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Full-Text Articles in Law
Behavioral Economics And Its Meaning For Antitrust Agency Decision Making, William E. Kovacic, James C. Cooper
Behavioral Economics And Its Meaning For Antitrust Agency Decision Making, William E. Kovacic, James C. Cooper
GW Law Faculty Publications & Other Works
Of all fields of regulation in the United States, antitrust law relies most heavily on economics to inform the design and application of legal rules. When drafting antitrust statutes in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, Congress anticipated that courts and enforcement agencies would formulate and adjust operational standards to account for new learning. The field of economics — especially industrial organization economics — would give broad statutory commands much of their analytical content.
In principle, the flexibility of U.S. antitrust statutes makes competition policy adaptable and accommodates for upgrades over time. This evolutionary process is only effective if …
Behavioral Economics: Implications For Regulatory Behavior, William E. Kovacic, James C. Cooper
Behavioral Economics: Implications For Regulatory Behavior, William E. Kovacic, James C. Cooper
GW Law Faculty Publications & Other Works
Behavioral economics (BE) examines the implications for decision-making when actors suffer from biases documented in the psychological literature. This article considers how such biases affect regulatory decisions. The article posits a simple model of a regulator who serves as an agent to a political overseer. The regulator chooses a policy that accounts for the rewards she receives from the political overseer — whose optimal policy is assumed to maximize short-run outputs that garner political support, rather than long-term welfare outcomes — and the weight the regulator puts on the optimal long run policy. Flawed heuristics and myopia are likely to …