Law Commons^™

The Ghosts Of Chevron Present And Future, Gary S. Lawson

Faculty Scholarship

In the October 2021 term, the Supreme Court decided six cases involving federal agency interpretations of statutes, at least five of which seemingly implicated the Chevron doctrine and several of which explicitly turned on applications of Chevron in the lower courts. But while the Chevron doctrine has dominated federal administrative law for nearly four decades, not a single majority opinion during the term even cited Chevron. Three of those cases formalized the so-called “major questions” doctrine, which functions essentially as an anti-Chevron doctrine by requiring clear congressional statements of authority to justify agency action on matters of great legal and …

Derailing The Deference Lockstep, Aaron J. Saiger

Faculty Scholarship

Key voices, most prominently that of Justice Neil Gorsuch, have embraced the position that the Chevron doctrine, under which federal courts defer to an agency’s reasonable interpretation of its organizing statutes, is incompatible with the judicial duty to “say what the law is.” These voices include several state supreme courts, which have held (often citing Justice Gorsuch) that state-court deference to state agency interpretations likewise impinges upon the fundamental duty of state judges to decide, on their own, what state law is.

This Article urges states to resist the uncritical importation into state law of antideference arguments based on the …

The Self-Delegation False Alarm: Analyzing Auer Deference’S Effect On Agency Rules, Daniel E. Walters

Faculty Scholarship

Auer deference holds that reviewing courts should defer to agen­cies when the latter interpret their own preexisting regulations. This doc­trine relieves pressure on agencies to undergo costly notice-and-com­ment rulemaking each time interpretation of existing regulations is neces­sary. But according to some leading scholars and jurists, the doc­trine actually encourages agencies to promulgate vague rules in the first instance, augmenting agency power and violating core separation of pow­ers norms in the process. The claim that Auer perversely encourages agencies to “self-delegate”—that is, to create vague rules that can later be informally interpreted by agencies with latitude due to judicial defer­ence—has helped …

The Field Of Invention, Saurabh Vishnubhakat

Faculty Scholarship

Federal courts can ill afford to ignore, assume, or improvise a pervasively important administrative power that the Patent Office exercises regularly and effectively: technology classification. This agency-court asymmetry has persisted for decades but has now become unmanageably problematic for two related reasons. First, Supreme Court guidance, patent reform legislation, and academic commentary have all broadly rejected long-standing patent exceptionalism in administrative law, while making the Patent Office a major substitute for federal courts in resolving patent disputes. Still, patent doctrine has been slow to correct, particularly in judicial deference to agency action. Second, criticisms of the patent system are highly …

The Challenges Of Fitting Principled Modern Government – A Unified Public Law – To An Eighteenth Century Constitution, Peter L. Strauss

Faculty Scholarship

The papers presented at a fall 2016 conference at Cambridge University, The Unity of Public Law?, generally addressed issues of judicial review in the UK, Canada, Australia and New Zealand, often from a comparative perspective and the view that unifying impulses in “public law” arose from the common law. Accepting what Justice Harlan Fisk Stone once characterized as the ideal of “a unified system of judge-made and statute law woven into a seamless whole by [judges],” The Common Law in the United States, 50 Harvard L Rev 4 (1936), this paper considers a variety of issues that have complicated maintaining …

Reflections On Seminole Rock: The Past, Present, And Future Of Deference To Agency Regulatory Interpretations, Gillian E. Metzger, Aaron Nielson, Sanne H. Knudsen, Amy J. Wildermuth, Aditya Bamzai, Richard J. Pierce, Cynthia Barmore, William Yeatman, Christopher J. Walker, Kevin M. Stack, Andy Grewal, Steve R. Johnson, F. Andrew Hessick, Jonathan H. Adler, Catherine M. Sharkey, David Feder, Cass R. Sunstein, Adrian Vermeule, Ronald M. Levin, Kevin O. Leske, James Cleith Phillips, Daniel Ortner, William Funk, Kristen E. Hickman, Jeffrey A. Pojanowski, Adam White, Conor Clarke

Faculty Scholarship

Seminole Rock (or Auer) deference has captured the attention of scholars, policymakers, and the judiciary. That is why Notice & Comment, the blog of the Yale Journal on Regulation and the American Bar Association’s Section of Administrative Law & Regulatory Practice, hosted an online symposium from September 12 to September 23, 2016 on the subject. This symposium contains over 20 contributions addressing different aspects of Seminole Rock deference.

