical error to take the position he did. I suggest that, as was the case with the invention of modem standing doctrine, Frankfurter was here engaged in a stealthy, anachronistic campaign against the jurisprudence of the Lochner era - attempting to …


Legal Interpretation And A Constitutional Case: Home Building & Loan Association V. Blaisdell, Charles A. Bieneman Aug 1992

Legal Interpretation And A Constitutional Case: Home Building & Loan Association V. Blaisdell, Charles A. Bieneman

Michigan Law Review

The approaches of Hughes and Sutherland are but two extremes in constitutional interpretation. Though only two results were possible in the case - either the Act was constitutional or it was not - there are more than two methods by which an interpreter could reach those results. This Note explores possible ways of deciding Blaisdell, using the case as a vehicle for delimiting the boundaries of a positive constitutional command. As a sort of empirical investigation of legal philosophy, the Note examines how various interpretive theories affect an interpreter's approach to the case, and the results these theories might …