Law Commons^™

A Law And Economics Perspective On Terrorism, Nuno M. Garoupa , Jonathan Klick, Francesco Parisi

George Mason University School of Law Working Papers Series

This paper reviews the existing law and economics literature on crime, noting where various models might apply to the terror context. Specifically, it focuses on two strands of the literature, deterrence and incapacitation. Challenging the conventional application of the basic rational agent model of crime in the context of terrorism, it considers anti-terror measures enacted by different countries, highlighting how the details of the laws correspond to the insights from economic models of crime. In conclusion, the paper proposes an efficient sorting mechanism in which individuals will be provided with adequate incentives to reveal their type to law enforcement authorities.

Two Tales Of Bundling, Bruce H. Kobayashi

George Mason University School of Law Working Papers Series

The economic literature on bundling has made many theoretical advances. However, several omissions reveal themselves. The advances have largely been on the theoretical side. These models contain restrictive assumptions regarding the existence of monopoly in some markets, and the nature of rivalry in others. The models generally ignore obvious and ubiquitous reasons firms may use bundled discounts. These models have not been subject to robustness checks, nor have their assumptions been tested empirically. As a result, the literature that shows the possibility of anticompetitive harm does not provide a reliable way to gauge whether the potential for harm would outweigh …

The Economics Of Loyalty Discounts And Antitrust Law In The United States, Bruce H. Kobayashi

George Mason University School of Law Working Papers Series

This paper examines the law and economics of loyalty discounts. While there have been recent advances in the economic analysis of loyalty discounts, this literature is still relatively recent and sparse. Though some of these papers provide tests that would serve to identify either deviations from short run profit maximization or, in the case of bundled discounts, a reduction in consumer welfare or the exclusion of a hypothetically equally efficient competitor, these tests have several shortcomings. As a result, the economic literature currently does not provide a reliable way to gauge whether the potential harm from the use of loyalty …

Life V. Death: Or Why The Death Penalty Should Marginally Deter, Charles N. W. Keckler

George Mason University School of Law Working Papers Series

Econometric measures of the effect of capital punishment have increasingly provided evidence that it deters homicides. However, most researchers on both sides of the death penalty debate continue to rely on rather simple assumptions about criminal behavior. I attempt to provide a more nuanced and predictive rational choice model of the incentives and disincentives to kill, with the aim of assessing to what extent the statistical findings of deterrence are in line with theoretical expectations. In particular, I examine whether it is plausible to suppose there is a marginal increase in deterrence created by increasing the penalty from life imprisonment …

Crops, Guns & Commerce: A Game Theoretical Critique Of Gonzales V. Raich, Maxwell L. Stearns

George Mason University School of Law Working Papers Series

In Gonzales v. Raich, the Supreme Court sustained an application of the Controlled Substances Act (“CSA”), banning all private use of marijuana, as applied to two women who had cultivated or otherwise acquired marijuana for the treatment of severe pain pursuant to the California Compassionate Use Act. Writing for the majority, Justice Stevens placed Raich at the intersection of two landmark Commerce Clause precedents: Wickard v. Filburn, the notorious 1942 decision, which upheld a penalty under the Agriculture Adjustment Act of 1938 applied to a local farmer who violated his wheat quota but who had used the modest excess portion …

Is Forum-Shopping Corrupting America's Bankruptcy Courts? Review Of Lynn M. Lopucki, "Courting Failure: How Competition For Big Cases Is Corrupting The Bankruptcy Courts", Todd J. Zywicki

George Mason University School of Law Working Papers Series

In his new book, Courting Failure: How Competition for Big Cases is Corrupting the Bankruptcy Courts, Professor Lynn LoPucki’s book argues that that current bankruptcy venue rules have spawned an improper “competition for big cases” that has “corrupted” America’s bankruptcy courts. LoPucki argues that this competition has harmed the bankruptcy system and the economy, transferring wealth from creditors and employees to incumbent management and bankruptcy professionals. He also argues that the competition that has corrupted the American bankruptcy system is being replicated internationally, resulting in a similar competition and similar harm on the global stage.

This essay reviews LoPucki’s book …

Neuronomics And Rationality, Terrence Chorvat, Kevin Mccabe

George Mason University School of Law Working Papers Series

The assumption of rationality is both one of the most important and most controversial assumptions of modern economics. This article discusses what current experimental economic as well as neuroscience research tells us about the relationship between rationality and the mechanisms of human decision-making. The article explores the meaning of rationality, with a discussion of the distinction between traditional constructivist rationality and more ecological concepts of rationality. The article argues that ecological notions of rationality more accurately describe both human neural mechanisms as well as a wider variety of human behavior than do constructivist notions of rationality.

The Comparative Law And Economics Of Pure Economic Loss, Francesco Parisi, Vernon Valentine Palmer, Mauro Bussani

George Mason University School of Law Working Papers Series

Law and economics shows that a key factor in determining the optimal economic loss rule is found in the relationship between pure economic loss and social loss. Economic loss should be compensable in torts only to the extent that it corresponds to a socially relevant loss. In this paper we undertake a comparative evaluation of the economic loss rule to verify whether modern legal systems, although not formally adopting the economic criterion, define the exclusionary rule in light of efficiency considerations. The comparative analysis reveals that the substantive applications of the economic loss rule in European jurisdictions are consistent with …

An Economic Analysis Of The Private And Social Costs Of The Provision Of Cybersecurity And Other Public Security Goods, Bruce H. Kobayashi

