Law Commons^™

Duty In Tort Law: An Economic Approach, Keith N. Hylton

Faculty Scholarship

Theories of tort law have focused on the breach and causation components of negligence, saying little if anything about duty. This paper provides a positive economic theory of duty doctrine. The theory that best explains duty doctrines in tort law is the same as the theory that explains strict liability doctrine. The core function of both sets of doctrines is to regulate the frequency or scale of activities that have substantial external effects. Strict liability aims to suppress or tax activities that carry unusually large external costs. Duty doctrines, especially those relieving actors of a duty of care, serve several …

Biometrics: Solving The Regressivity Of Vats And Rsts With 'Smart Card' Technology, Richard Thompson Ainsworth

Faculty Scholarship

Biometric identifiers embedded in national identity cards puts a formerly impossible goal of consumption taxation within the grasp of policymakers for the first time. Never before has it been possible to design a broad-based, single rate consumption tax that is truly progressive.

No consumption tax has ever had all three of the critical attributes of a progressive consumption tax: a broad base, a single rate, and measured relief for those in greatest need. Although economists have urged that a broad base and a single rate be pursued over progressivity, most consumption taxes instead seek progressivity at the expense of both …

Crime And Punishment In Taxation: Deceit, Deterrence, And The Self-Adjusting Penalty, Alex Raskolnikov

Faculty Scholarship

Avoidance and evasion continue to frustrate the government's efforts to collect much-needed tax revenues. This Article articulates one of the reasons for this lack of success and proposes a new type of penalty that would strengthen tax enforcement while improving efficiency. Economic analysis of deterrence suggests that rational taxpayers choose avoidance and evasion strategies based on expected rather than nominal sanctions. I argue that many taxpayers do just that. Because the probability of detection varies dramatically among different items on a tax return while nominal penalties do not take the likelihood of detection into account, expected penalties for inconspicuous noncompliance …