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Lawrence Rosenthal

Constitutional Interpretation

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Full-Text Articles in Law

Originalism In Practice, Lawrence Rosenthal Dec 2011

Originalism In Practice, Lawrence Rosenthal

Lawrence Rosenthal

Originalism is in ascendance. Both in judicial opinions and in the legal academy, arguments for the interpretation of the Constitution based on its original meaning are increasingly prominent. The scholarly literature to date, however, has focused on theory. Supporters and opponents debate the theoretical merits of originalism, but rarely test their views on the merits of originalism by reference to the realities of constitutional adjudication. In science, a theory gains acceptance if it makes testable predictions that are later borne out. Whatever its theoretical merit, originalism deserves recognition as genuinely distinctive and useful approach to constitutional adjudication only if, in …


Originalism Is Useless, Lawrence Rosenthal Aug 2010

Originalism Is Useless, Lawrence Rosenthal

Lawrence Rosenthal

Originalism is in ascendance. Both in judicial opinions and in the legal academy, originalist methods of constitutional interpretation are increasingly prominent. This essay nevertheless makes what may seem a claim – originalism is useless. In this, the essay takes a different path the the critics of orignalism have offered to date. Attacks on originalism usually question its normative desirability, but do not doubt that originalism offers a distinct approach to constitutional adjudication as compared to nonoriginalism. The concern here is with the question whether originalism is actually of help in addressing the kind of constitutional questions that come before the …


Originalism Is Useless, Lawrence Rosenthal Aug 2010

Originalism Is Useless, Lawrence Rosenthal

Lawrence Rosenthal

Originalism is in ascendance. Both in judicial opinions and in the legal academy, originalist methods of constitutional interpretation are increasingly prominent. This essay nevertheless makes what may seem a claim – originalism is useless. In this, the essay takes a different path the the critics of orignalism have offered to date. Attacks on originalism usually question its normative desirability, but do not doubt that originalism offers a distinct approach to constitutional adjudication as compared to nonoriginalism. The concern here is with the question whether originalism is actually of help in addressing the kind of constitutional questions that come before the …