George Mason University School of Law Working Papers Series

This paper examines the incentives of private actors to invest in cybersecurity. Prior analyses have examined investments in security goods, such as locks or safes that have the characteristics of private goods. The analysis in this paper extends this analysis to examine expenditures on security goods, such as information, that have the characteristics of public goods. In contrast to the private goods case, where individual uncoordinated security expenditures can lead to an overproduction of security, the public goods case can result in the underproduction of security expenditures, and incentives to free ride. Thus, the formation of collective organizations may be …

Modernization Of European Antitrust Enforcement: The Economics Of Regulatory Competition, Ben Depoorter, Francesco Parisi

George Mason University School of Law Working Papers Series

In this article we analyze the expected effects of regulatory overlap in European competition law resulting from Regulation 1/2003. Drawing upon recently developed economic theories of regulatory competition, our model foresees a number of qualitative adjustments resulting from this reform. On one hand, the direct applicability of the exemption provision should increase the overall amount of exemptions. On the other hand, a decentralized system permits private litigants' forum shopping, and parallel enforcement by multiple national competition authorities will drive up the number of infringement findings. Although the precise direction of substantive competition law is unclear, the overall effect is higher …

The Ftc And State Action: Evolving Views On The Proper Role Of Government, John T. Delacourt, Todd Zywicki

George Mason University School of Law Working Papers Series

The state action doctrine was born in an era of exceptional confidence in government, with governmental entities widely regarded as unbiased and conscientious defenders of the public interest. Over time, however, more cautious and skeptical theories of government began to gain sway. In particular, the school of thought known as “public choice” – which holds that governmental entities, like private firms, will act in their economic self-interest – began to influence both legal theory and competition policy. Indeed, a close examination of recent state action case law suggests that public choice thinking has driven a slow, but consistent, evolution of …

A Response To Professor Goldberg: An Anticompetitive Restraint By Any Other Name..., Timothy J. Muris

George Mason University School of Law Working Papers Series

In ignoring the facts of the Three Tenors case and the transactions costs of legal rulemaking, Professor Goldberg would unnecessarily complicate antitrust law to the detriment of consumers. Contrary to his assertions, the FTC’s opinion does not favor ownership over contract. The parties could have chosen to coordinate Three Tenors products and promote a “brand,” but their contract explicitly provided otherwise. For a small class of cases – in which the parties restrain basic forms of competition such as price or advertising without a claim of consumer benefit – antitrust law avoids the costs of finding market power. In any …

Institutions, Incentives, And Consumer Bankruptcy Reform, Todd Zywicki

George Mason University School of Law Working Papers Series

Consumer bankruptcy filing rates have soared during the past 25 years. From 225,000 filings in 1979, consumer bankruptcies topped 1.5 million during 2004. This relentless upward trend is striking in light of the generally high prosperity, low interest rates, and low unemployment during that period. This anomaly of ever-upward bankruptcy filing rates during a period of economic prosperity had spurred calls to reform the Bankruptcy Code to place new conditions on bankruptcy relief. Although bankruptcy reform has drawn broad bipartisan support on Capitol Hill, these proposals have proven controversial within the academy. Critics have argued that these reforms are unnecessary …

Overcoming Poletown: County Of Wayne V. Hathcock, Economic Development Takings, And The Future Of Public Use, Ilya Somin

George Mason University School of Law Working Papers Series

County of Wayne v. Hathcock is an important step forward in public use takings law. The Michigan Supreme Court was right to overturn its notorious 1981 Poletown decision and forbid condemnations that transfer property to private parties solely on the grounds that the new owners will contribute to “economic development.” Poletown was the best known and most widely criticized decision justifying a nearly unlimited condemnation power.

As the Poletown case dramatically demonstrates, the economic development rationale is a virtual blank check for eminent domain abuse for the benefit of private parties. Poletown upheld a condemnation as a result of which …

Soft Regulators, Tough Judges, Gerrit De Geest, Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci

George Mason University School of Law Working Papers Series

Judges have a tendency to be more demanding than regulators. In the United States, a majority of the courts has adopted the rule that the unexcused violation of a statutory standard is negligence per se. However, the converse does not hold: compliance with regulation does not relieve the injurer of tort liability. In most European legal systems, the outcome is similar. We use a framework in which, on the one hand, the effects of tort law are undermined by insolvency and evidence problems and, on the other hand, regulation is expensive in terms of monitoring and information gathering. We show …

Taxing Utility, Terrence Chorvat

George Mason University School of Law Working Papers Series

In order to assess the efficiency of a tax, we should examine its effect on the behavior of individuals. In general, the less a tax affects behavior, the more efficient it is thought to be. The standard example of a non-distorting tax is a lump-sum tax, which does not change with the behavior of the taxpayer. However, this article demonstrates that behavioral distortions can and do arise from a change in even a lump-sum tax. The only truly non-distortionary tax would be one based on utility itself. Utility, which has been used as a norm for distributional analysis, is also …

Disappearing Defendants V. Judgment Proof Injurers: Upgrading The Theory Of Tort Law Failures, Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci, Barbara Mangan

George Mason University School of Law Working Papers Series

Do injurers’ insolvency and victims’ reluctance to sue affect accident prevention in the same way? Are these circumstances less of a problem under the negligence rule than under strict liability? We argue, contrary to the literature, that the answer is, in most cases, negative and make three main points. First, the judgment proof problem and the disappearing defendant problem are shown to have different effects on injurers’ behavior and hence yield dissimilar levels of social welfare. Second, when these two problems occur simultaneously they may have offsetting effects. Third, the negligence rule is superior to strict liability only under some …