Topics include:

• History of Seminole Rock
• Empirical Examinations of Seminole Rock
• Understanding Seminole Rock Within Agencies
• Understanding Seminole Rock as Applied to Tax, Environmental Law, and Criminal Sentencing
• Why Seminole Rock Matters …

Failing Expectations: Fourth Amendment Doctrine In The Era Of Total Surveillance, Olivier Sylvain

Faculty Scholarship

Today’s reasonable expectation test and the third-party doctrine have little to nothing to offer by way of privacy protection if users today are at least conflicted about whether transactional noncontent data should be shared with third parties, including law enforcement officials. This uncertainty about how to define public expectation as a descriptive matter has compelled courts to defer to legislatures to find out what public expectation ought to be more as a matter of prudence than doctrine. Courts and others presume that legislatures are far better than courts at defining public expectations about emergent technologies.This Essay argues that the reasonable …

"Deference" Is Too Confusing – Let's Call Them "Chevron Space" And "Skidmore Weight", Peter L. Strauss

Faculty Scholarship

This Essay suggests an underappreciated, appropriate, and conceptually coherent structure to the Chevron relationship of courts to agencies, grounded in the concept of "allocation." Because the term "deference" muddles rather than clarifies the structure's operation, this Essay avoids speaking of "Chevron deference" and "Skidmore deference." Rather, it argues, one could more profitably think in terms of "Chevron space" and "Skidmore weight." "Chevron space" denotes the area within which an administrative agency has been statutorily empowered to act in a manner that creates legal obligations or constraints – that is, its allocated authority. "Skidmore weight" …

State Constitutionalism: State-Court Deference Or Dissonance?, Arthur Leavens

Faculty Scholarship

This Article focuses on the debate concerning state constitutional expansion of criminal-procedure protections. It examines two such rights: (1) the protection against unreasonable searches and seizures; and (2) the right to the assistance of counsel in defending a criminal case. Each of these rights is embodied in both the federal and most, if not all, state constitutions. Each right is thus doubly applicable to the states, first, through the federal version by virtue of its incorporation into the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process protection and, second, through the state constitution’s version of the cognate right. So focused, the question is, what …

A New Board Policy On Deferral To Arbitration: Acknowledging And Delimiting Union Waiver Of Employee Statutory Rights, Michael C. Harper

Faculty Scholarship

This article considers the extent to which the National Labor Relations Board should defer in its protection of statutory rights to the private arbitration process under collective bargaining. The article explains and criticizes the theory of implied union waiver advanced by the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals under the leadership of Judge Harry Edwards. It posits a reformulation of Board deferral doctrine for waivable substantive rights. The article also consider the relevance of the Supreme Court’s 2009 decision in 14 Penn Plaza, LLC v. Pyett to Board deferral to arbitration in cases involving § 7 rights that are …

"Streamlining" The Rule Of Law: How The Department Of Justice Is Undermining Judicial Review Of Agency Action, Shruti Rana

Faculty Scholarship

Judicial review of administrative decision making is an essential institutional check on agency power. Recently, however, the Department of Justice dramatically revised its regulations in an attempt to insulate its decision making from public and federal court scrutiny. These “streamlining” rules, carried out in the name of national security and immigration reform, have led to a breakdown in the rule of law in our judicial system. While much attention has been focused on the Department of Justice’s recent attempts to shield executive power from the reach of Congress, its efforts to undermine judicial review have so far escaped such scrutiny. …

Judicial Deference To Administrative Agencies And Its Limits, Graham G. Martin, David A. Super

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Everything I Need To Know About Presidents I Learned From Dr. Seuss, Gary S. Lawson

Faculty Scholarship

Oaths are out of fashion these days. This is an era in which it is widely considered unreasonable to expect the President of the United States to obey basic principles of law and justice, much less to honor something as abstract as an oath. Perjury the violation of a legally binding oath-is publicly defended as proof of the offender's humanity rather than his criminality. And one should not even mention in polite company something as gauche as honoring an oath of marriage. Those pesky vows of marital fidelity were, after all, just words.

Reconceptualizing Federal Habeas Corpus For State Prisoners: How Should Aedpa's Standard Of Review Operate After Williams V. Taylor?, Adam N. Steinman

Faculty Scholarship

This Article aims to expand the debate over the proper standard of review that applies in state prisoner habeas corpus actions in federal court. To date, this debate has centered on whether federal habeas courts should defer to the state court's resolution of federal legal questions, or whether federal habeas courts should assess and apply federal law de novo. However, in Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000), the Supreme Court held that the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) imposes a deferential standard of review that precludes a federal habeas court from granting relief based simply on its …

Judicial Deference To The Pto's Interpretations Of The Patent Law, R. Carl Moy

Faculty Scholarship

This article attempts to provide a basis upon which to preserve the Federal Circuit's current lawmaking primacy. Given the large body of preexisting literature on Chevron, USA, Inc v. Natural Resources Defense Council, it does not address whether Chevron allocates power between agencies and the courts optimally. Rather, the article examines how the PTO's statutory interpretations should be reviewed under Chevron. In Section I, the article places the examination in context by describing the Chevron decision and its general implications. Section II of the article examines how Chevron should be applied specifically in the context of reviewing statutory interpretations of …